Turkey's Kurds Declare Democratic Autonomy

[Masada]

What nasty stuff? Oh, yes, they carried out a coup and tried to take power by force

Mmm you might to ask UDT what kind of stuff FRETLIN got up to - it helps to explain why UDT sided with Indonesia and why the whole struggle for East Timor spent decades dead-in-the-water. (And the UDT was not Apodeti). It was only in the late-80s, early 90s that 'the struggle' (the peaceful political one, and not the waste-of-time armed one) gained traction, and that mostly stems from a resolution of existing FRETLIN - UDT tensions (a promise not to be repeat 1975 being the key), the rise of a younger generation, mostly Indonesian educated, who couldn't get jobs and didn't have 1975 hanging over their heads and the 1991 Dili Massacre/Santa Cruz Massacre. And even then support was hardly universal, the struggle essentially ineffective, and the parties distrustful of each other. Hilariously, FRETLIN jumped the gun again and the UDT nearly baulked, visions of 1975 and all that nonesense.

FRETLIN, despite the coup (and why it happened, that's a very interesting question, the outside parties wishing it were so many) didn't even had the strength to enforce the typical supposedly left-wing third-world dictatorship of the 1970s on the country

How the hell do you know that? It was doing a good job of destroying UDT even during the invasion. (Yes, FRETLIN was executing people during the invasion. This can be explained in one of two ways: (1) people thought the invasion was not intended as an occupation but an intervention, not an unreasonable assumption to make and (2) that even if it was intended as an occupation, then it couldn't possibly last all that long).

No, the real cause of the invasion was american fear that either China or the USSR would eventually support it later and build some base there.

Utter nonesense. Go read any modern academic treatment of the issue. By all accounts, Indonesia was prepared to go with or without American support; granted, American did nothing and agreed beforehand to do so, but Indonesian planning up to that point had been based on an invasion with America's position viz. a viz. Timor usually assumed to be hostile. And just for the record, Suharto was not convinced of the need for the invasion until the last moment. It seems Ali Murtopo in typical fashion played up the danger - playing on Suharto's 1965 syndrome - and may have had a significant hand in actually escalating events, drumming up a war all the while. It's hard to gauge what Suharto thought, save to say that we know he refused to have anything to do with the invasion once he signed the order. He recieved - I believe, I don't have my books - two reports, the second declaring victory, and then refused to see anything else. And again, this is going from memory, he took little interest in the place until '85 or thereabouts when he pushed for reforms, which were undermined by the TNI soon after.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

I think addressing to the need of establishing a Palestinian State, and having Israel to end its hostility and a military occupation in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is primary concern for the stability of that geopolitical region. Then we can carry that over to the problem of finding a solution in creating a much needed Kurdistan State stretching from certain part of Turkey all the way through northern Iraq and a small chunk of western Iran.

 

[NovaKart]

That would require the cooperation of 3 countries or 4 if you count Syria since a lot of Kurds are there too. I think it's more realistic if the issues are treated separately and since it's an internal issue for those countries I don't think they would go for international interferance.

 

[Thoughtful Thug]

That would require the cooperation of 3 countries or 4 if you count Syria since a lot of Kurds are there too. I think it's more realistic if the issues are treated separately and since it's an internal issue for those countries I don't think they would go for international interferance.

I agree with the exception of Israel though.

 

[r16]

have never been a fast typist and too much incoherence makes it a complete waste of time . So the proper answers involve careful writing and many checks at home ; although can not guarantee it will make much difference .

the young American defines something ugly American can not . As that would be a gross misrepresentation . Young Americans are people who are bound to say "Whoaaa" , on a probability scale slightly more than 50% , when whacked on the head with an inch thick history volume by senior Americans and go look for new ways of serving their country . The other kind rarely serve , unless circumstances conspire to do so .

not that it makes much difference , just the opening paragraph alludes to . It won't be some single American civvie to accuse of us being partial to Palestinians and more , far more, when the time comes . Let me stress that this is not personal , or nothing to disprove anything or whatever , ı am what ı am . That's all . So the charge ( if it can be termed as such and ı am positive that the entire forum would agree that my definition is waaaaaay overblown since there is no allusion in the relevant post whatsoever ) is we support Palestinians , specifically the bunch the West defines as terrorists as a tit for tat for American support of our seperatists to convert them into a leverage against Iran and the unfortunate-unintented fallout causes troubles in Turkey . Let me turn this around with some historical / fictional garbage that is not required but as ı said ı am r16 , this is what ı do . Much to the amusement of locals , they now think ı take myself as the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces .

the people of the Middle East see the Turks as an accident , an aberration in history . Can not blame them , there is not that much in real history to say otherwise . As such when it became clear who would win the WW2 , Ankara sweated coldly with a nightmare of being on the losing side , again , and all the doors were opened to Americans . ( Russians were Russians , and now Commies , too . )Turkish foreign policy even before joining NATO never strayed from American wishes . There is a reason why Palestinians like Greeks far more than Turks , neither the Algerians have entirely whitewashed the fact that Ankara voted against their independence and for France . Returning to Palestine , there are people alive who remember the paper / speech that said their terrorism [against the Israeli civilians as contrasted to fighting for existence] would not take Palestinian cause anywhere , apart from being an instrument for hire to be regularly used by the Arab goverments and the Ruskies , plus there was no way they could resist Israeli expansion once they took control of Jordan as per their instructions from the "Leftists" ; hence their function as a siegeram for Israel was not to be . ( And regarding the quoted "treason of the Hashimites" , well everybody betrays the Turks regularly .) Nobody in Palestine for one moment believes , well ...

nobody should take this personally , as it was before even ı was born .

yet it does not stop the Americans hinting that it would be real cool for Turkey to infiltrate the Islamic resistance to Western values . We are the hand the West extends , we are the finest example that we can pray 5 times a day to our "invented-out-of-Christian-God" Allah and work to buy the latest in the products of the commercial world . Only because the run of the mill Palestinian is a former leftist and kinda tamed , our newly found Islamicism was applied only to Hamas in the context of Palestine . And it was obvious to anybody that ever thought on it , albeit within a certain set of conditions . Before the Arab awakening our elites were dreaming of the new influence zone we would establish in the lands of the "Stupid Arab and the even worse Farsi " with the kind of expection males get when thinking of females in a reproductory context . Though since Iran had already tons of deals against us , Iraq is the base where America protects anybody against us and Syria was just foxing us ... that leaves only Palestine as a whole where we can appear to have succeeded .

and it is not making any headway anyway . Even the Mavi Marmara proves it . Everybody attacked the Israelis with iron bars , only the Turks died . Where are the 5 others , those non-Turks as reported dead by the likes of al-Jazeera ? Mebbe 'cause every Israeli trooper would at least have a smattering of Arabic and they had those pamphlets with names and pics of people to avoid hurting , not for arresting ? There are times when interests collude not collide . On "our" side , the overriding desire might well have been a bloodbath as there is this tiny anti-Semitism in the new elites who suspect the previous elites were closet Jews . A war in the Med , even if limited to the ship alone would have been nice propaganda in victory , in stasis or even in defeat . Winning always helps and against the miiiighty Israel , a draw is more than enough . It is so positively reported here that people will accept this country of mine can not correct mechanical damage caused by Israelis a year ago and that is why this year's Gazze fleet had to wait out the Turkish elections and still sailed without Mavi Marmara . It must be lack of iron bars or maybe balls , who knows , that that French ship was captured without bloodshed . But then there was no need , wasn't it ?

defeat starts the blame game . 'Cause let me see , the Turkish military did not help . Which proves they are closet Jews . Had there been a shooting war on the ship , Israeli Jews would never forgive the closet Jews and the new elite would have considered this the ultimate victory as they could have the country forever . Though as everybody is bound to suspect , the TSK would have been gangraped ( America the mighty , ya know ) and that would also work for the new elites as then they would have their scapegoats and it wouldn't even need a media bombardment in the way they tirelessly conduct , for years now .

quite an imagination ı must have jumping from this to totally unrelated that . ı could indeed make something on why the West liked Saladin so much in the day and the relationship is kept alive in the likes of Arn the Knight Templar even with the scripted reminder that for every Arn there were two Breiviks . And the Norwegians have revised down "their" casualties , as it seems from the distant Turkey . Dexterization matters not in certain cases . It hurts them , still hurts them but there is one thing the racists of all colours forget in this particular case . That the blood of their ancestors still flow in their genes , thanks to laws of genetics . Scratch them and they are still Vikings . Just don't scratch too much , we don't want them sailing around in longships again. Talking of baseless imagination ı was , and imagine how bad it would have been for the world if the Norwegian Prime Minister was to face an Al Queda team on Saturday , with Breivik as their getaway driver .

hah , talkin of conspiracies , how about one on how Washington supports anti-Semitism in Turkey ? Knowing we are toothless useless monsters , sorry kitten hiding behind the cupboards and under the tables , only making catalogues of those good measures taken against us . As if seperatists , Armenian "territorial ambitions" , "our Islamic Brothers" busy with conversion of the heathen in the shape of Turks , our so called Nationalists who will prove our barbaric tendencies if given a single nod , our occupation of Europe through the gastarbeiter and their reaction , even history in itself is not enough . Only thing that matters is the public opinion and only the one in America . So when our turn comes , we will be shown to be traitors even to the Jewish Lobby , who is supposed to be the only freind Turkey has ever had . It doesn't mean anything to our new elites . They think America likes them , because America put them in charge , over the lackeys they had for a half-century , hence indeed America loves them . Which is a bigger delusion , theirs or mine that we field two squadrons of Incom 65s , we are about to see .

ı will get to sign their orders for the first two missions , just a record for posterity .

 

[innonimatu]

Mmm you might to ask UDT what kind of stuff FRETLIN got up to - it helps to explain why UDT sided with Indonesia and why the whole struggle for East Timor spent decades dead-in-the-water. (And the UDT was not Apodeti). It was only in the late-80s, early 90s that 'the struggle' (the peaceful political one, and not the waste-of-time armed one) gained traction, and that mostly stems from a resolution of existing FRETLIN - UDT tensions (a promise not to be repeat 1975 being the key), the rise of a younger generation, mostly Indonesian educated, who couldn't get jobs and didn't have 1975 hanging over their heads and the 1991 Dili Massacre/Santa Cruz Massacre. And even then support was hardly universal, the struggle essentially ineffective, and the parties distrustful of each other. Hilariously, FRETLIN jumped the gun again and the UDT nearly baulked, visions of 1975 and all that nonesense.

I know very well the history of East Timor up to the indonesian invasion, thank you. At least from the portuguese perspective, I even had opportunity to discus it with some people involved with it and I do believe that I have better sources that you on what happened in the territory up to the invasion. UDT and FRETILIN were so recent and so weak locally by mid-1975 (they were less than one year old and didn't really had any set ideology) that they could not have done much to rule a new independent country. If they came to war it would be quickly over, the territory and the urban base they used being so small! As it was (and when it happened, frankly the party which behaved worse was the portuguese governor who retreated to Ataúro instead of putting up a fight and denying political cover for the indonesian invasion plot known to be taking place).
APODETI was the third party born in 1974, the indonesian tool, which was fine with Portugal so long as it could show that it had major support - releasing East Timor as an independent state or to Indonesia, it didn't matter so long as that was what the timorese wanted. The problem was, they didn't want to become part of Indonesia. UDT and FRETILIN joined to demand the exclusion of APODETI from the negotiations in Macau.

So, with APODETI marginalized, the indonesians set about drivings wedge between the UDT-FRETILIN alliance made in January 1975 and seducing UDT. And managed to do it, in May, 27 the alliance was broken. In June 25 a new local local statute to prepare the independence was approved by the portuguese government, but FRETILIN boycotted the meeting. It had started to become more markedly leftist. It was also finding some sympathy within several locally recruited military units. This in turn made UDT paranoid and led it to accept weapons from the indonesians and prepare a coup of its own before - they feared - FRETILIN manged to do one. In August 10 UDT launched that coup and seized control of Dili. The governor fled to Ataúro with a few soldiers, and those leaders of FRETILIN who escaped moved to the east where the local military units, after final the breakdown of command with the withdrawal of the governor, took their side. A brief war ensured, with UDT defeated and withdrawing from Dili towards Indonesia in about two weeks.

The portuguese neglect of the territory and absolute lack of authority which developed there in 1975 allowed UDT to lauch its little coup, with indonesian weapons and the collaboration of a few policemen of the colonial administration, and allowed also the other party which fought back to present themselves and be presented to the world as a dangerous pro-communist party (FRETILIN) about to take power in a new state when they moved against and defeated UDT's coup. They weren't. FRETILIN just didn't had the people to go over the traditional local authorities and effectively rule the country as some communist dictatorship. It didn't even want to. It wasn't even a proper communist party: it had started out as the "social-democratic timorese assotiation" and until the coup the war its membership and ideas were in flux.

How the hell do you know that? It was doing a good job of destroying UDT even during the invasion. (Yes, FRETLIN was executing people during the invasion. This can be explained in one of two ways: (1) people thought the invasion was not intended as an occupation but an intervention, not an unreasonable assumption to make and (2) that even if it was intended as an occupation, then it couldn't possibly last all that long).

Yes, it was killing people, a few of those were portuguese prisioners caught after their participation in the failed UDT coup. As I said, I know that portion of the story very well. In civil wars people get killed. Duh!

Anyway, as I said, the real shame was on the portuguese government for not sending some more disciplined troops there as Indonesia's intention became obvious over the Spring of 1975. But it was a difficult time, the portuguese government had very few disciplined soldiers to spare, and many places where they were needed. Ultimately Angola was far more important that East Timor.
And Lemos Pires too. His intentions were good, but he made a very bad judgement in withdrawing to Ataúro. He should have remained in Dili and commanded the local troops to fight the UDP coup. That would have severely dented the excuse which the indonesians planned to use for the invasion: they'd be attacking Portugal, not a new leftist regime in a newly proclaimed country (which, incidentally, was the last of FRETILIN's serious mistakes, proclaiming independence). I'm not sure it would stop the plans outright, but it might delay them enough that that swine Kissinger would cease to be a factor in US's backing of the invasion and Indonesia would have had the rug pulled under from it.
But the governor didn't want to take sides and as a result lost control of the situation. He should have known that by withdrawing he'd let the local troops fall in with FRETILIN and with that finally allow it not only to fight back UDT but also to seem like a real "threat" and thus justify the intended indonesian invasion.

Utter nonesense. Go read any modern academic treatment of the issue. By all accounts, Indonesia was prepared to go with or without American support; granted, American did nothing and agreed beforehand to do so, but Indonesian planning up to that point had been based on an invasion with America's position viz. a viz. Timor usually assumed to be hostile. And just for the record, Suharto was not convinced of the need for the invasion until the last moment. It seems Ali Murtopo in typical fashion played up the danger - playing on Suharto's 1965 syndrome - and may have had a significant hand in actually escalating events, drumming up a war all the while. It's hard to gauge what Suharto thought, save to say that we know he refused to have anything to do with the invasion once he signed the order. He recieved - I believe, I don't have my books - two reports, the second declaring victory, and then refused to see anything else. And again, this is going from memory, he took little interest in the place until '85 or thereabouts when he pushed for reforms, which were undermined by the TNI soon after.

I do believe that Suharto wasn't planning for an invasion until late 1974. You will know more than me about internal indonesian politics, but it seems clear to me that once Portugal informed the Indonesian government of its intention to dispose of East Timor, serious plans for annexation began to be advanced in Indonesia, and I just don't believe that could have been done without his agreement. APODETI wasn't formed accidentally. Suharto's visit to the US in June wasn't accidental. And Kissinger pretty much admitted to his (and the US's) role in supporting and even encouraging the invasion.

 

[GoodGame]

24 dollars is supposed to do what exactly when you come across Manhattan? I mean, if that's for tolls, it'll get you across, but it won't get you back.

A full gas tank in my Honda Civic!


Anyway, if these minor declarations lead to human rights reform without significant violence, is it something to really be upset about? I seriously doubt that the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey will be spontaneously re-united into their own state, so I'd assume this is all about getting equal treatment, if not citizenship. Else I guess they could try evading border patrol...in the USA, and be treated better.

 

[r16]

kurds think USA will give them a state , an empire , a whatever one can dream off , in return for fighting their enemies and this being Middle East , the place where backstabbing was invented , unless Europeans can offer a better example , they are merely pocketing anything that comes their way . They would rather watch no fly zone devastate the newest enemy of US rather than doing the dirty biz , but that is getting ahead of the game for today . Our turn has not come yet .

 

[NovaKart]

Anyway, if these minor declarations lead to human rights reform without significant violence, is it something to really be upset about? I seriously doubt that the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey will be spontaneously re-united into their own state, so I'd assume this is all about getting equal treatment, if not citizenship. Else I guess they could try evading border patrol...in the USA, and be treated better.

The human rights situation has improved in the last few years with more cultural freedoms such as allowing Kurds to celebrate Kurdish holidays and legalizing the language but many Kurdish people live in poverty and don't have education so I imagine that's still one gripe.

It's only very recently that the human rights situation did improve so there's still some resentment over actions by the military in the 90s and the cultural restrictions in the early 00s and maybe some of that's still going on. I've heard in jail inmates are not allowed to speak Kurdish for example.

Last year I heard about a journalist who was sentenced to prison for not referring to fallen Turkish soldiers as şehit (martyrs). I couldn't find a source for this so I don't know if it's true or if some of the facts are mixed up.

 

[Masada]

I know very well the history of East Timor up to the indonesian invasion, thank you. At least from the portuguese perspective, I even had opportunity to discus it with some people involved with it and I do believe that I have better sources that you on what happened in the territory up to the invasion.

Right, because you've demonstrated that by responding to something I never said; namely, that I thought the destruction of FRETLIN the lesser evil. I certainly think the destruction of FRETLIN a Good Thing, mostly because killing people is a Bad Thing, however you spin it. But that isn't to say that I think, or have ever thought, that the Indonesian invasion was a Good Thing. And moreover, you should know this, I've said as much in past threads - ones, if memory serves me right - you've been a party too. Also, when responding in a manner which accords with a great deal of knowledge, don't give me the potted version. I think it fair to assume that in most matters SEAsian, I'm familiar with the particulars.

UDT and FRETILIN were so recent and so weak locally by mid-1975 (they were less than one year old and didn't really had any set ideology) that they could not have done much to rule a new independent country.

Yes, I'm aware of that - but I fail to see how a lack of formal -lolmarxism/capitalism - ideology had much to do with anything. The most salient issue was independence: the when's, the where’s and the how's. On that issue the UDT and FRETLIN divide was obvious and gaping. And a cursory understanding of SEA history would tell you that single issues - especially in the pre-independence phase - are sufficient to hang people over (har har).

If they came to war it would be quickly over, the territory and the urban base they used being so small!

That's not the point. There was no war (and I know that) more a series of interconnected massacres involving conflicting elites, drawing on small ideologically motivated bases to do the dirty work. But all that doesn't excuse what went on: there were massacres, killings and general nastiness (that word again!), which you denied. And that did bitterly sour relations between the UDT and FRETLIN.

As it was (and when it happened, frankly the party which behaved worse was the portuguese governor who retreated to Ataúro instead of putting up a fight and denying political cover for the indonesian invasion plot known to be taking place).

There was no 'Indonesian' invasion plot. There was a group of doods inside the Indonesian government clustered around Ali Murtopo whose job - on paper, at least - was to try and induce Timor to join peacefully. Murtopo knew that was a still-birth and decided to orchestrate a crisis with the express purpose of bringing about an invasion and occupation of Timor. (And frankly that's even giving Murtopo more credit than he deserves, because it isn't clear if that's what he was really trying to do. Murtopo is notable for causing one crisis, only to use it as an excuse to sort out another; that was how he rolled, and it served Suharto really well, putting the apparent targets on watch while decimating the real targets flat-footed.

The other principal player in the thing is Benny Murdani (actual name: Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani) whose role is even more confusing, because he was given the job of collecting intelligence but never seems to have collected much. He seems to have preferred to collect a careful concoction of lies and propaganda. (And even then, it isn’t quite clear what Murdani was angling for although it might be personal gains, not necessarily as a result of the invasion. From his perspective: a Communist (FRETLIN) take-over despite his (mostly bull) warnings would have made him look better viz. a viz. his competition).

When der tag became 'inevitable' it was Murtopo and Murdani who blazed the trail keeping in the dark most of the rest of the military. This was all done in the guise of operational secrecy but was more than likely a means of keeping knowledge of the extent of the plotting secret from Suharto (we think). Because it helps to explain why Murtopo and Murdani both intelligence officers, with no staff experience, were 'allowed' to plan an invasion in the first place and were moreover not punished when it went ass up.

All this was set against Suharto's own ambivalence to the whole scheme. Even the '65 fever seems to have trouble being baited. In some cases he seems to be have been downright hostile to the whole notion going so far as to do nothing on the day of the invasion. He was also supposed to have said something to the effect of, in an emotional voice, itself unheard off: This is what I shall be remembered for. This is so far out of character for Suharto that a fair few sources have rejected it out of hand even with the strong evidence we have for him having said it. All-in-all it took some serious pushing over about the life of the crisis before he could get prodded towards action and even then he dragged his feet the whole way.

Part of the reason he did so was because Adam Malik and literally the whole of the loltechnocrats and civilian administration vehemently opposed intervention. They thought - quite correctly - that they could restrain Suharto, which they did, what they hadn't counted on was elements of the military going it alone, presenting Suharto what amounted to a fait accompli for invasion and convincing him to sign it without the chance to argue him down. This was despite Malik's rather inopportune assurance to José Ramos-Horta that there would be no invasion - really intervention because nobody thought of an occupation as a likely outcome - which was itself endorsed by Suharto.

In sum, there was no Indonesian plot, there was a plot of Indonesians composed chiefly of two senior intelligence officers, who did it for reasons that aren't wholly clear. Moreover, what the hell was the governor going to do? The UDI would have gone ahead even if he had intervened against it, hell that would be one of the few things that would have possibly made it go faster. Even if we assume that it all went ahead at the same time - or some latter period - then what's the governor going to do to stop the invasion? Wave a flag? Dude might have taken the easy approach - sit back and wait - but that was also the sensible approach to be honest. The most likely result was right up until the UDI a UDT victory and a staged withdrawal of Portuguese power. And frankly, while he did have knowledge of an Indonesian hand in events there's no reason to suppose that he knew anything more than Malik the freaking Foreign Minister of Indonesia did.

APODETI was the third party born in 1974, the indonesian tool, which was fine with Portugal so long as it could show that it had major support - releasing East Timor as an independent state or to Indonesia, it didn't matter so long as that was what the timorese wanted.

APODETI didn't matter. It had some support in the border, and amongst a small swathe of the elite and the Muslim population. But even with Indonesian support it didn't amount to much. I dismissed it accordingly, and didn't bother to even mention it. For the record, it was also subject to FRETLIN attacks.

UDT and FRETILIN joined to demand the exclusion of APODETI from the negotiations in Macau.

Hur, hur. That was fine, they could that, but the sad face fact is that they couldn't and that it was still the prick relative of Indonesian policy.

So, with APODETI marginalized, the indonesians set about drivings wedge between the UDT-FRETILIN alliance made in January 1975 and seducing UDT. And managed to do it, in May, 27 the alliance was broken.

Does not follow. The exclusion of APODETI was a Bad Thing for Indonesian policy. It meant the complete death of the lolpeaceful integration option - granted it was a dumb idea to begin with but it was peaceful. The real intent of the UDT-FRETLIN wedge was intended to distance UDT from FRETLIN with the express intent of excluding FRETLIN from power. It was mostly successful in doing so.

In June 25 a new local local statute to prepare the independence was approved by the portuguese government, but FRETILIN boycotted the meeting. It had started to become more markedly leftist. It was also finding some sympathy within several locally recruited military units.

Which was the case here. FRETLIN boycotted, lost its say (woo said Indonesian policy makers) and in doing so excluded itself from the more moderate path leaving it with the UDI as the only real trump card left in the deck (booo said Indonesian policy makers). As to the militant leftist isn't that in contradiction to what you said earlier, or is that a recognition of what I said: that independence was the important thing and not Orthodachs Marxism. And I'm aware of the growth of it's relative military power viz. a viz. the UDT - that helps to explain what happened next.

This in turn made UDT paranoid and led it to accept weapons from the indonesians and prepare a coup of its own before - they feared - FRETILIN manged to do one.

Which is this. And there's every indication that FRETLIN was planning one of its own.

The portuguese neglect of the territory and absolute lack of authority which developed there in 1975 allowed UDT to lauch its little coup, with indonesian weapons and the collaboration of a few policemen of the colonial administration, and allowed also the other party which fought back to present themselves and be presented to the world as a dangerous pro-communist party (FRETILIN) about to take power in a new state when they moved against and defeated UDT's coup. They weren't.

I'm really only interested in the pro-communist part; the rest I agree with except for the Portuguese neglect angle. But w/e. The simple fact was that FRETLIN was fingered with the Chinese and had been moving further to the left. Whether or not it was Communist in actual fact was immaterial. What is telling is that Indonesian policy makers could pass them off as Communist which was a reflection of FRETLIN as it was: not quite Communist and certainly not Capitalist. (lame division I know, but whatever this is the Cold War).

FRETILIN just didn't had the people to go over the traditional local authorities and effectively rule the country as some communist dictatorship. It didn't even want to. It wasn't even a proper communist party: it had started out as the "social-democratic timorese assotiation" and until the coup the war its membership and ideas were in flux.

Something about flux and didn't even want to don't add up. But the sad fact is that most of the people involved were looking long-term rather than short-term. You have to calibrate your responses to a newly independent or soon-to-be independent country with that in mind. UDT did it, so did FRETLIN (kind off) and the US (not mentioned yet) and Indonesian certainly were.

Yes, it was killing people, a few of those were portuguese prisioners caught after their participation in the failed UDT coup. As I said, I know that portion of the story very well. In civil wars people get killed. Duh!

I don't admit to caring much about Portuguese? Shoot me. But I don't see how the rather lame claim that: people die in civil wars makes it somehow alright or morally acceptable for them to do so. Frankly, people seldom just drop murdered...

Anyway, as I said, the real shame was on the portuguese government for not sending some more disciplined troops there as Indonesia's intention became obvious over the Spring of 1975. But it was a difficult time, the portuguese government had very few disciplined soldiers to spare, and many places where they were needed. Ultimately Angola was far more important that East Timor.

There was no obvious 1975 intention.

(which, incidentally, was the last of FRETILIN's serious mistakes, proclaiming independence).

That was the mistake - sitting out Macau was understandable, kind of petulant but there was rhyme to the reason. Fighting UDT was again, understandable. Winning was a good thing in the short run, and a disaster in the long run. But it was still not impossible to come to a concord, with the parts of the UDT that hadn't been involved in or had been at best lukewarm to the coup. The UDI bought that to an end in three ways (1) it demonstrated FRETLINS intention to rule unilaterally, (2) made it almost impossible for FRETLIN to reconcile with UDT or the Portuguese Government and (3) provoked more moderate opinion in Indonesia (fit that into the narrative I presented above) that an invasion was necessary and desirable. (3) Was also despite warnings from parties inside Indonesia sympathetic to peace to do anything else but to stop short of doing that. In doing so, it also stripped itself of Portuguese support and opened itself to invasion.

But the governor didn't want to take sides and as a result lost control of the situation. He should have known that by withdrawing he'd let the local troops fall in with FRETILIN and with that finally allow it not only to fight back UDT but also to seem like a real "threat" and thus justify the intended indonesian invasion.

I'm going to go with: he did and knew that ordering them to deal with UDT was the same damn thing.

I do believe that Suharto wasn't planning for an invasion until late 1974. You will know more than me about internal indonesian politics, but it seems clear to me that once Portugal informed the Indonesian government of its intention to dispose of East Timor, serious plans for annexation began to be advanced in Indonesia, and I just don't believe that could have been done without his agreement. APODETI wasn't formed accidentally. Suharto's visit to the US in June wasn't accidental. And Kissinger pretty much admitted to his (and the US's) role in supporting and even encouraging the invasion.

4srs plans are quite separate from 4srs policy. Suharto was always pushing the peaceful option even when it was quite obviously not working. He seems to have thought until the last moment that a war over Timor simply wasn't worth it. It was only after the counter-coup and UDI that he thought the need to look at teh master pran. Also, his visit to America was intended to do a couple of things (1) suss out where America stood (ambivalent), (2) test the American waters with Indonesian policy (mostly ambivalent; but opposed to war) and (3) figure out how that all synched with his chosen policy (lol peaceful integration). It told him nothing he didn't already know: America ambivalent; war bad and peaceful integration good. Whatever the case, the US's rather tepid support for lolwar, when it was broadcast (really late in the game), was at best a secondary consideration for more immediate Indonesian planning. American couldn't have intervened even had it wanted to militarily, and it was unlikely, or thought to be, to reduce civilian aid. Military aid on the other hand was expected to fall and that was part of the calculations and had been the whole time.

 

[GoodGame]

kurds think USA will give them a state , an empire , a whatever one can dream off , in return for fighting their enemies and this being Middle East , the place where backstabbing was invented , unless Europeans can offer a better example , they are merely pocketing anything that comes their way . They would rather watch no fly zone devastate the newest enemy of US rather than doing the dirty biz , but that is getting ahead of the game for today . Our turn has not come yet .

The reality is the US has little strategic interest in irritating allies in Iraq and Turkey by sponsoring a new nation to form. But obviously the US would have some interest in mediating human rights disputes among friends in those areas.

 

[innonimatu]

Right, because you've demonstrated that by responding to something I never said; namely, that I thought the destruction of FRETLIN the lesser evil. I certainly think the destruction of FRETLIN a Good Thing, mostly because killing people is a Bad Thing, however you spin it. But that isn't to say that I think, or have ever thought, that the Indonesian invasion was a Good Thing. And moreover, you should know this, I've said as much in past threads - ones, if memory serves me right - you've been a party too. Also, when responding in a manner which accords with a great deal of knowledge, don't give me the potted version. I think it fair to assume that in most matters SEAsian, I'm familiar with the particulars.

I'm sorry, but I cannot view your position on this charitably. Evaluating whether an outcome is good or bad can only be done in relation to the possible alternative outcomes. Even when it is about choosing only the lesser evil. As the situation stood after mid-August 1975 the two possible outcomes were independence under FRETILIN or annexation by Indonesia. Saying that the destruction of FRETILIN was a good thing is endorsing the other option.
And I'm afraid that discussing this in a generalist internet forum does require some potting, if some other are to also read our walls of text!

Yes, I'm aware of that - but I fail to see how a lack of formal -lolmarxism/capitalism - ideology had much to do with anything. The most salient issue was independence: the when's, the where’s and the how's. On that issue the UDT and FRETLIN divide was obvious and gaping. And a cursory understanding of SEA history would tell you that single issues - especially in the pre-independence phase - are sufficient to hang people over (har har).

SEA is not unique in that regard. It 1975 was happening in the african colonies of Portugal in a greater scale, and I'm sure it happened in most of the others. Still, I find that every territory had its unique issues. So let's discuss East Timor only here.

That's not the point. There was no war (and I know that) more a series of interconnected massacres involving conflicting elites, drawing on small ideologically motivated bases to do the dirty work. But all that doesn't excuse what went on: there were massacres, killings and general nastiness (that word again!), which you denied. And that did bitterly sour relations between the UDT and FRETLIN.

Well, personally I much prefer that civil wars be restricted to the elites and their immediate dependents, rather that recruit poor bastards without any stake in it for cannod fodder. And I still consider those civil wars.
But the Situation in August was: UDT lauched a coup, took power, and pushed the portuguese governor out of Dili. They took power by force. That they killed fewer people is immaterial to the situation they created: the other party was left with the choices of surrendering (after some of its members had been killed themselves, that inspires both fear and desire for revenge), or fighting back. Predictably, it fought back. Predictably, it took over control of most of the territory (towns, in fact) in about two weeks. All very predictable, considering that local troops had been becoming pro-FRETILIN, and that UDT threw away its political credibility with the coup. Perhaps not accidentally, that logic was a feature of the Portuguese political impasse in Portugal itself in August-September 1975: "he who advances first loses"; and so it was, complete with provocative actions from several players to make the other side advance; thankfully we avoided any kind of civil war. But that's another story.

There was no 'Indonesian' invasion plot. There was a group of doods inside the Indonesian government clustered around Ali Murtopo whose job - on paper, at least - was to try and induce Timor to join peacefully. Murtopo knew that was a still-birth and decided to orchestrate a crisis with the express purpose of bringing about an invasion and occupation of Timor. (And frankly that's even giving Murtopo more credit than he deserves, because it isn't clear if that's what he was really trying to do. Murtopo is notable for causing one crisis, only to use it as an excuse to sort out another; that was how he rolled, and it served Suharto really well, putting the apparent targets on watch while decimating the real targets flat-footed.

The other principal player in the thing is Benny Murdani (actual name: Leonardus Benjamin Moerdani) whose role is even more confusing, because he was given the job of collecting intelligence but never seems to have collected much. He seems to have preferred to collect a careful concoction of lies and propaganda. (And even then, it isn’t quite clear what Murdani was angling for although it might be personal gains, not necessarily as a result of the invasion. From his perspective: a Communist (FRETLIN) take-over despite his (mostly bull) warnings would have made him look better viz. a viz. his competition).

When der tag became 'inevitable' it was Murtopo and Murdani who blazed the trail keeping in the dark most of the rest of the military. This was all done in the guise of operational secrecy but was more than likely a means of keeping knowledge of the extent of the plotting secret from Suharto (we think). Because it helps to explain why Murtopo and Murdani both intelligence officers, with no staff experience, were 'allowed' to plan an invasion in the first place and were moreover not punished when it went ass up.

All this was set against Suharto's own ambivalence to the whole scheme. Even the '65 fever seems to have trouble being baited. In some cases he seems to be have been downright hostile to the whole notion going so far as to do nothing on the day of the invasion. He was also supposed to have said something to the effect of, in an emotional voice, itself unheard off: This is what I shall be remembered for. This is so far out of character for Suharto that a fair few sources have rejected it out of hand even with the strong evidence we have for him having said it. All-in-all it took some serious pushing over about the life of the crisis before he could get prodded towards action and even then he dragged his feet the whole way.

Part of the reason he did so was because Adam Malik and literally the whole of the loltechnocrats and civilian administration vehemently opposed intervention. They thought - quite correctly - that they could restrain Suharto, which they did, what they hadn't counted on was elements of the military going it alone, presenting Suharto what amounted to a fait accompli for invasion and convincing him to sign it without the chance to argue him down. This was despite Malik's rather inopportune assurance to José Ramos-Horta that there would be no invasion - really intervention because nobody thought of an occupation as a likely outcome - which was itself endorsed by Suharto.

In sum, there was no Indonesian plot, there was a plot of Indonesians composed chiefly of two senior intelligence officers, who did it for reasons that aren't wholly clear. Moreover, what the hell was the governor going to do? The UDI would have gone ahead even if he had intervened against it, hell that would be one of the few things that would have possibly made it go faster. Even if we assume that it all went ahead at the same time - or some latter period - then what's the governor going to do to stop the invasion? Wave a flag? Dude might have taken the easy approach - sit back and wait - but that was also the sensible approach to be honest. The most likely result was right up until the UDI a UDT victory and a staged withdrawal of Portuguese power. And frankly, while he did have knowledge of an Indonesian hand in events there's no reason to suppose that he knew anything more than Malik the freaking Foreign Minister of Indonesia did.

I do defer to you on knowledge about the internal politics of Indonesia. Thanks for the description. But the fact that not all the government and the military was in it still does not deny the fact that there was an indonesian plot.

And I think that you are missing out the american link in all this. Suharto visited Washington in June, and I'm sure that East Timor was discussed. Kissinger's support of an invasion could have tipped a balance in Indonesia. I will only say that I've heard from someone reliable about some remarks made to him by a famous american politican/diplomat (not mentioning names, not even in an unimportant forum, the guy's still active and recently helped destroy Iraq) who not only admitted that the US endorsed the invasion but went on to ask why the governments of Portugal kept bothering the american government over the occupation of such an unimportant territory, apparently irritated with it...

Which was the case here. FRETLIN boycotted, lost its say (woo said Indonesian policy makers) and in doing so excluded itself from the more moderate path leaving it with the UDI as the only real trump card left in the deck (booo said Indonesian policy makers). As to the militant leftist isn't that in contradiction to what you said earlier, or is that a recognition of what I said: that independence was the important thing and not Orthodachs Marxism. And I'm aware of the growth of it's relative military power viz. a viz. the UDT - that helps to explain what happened next.

No, it wasn't: independence was never in question. Portugal wanted to get rid of its colonies. Macau was outright offered to China immediately; in Cape Verde locals who spoke against independence were even imprisoned by the military and newspapers shut down. East Timor wasn't an exception. Not that the portuguese government would throw it to the indonesians: the idea was to genuinely let the timorese choose their own path. Unfortunately it all developed then rather too fast, because as it became clear that independence was going to happen, the fight for power post-independence started. That was the real cause of the differences between UDT and FRETILIN: both wanted to be in control after independence. It was not a matter of how quickly that independence happened.

Which is this. And there's every indication that FRETLIN was planning one of its own.

I'm really only interested in the pro-communist part; the rest I agree with except for the Portuguese neglect angle. But w/e. The simple fact was that FRETLIN was fingered with the Chinese and had been moving further to the left. Whether or not it was Communist in actual fact was immaterial. What is telling is that Indonesian policy makers could pass them off as Communist which was a reflection of FRETLIN as it was: not quite Communist and certainly not Capitalist. (lame division I know, but whatever this is the Cold War).

Agreed.

Something about flux and didn't even want to don't add up. But the sad fact is that most of the people involved were looking long-term rather than short-term. You have to calibrate your responses to a newly independent or soon-to-be independent country with that in mind. UDT did it, so did FRETLIN (kind off) and the US (not mentioned yet) and Indonesian certainly were.

So we actually agree on this also?

I don't admit to caring much about Portuguese? Shoot me. But I don't see how the rather lame claim that: people die in civil wars makes it somehow alright or morally acceptable for them to do so. Frankly, people seldom just drop murdered...

It doesn't. It only puts both sides on the same moral level. You seemed to have been be favouring one above the other.

That was the mistake - sitting out Macau was understandable, kind of petulant but there was rhyme to the reason. Fighting UDT was again, understandable. Winning was a good thing in the short run, and a disaster in the long run. But it was still not impossible to come to a concord, with the parts of the UDT that hadn't been involved in or had been at best lukewarm to the coup. The UDI bought that to an end in three ways (1) it demonstrated FRETLINS intention to rule unilaterally, (2) made it almost impossible for FRETLIN to reconcile with UDT or the Portuguese Government and (3) provoked more moderate opinion in Indonesia (fit that into the narrative I presented above) that an invasion was necessary and desirable. (3) Was also despite warnings from parties inside Indonesia sympathetic to peace to do anything else but to stop short of doing that. In doing so, it also stripped itself of Portuguese support and opened itself to invasion.

I'm going to go with: he did and knew that ordering them to deal with UDT was the same damn thing.

Agreed, except for one thing: I don't know, but I suspect that Lemos Pires was forced to flee to Ataúto and thus allow FRETILIN to carry on the brief war against UDT and open the way for it to unilaterally declare independence, by some officers which were supposed to be under his command. Independence under FRETILIN was favored by some people, but I do not believe by the portuguese government or the governor himself, who surely could see the disaster coming, and was not, by any accounts, either stupid, a traitor, or an evil man. His underlings, though... there were a lot of stupid (or, to be charitable, naive) officers running loose.
That's where the issue intersects with portuguese politics and the mess going on here on that supper, the infighting within the MFA and between it, the political parties, the government, and the generals. I'm afraid that he died without ever stating publicly his version of the events, nor did I ever hear of him talking about it. Almeida Santos had quite a few bad things to say about some officers there, but then again he was the diplomat on the issue and might just have been seeking someone else to shift blame to.

4srs plans are quite separate from 4srs policy. Suharto was always pushing the peaceful option even when it was quite obviously not working. He seems to have thought until the last moment that a war over Timor simply wasn't worth it. It was only after the counter-coup and UDI that he thought the need to look at teh master pran. Also, his visit to America was intended to do a couple of things (1) suss out where America stood (ambivalent), (2) test the American waters with Indonesian policy (mostly ambivalent; but opposed to war) and (3) figure out how that all synched with his chosen policy (lol peaceful integration). It told him nothing he didn't already know: America ambivalent; war bad and peaceful integration good. Whatever the case, the US's rather tepid support for lolwar, when it was broadcast (really late in the game), was at best a secondary consideration for more immediate Indonesian planning. American couldn't have intervened even had it wanted to militarily, and it was unlikely, or thought to be, to reduce civilian aid. Military aid on the other hand was expected to fall and that was part of the calculations and had been the whole time.

Well, he turned out right, though it took two decades. The american position could perhaps better be described as "divided", but the hawks were on top. East Timor was peanuts for someone who was pushing Mobutu to send a proxy army to occupy Luanda (to be fair they were really divided about that). Of course they'd prefer peaceful integration, which (as you've implied) was not going to happen. But they were not averse to an invasion. They would just have to "condemn" it in public, and keep up the military aid privately. It wasn't as if they had even commented on the indian annexation of Goa earlier, therefore why would they object to another annexation where the "owning" country wasn't even supposed to care any longer for the territory shifting hands?
As it turned out, people in Washington were quite irritated at not being able to just endorse integration, because between one of its little allies resisting the idea and raising the issue at every turn, and the fact that the self-determination thing and actually got going in East-Timor before the invasion, it would look very bad. Of course, absence of diplomatic recognition over the annexation did not became a stumbling block for american cooperation with Indonesia, not for Australia to sign a treaty for splitting the revenues of East Timor's gas and oil.

 

[Masada]

I'm sorry, but I cannot view your position on this charitably. Evaluating whether an outcome is good or bad can only be done in relation to the possible alternative outcomes.

Riiiiight inevitable Communist takeover and installastion of a Stalinist regime anyone?

As the situation stood after mid-August 1975 the two possible outcomes were independence under FRETILIN or annexation by Indonesia.

Wrong, wholly and totally wrong. Support for any peaceful annexation was still the dominant strain of thought in the military outside of Ali Murtopo and Benny Murdani until mid-bloody-September. Support for that option waned as we move towards November and ended rather decisively on or around 28 November. After that, the military seems to have come to the realisation that a military intervention was the 'best' option avaiable. That isn't to say that war became inevitable, it was still one option amongst many and the Old Man hadn't been convinced either way. What resulted was a general perception amongst the military for the need to do something, the end result of which might be war and if so, then so be it. It wasn't a call for war! war! war! but a realisation that war was both a viable tool and a potential end-game. The civilians were wholly opposed to war and didn't even seem to have considered lolannexation as likely or even possible. And as I've already stated the Old Man was at worst ambivalent to elements of his own military running around planning war - without his support or that of the broader military establishment - and at best opposed to the whole notion in the first place. More than likely he was opposed to it in principle and actuality with those reservations slowly melting away through September and into early November before shattering on 28 November.

Saying that the destruction of FRETILIN was a good thing is endorsing the other option.

Wrong, destroying FRETLIN was a Good Thing. Hell we wouldn't be having this conversation had the UDT won and moved towards staged independence. For that matter, we wouldn't be having this conversation if 28 November hadn't rolled around with such fateful consequences. Woo alternative possibilities/histories and all that janx.

And I'm afraid that discussing this in a generalist internet forum does require some potting, if some other are to also read our walls of text!

Bah, I don't post here for other's benefit, if they gain some then fine, if they don't then I'm fine with that as well - less fine, but whatever.

SEA is not unique in that regard. It 1975 was happening in the african colonies of Portugal in a greater scale, and I'm sure it happened in most of the others. Still, I find that every territory had its unique issues. So let's discuss East Timor only here.

Er, that's not an answer: that's a backdown (more on this later).

Well, personally I much prefer that civil wars be restricted to the elites and their immediate dependents, rather that recruit poor bastards without any stake in it for cannod fodder. And I still consider those civil wars.

Can't say I disagree with this notion - the smaller the better, usually.

But the Situation in August was: UDT lauched a coup, took power, and pushed the portuguese governor out of Dili. They took power by force. That they killed fewer people is immaterial to the situation they created: the other party was left with the choices of surrendering (after some of its members had been killed themselves, that inspires both fear and desire for revenge), or fighting back. Predictably, it fought back. Predictably, it took over control of most of the territory (towns, in fact) in about two weeks. All very predictable, considering that local troops had been becoming pro-FRETILIN, and that UDT threw away its political credibility with the coup. Perhaps not accidentally, that logic was a feature of the Portuguese political impasse in Portugal itself in August-September 1975: "he who advances first loses"; and so it was, complete with provocative actions from several players to make the other side advance; thankfully we avoided any kind of civil war. But that's another story.

Er, political credibility to whom? It actually bolstered it in most external quarters and boosted its credibility in the cities and towns amongst the elite. But that doesn't address the essential point that UDT members packed up shop and fled across the border into Indonesia, resisted active collaboration (except for living) and then in desperation after 28 November turned around and endorse the Balibo Declaration. Hip hip hurrah for bitter emnity!

But the fact that not all the government and the military was in it still does not deny the fact that there was an indonesian plot.

Because using 'Indonesian' with regards to Murdani and Murtopo is being totally honest here. Sure they were Indonesians, but that's the smaller part of it: the important things to note is that they were a two man show, operating outside of their authority and for the most part pissing into an indifferent military - not to say civilian - wind, executing on the one hand another policy, while simulatenously for whatever reason making fantasical provisions (really planning) for an option that looked insane till mid-to-late September and was so far left of field that even other policy makers - Malik - hadn't seriously considered it being employed right up until it was lololol.

And I think that you are missing out the american link in all this. Suharto visited Washington in June, and I'm sure that East Timor was discussed.

Yes in June. That's hardly August. And that needs to be set against a whole bunch of other factors most importantly that invasion was not seriously considered outside of Murdani and Murtopo till somewhere in September or November in the military. That says nothing of Suharto's role.

Kissinger's support of an invasion could have tipped a balance in Indonesia.

Planning seems to have just assumed that America would be hostile in some fashion; even the more optimistic plans assumed a withdrawal of military funding. If Kissinger had given assurances - and there's reason to suppose he did, insofar as it related to Indonesian policy as it was in June - there's still no reason to suppose that he just upped the ante and gave Indonesia a blank cheque to invade Timor. The reluctance of Indonesia to get involved, the utter ineptitude with which the invasion was carried out (more evidence of the fact that the TNI was not executing things from a play-book of ossim that it had spent years cooking up) and the rather simple fact that Suharto took his hands off the tiller for the whole damn period so as to distance himself from the invasion all seem to suggest otherwise.

I will only say that I've heard from someone reliable about some remarks made to him by a famous american politican/diplomat (not mentioning names, not even in an unimportant forum, the guy's still active and recently helped destroy Iraq) who not only admitted that the US endorsed the invasion but went on to ask why the governments of Portugal kept bothering the american government over the occupation of such an unimportant territory, apparently irritated with it...

That's fair, I think you'll find that there is support for that kind of attitude existing in the states after the invasion. I'm familiar with some anecdotes to that effect. But I doubt if it occured during June - the visit - it could have developed in say September and more likely November. America also 'endorsed' the invasion but that isn't to say that it was doing so in June. It did in the aftermath, but not four months before boots hit the ground.

No, it wasn't: independence was never in question. Portugal wanted to get rid of its colonies. Macau was outright offered to China immediately; in Cape Verde locals who spoke against independence were even imprisoned by the military and newspapers shut down. East Timor wasn't an exception. Not that the portuguese government would throw it to the indonesians: the idea was to genuinely let the timorese choose their own path. Unfortunately it all developed then rather too fast, because as it became clear that independence was going to happen, the fight for power post-independence started. That was the real cause of the differences between UDT and FRETILIN: both wanted to be in control after independence. It was not a matter of how quickly that independence happened.

Nooooo it wasn't. UDT and FRETLIN's main bone of contention was the speed with which independence was to be achieved. The UDT favoured a gradual phased transition, something that became impossible and something that UDT reconciled with on 25 June. That FRETLIN sulked was in part political posturing - FRETLIN needed to differentiate it's brand, even if the terms offered were better (?) than those it had itself demanded intially - and part political calculating - it saw another way a UDI which it could flourish if needed as a means of seizing the political intiative. That was the trump card. That can be seen as a means of manevouring for political gain and also as a means of in the long(er) run gaining political control. However, at least, to me, it seems to be a poor means of gaining political control. Timing seems the more important element: maybe I'd be willing to accept it as part of an unfolding struggle for power but there's faint evidence of that, for a little while at least. And we don't quite know if UDT was right in anticipating FRETLIN's projected Next Move - the coup - although we seem to agree that it was likely? So I guess we have to rely on what UDT percieved to be the case and leave it at that? I dunno, interesting question.

So we actually agree on this also?

Kind off, I suppose. Probably for different reasons but w/e?

It doesn't. It only puts both sides on the same moral level. You seemed to have been be favouring one above the other.

Ah, rite. UDT killed far less people. It started the coup I'll grant and deserves opporbium for doing so. But it was FRETLIN that escalated the thing. Although I will admit to finding the whole notion of counting bodies to determine evil kind of stupid. Mostly because 1 body is still pretty bad, let alone 2.

Agreed, except for one thing: I don't know, but I suspect that Lemos Pires was forced to flee to Ataúto and thus allow FRETILIN to carry on the brief war against UDT and open the way for it to unilaterally declare independence, by some officers which were supposed to be under his command. Independence under FRETILIN was favored by some people, but I do not believe by the portuguese government or the governor himself, who surely could see the disaster coming, and was not, by any accounts, either stupid, a traitor, or an evil man. His underlings, though... there were a lot of stupid (or, to be charitable, naive) officers running loose.

Eh, that doesn't surprise me. Although I'm not sure if sympathy in the ranks translates into sympathy in the officers mess? I'm not actually sure to be honest.

That's where the issue intersects with portuguese politics and the mess going on here on that supper, the infighting within the MFA and between it, the political parties, the government, and the generals. I'm afraid that he died without ever stating publicly his version of the events, nor did I ever hear of him talking about it. Almeida Santos had quite a few bad things to say about some officers there, but then again he was the diplomat on the issue and might just have been seeking someone else to shift blame to.

Mmm the Portuguese side is the part I'm weak with. I understand the Timorese and Indonesian political sides but the Portuguese side seems stuck somewhere between insane and whimsical. I can't quite fathom their responses to the situation. That isn't to say that I think the invasion was forseeable, it was still right on the fringes even inside the Indonesian government.

Well, he turned out right, though it took two decades. The american position could perhaps better be described as "divided", but the hawks were on top. East Timor was peanuts for someone who was pushing Mobutu to send a proxy army to occupy Luanda (to be fair they were really divided about that). Of course they'd prefer peaceful integration, which (as you've implied) was not going to happen. But they were not averse to an invasion. They would just have to "condemn" it in public, and keep up the military aid privately. It wasn't as if they had even commented on the indian annexation of Goa earlier, therefore why would they object to another annexation where the "owning" country wasn't even supposed to care any longer for the territory shifting hands?

I'll respond to the American side in more detail tommorow, it's actually rather interesting. I might even riff on Australia if I can muster the interest...

 

[NovaKart]

At this point it's really better to make a separate thread on the Timor issue.

 

[Tee Kay]

I agree. Either way, let's keep the Timor discussion going.

 

[Masada]

Rubbish, Timorese Kurds they're all the same.

 

[NovaKart]

Considering the incredibly lenghty posts on the issue I'd say separate thread time.

 

[r16]

why , considering every Commie leader in the rebellions in Portugese colony turned out to be some professor in an American college , or am ı exaggeratin' it a bit .

 

[innonimatu]

I'm also for splitting, if some moderator will do it, and will answer after Masada finishes his answer. It has been an interesting comparison of POV so far.

why , considering every Commie leader in the rebellions in Portugese colony turned out to be some professor in an American college , or am ı exaggeratin' it a bit .

Certainly not every one, but yes, a few had connections there. That didn't escape notice at the time, either. There were outright tools, like Holden Roberto, and some accidental ones. In East Timor's case there were no american assets there at the time.

 

[r16]

well it is the time of the year when promotions to high military commands are discussed .True to form , as military laws ban the promotion of officers under lock for any reason , the " independent of everything " courts have issued arrest warrants yet more officers , known to be guilty for years . This why a four star general ( busy training troops according to us , invading Greece in time of war according to our dear neighbours ) is to be put into jail for life , because he was responsible for waging an internet campaign against the neo-Ittihadists . Chain of command does not apply to the enemies of the new rulers of the country . And why it should , since the closet somethings are all the same ... It is a good advice for new commanders to attach the epithet of (acting) to their titles voluntarily , but of course they will claim the continiuty of the state is essential . Sure , as long as the state lasts . This is a new age where people will be held accountable ; considering the homosexual generals of Germany and the Fuehrer Oath and where it all ended up . Laugh this off , just like the last year and see what the next year brings .

germany looms always large in this argument , as the rank and file of the new elites think they are supported by Germany against certain people whom the whole world hated openly until the discovery of the concentration camps . This is essentially why the new defence minister actually talked of Turkei über alles when commenting on the retirement of 4 generals before the military council , his volk are to be reassured of Germanness standing behind them . Now that Claudia Roth of German Greens made a show of trying to visit those arrested for conspiring against the goverment , was denied entry to prison , and immediately ran off when all the legal rules were supposed to be broken and a permit was issued . All normal , people can still manage to act like colonial governors . And the newly elites are not ashamed of doing it , eating their word whenever somebody important is around .

the sparkling performance of Mrs Roth peaked at the part where she commented that people would be taught how to speak to a Member of the German Parliament . Didn't we declare , sometime in the stone age it seems , she was unwelcome in Turkey , for her open support of the seperatists ? There must be a reason , of which we the monkeys are not aware , that she is all fired up for all those criminals who were responsible for all the Nacht und Nebel of the 1990s . Yeah , this is th' tree huggin' humanity lovin' Greens 4 ya , consider what the more geopolitically oriented guys would have done .

sure , there is a reason why the military is hammered right and left . Only because it is supposed to harbour the monkeys who would oppose the replacement of the American yoke with a German yoke , only because we would remember the Enverland where Deutschland was über Allah . And don't even think there is such a risk . That our new elites could ever dare to turn against their original masters . Some sparkling moment in the campaign against the military was when an officer did not storm out of a discussion in the Hudson Institute where the subject was division of Turkey in the due course of the Greater Middle East procession of USA that would result in heaven on Earth . And the reliable witness was the police specialist , the Atlantic Breeze#1 as he is now to be called , who stayed in the US for years , because the closet Jews had enough clout to have him arrested for treason then . Yeah , he was there and he also stayed in and he is "now" the patriot . We hear he is back in America , in this crisis of faith between Turkey and US in which one of the sides will not walk out from , giving handoccupations to anyone he comes across , that it is all right and a rosy future awaits all . Indeed , at a time where 200 000 soldiers , police and village guards are unable to stem the relentless American backed advance of the seperatists , an extra 1500 members to the 5000 strong police SWAT teams will win the day and keep the integrity of the country . You know , those were the days when their previous incarnation put a AK next to a 12 year kid [or maybe he already had one , accounts differ] and filled his long dead body with extra bullets , so that they could each claim combat pay . The guys were ordered to disappear rich Kurds supporting the seperatist cause with their wealth and they somehow discovered they liked the Kurds and stopped , after their percentage from the drug trade was assured . But no , our young Americans will tell us there is a new generation , and the guys are not like their precedessors . They would not threaten to make a raid on the Parliament and shoot MPs , if one single member of their force was ever killed by the seperatists , or anyone looked like one . ı would have to agree , they were the SS of another party .

and doesn't Mrs. Rodham talk on the importance of making bridges ? Oh, God ! No idea , how great my itch is to talk about Thanh Hoa . Of course it all looks stupid to 3rd parties who are wondering why Uncle Sam is not bombing this company reinforced with a tank platoon that repelled Bingazi guys for the day . You see , it is only because they are conserving their forces for the big one .Until then the nonbeautiful Americans will celebrate their scalps off the record .