I've decided to throw you people a modern day althist idea that struck me as having good NES potential; and for once I mean modern day as per Symphony D.'s definition, more or less (well, at any rate, it's Atomic Age and post-WWII).
Predictably, it concerns saving the Soviet Union. The most commonly proposed alternative for Gorbachev's reforms as a method of salvation is, ofcourse, the Chinese model, but I think that really wasn't a realistic option with Gorbachev, or really with anyone else in the late Soviet Union. Gorbachev wasn't Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping was, after all, a veteran of revolutionary struggles from the start, and survived even the Cultural Revolution. He was, therefore, trully experienced and very pragmatic; Gorbachev wasn't completely inexperienced, but it's really not comparable. The years of stagnation made the entirety of the party leadership rather naive - naively hardline or naively reformist. That must not be allowed to happen.
Therefore, if the Chinese model is to be adapted in the Soviet Union, it is to be done with a veteran, and fairly early on; specifically, within a decade of Stalin's death. And the candidature is extremelly obvious; Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria was the veteran's veteran, the pragmatic's pragmatic, and happened to advocate a much more serious detente with the West along with major reforms in the Soviet Union itself. And until the last moments he did have a fair amount of allies, such as Malenkov, another advocate of economic reform. The forces arranged against him were serious, but his victory in the post-Stalin power struggles was definitely not impossible.
After Beria takes power and asserts it properly, reforms will begin; without going into to much detail, there will be a general easing and liberalisation in most spheres of life. That much was inevitable anyway, but Beria and Malenkov will take it further than Khruschev did. Prisoners will be returned from the GULags much like in OTL, but economic development will be different; to help the nation "catch it's breath" (a widespread theme in contemporary Soviet state propaganda), focus will shift towards the development of light industries, revival of agriculture and economic decentralisation (which occured in OTL anyway; here, it too is taken further, but on the other hand the actual economic practice involves less disastrous experimentation). There will be a partial return to a revised variant of the policy of the NEP, and as relations with the West are normalised, further liberalisation will occur and foreign capital will be invited; it will help develop Siberia and Central Asia, as well as finish the reconstruction in European Russia. Also, Beria's victory will mean a major defeat of the Communist Part as such, as this will mean that Stalin's OTL gradual phasing out of party control will continue in good order. The state will remain very much authoritarian, ofcourse, and the ideology of communism will remain as well, but it will be moderated considerably.
Anyhow, you get the general idea. Of more interest to us are geopolitics, as usual, and there Beria, eager to concentrate on internal issues and to improve relations with the West, will go ahead with his ideas for the detente. Germany will be reunited and demilitarised (probably under Adenauer); the grip on the Eastern European states will be softened, while relations with Yugoslavia are normalised. Troops will probably be largely withdrawn from Eastern Europe, though a softer form of Soviet domination will be retained and an economic cooperation treaty is likely, but no Warsaw Pact. At the same time, the Sino-Soviet split will occur much earlier, and Mao will be very enraged at Soviet revisionism; it will be an even more bitter split, and the communist movement will often be divided between Maoist and Soviet factions, most revolutionary movements in Africa and Latin America aligning with the former for many reasons. North Korea and possibly Albania might also side with Mao for good. Elsewhere, Soviet foreign policy will probably be similar to OTL in general direction, but much less radical; the Soviets still will strongly support decolonisation, but won't usually send as much military and humanitarian aid into the 3rd world. Arab countries will still be given support over Israel in the Middle East, but likely not quite as much.
What of other countries, and further along the line? From here it gets more hypothetical (and less detailed).
The NATO is already in place, but it will naturally devolve considerably. Without Soviet pressure, USA is likely to eventually have yet another bout of "isolationism", though as usual it won't be quite as simple as that. Indeed, what is more likely to happen is that the USA's attention is decisively turned away from Europe and the Middle East; instead of the Cold War, it will have a War on Maoism, as the Maoist movements are further radicalised and rise to the forefront. Maoist and allied revolutionaries roam in Latin America, Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, and it is the duty of the USA to put an end to this, as well as to protect American financial interests over there. I predict an earlier Vietnam War, a Cuba War and many lesser such conflicts. In the process, the alliances with European nations and with Israel degrade in favour of alliances with former British dominions (Australia and New Zeeland in particular will help in Vietnam, and South Africa could be propped up and encouraged to become the gendarme of southern Africa). Vietnam and Cuba will probably see America triumph in the end, but not without considerable losses and expenditures, and some other interventions might not go very smooth neither (probably also inciting greater revolutionary tensions in the Third World; as a matter of fact, the defeated Cuban and Vietnamese revolutionaries will probably try and escape, and many of them will manage to spread wide and radicalise a lot of people). I suspect relations with such countries as India and France will go pretty rotten, too (Nehru and De Gaulle will have a field day blasting American imperialism, and European intellectuals will basically have to focus on it as well, in the absence of more convenient alternatives). There will be dissent, but probably not enough of it, and American politics will, generally be much more to the right without such an intense Cold War. Both the arms race and the space race will be much, much less intense as well.
Anyways, Europe. It is hard to say how things will go there. One thing is for sure, politics there will generally be much more left-wing than in OTL. If the Soviet foreign policy in Europe is either unbelievably unsuccesful or unbelievably succesful, there might arise a very early European Union from the Atlantic Ocean to the Soviet border (or, in the latter case, to the Pacific Ocean
). The former scenario will see it led by France and De Gaulle; the latter will have it either under Soviet leadership or a one that is very strongly influenced by said leadership and is generally left-wing. As said, both possibilities are outlandish and a bit boring. Slightly more likely is a later union, if the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe declines over time; that one will probably be German-led. But IMHO both the most interesting and the most likely scenario will see an European Economic Community, some diplomatic cooperation and not much else. In that case, after a reconstruction that without a Cold War will be generally faster but less dependant on foreign support (Americans focusing on the 3rd world and the Soviets busy rebuilding themselves; ofcourse, the one way an aforediscussed Soviet European Union might come to be is if the Soviets provide lots and lots of economic assistance to Europe, like they did in the 3rd world in OTL and with much the same intent), the various European countries will tread their own paths. Britain will focus on the Commonwealth and the other former colonies, trying to defend its economic interests and probably supporting, with reservations the American crusade against Maoism while attempting to reestablish the British influence in the more pro-American dominions. Britain will naturally also involve itself in the Middle East; there might be a renewed Great Game between the Soviets and the British there.
France... is really complicated. In the end, it is a question of colonial policy, I suppose. If France will try to hold on to its most important colonies, it will side with Britain and America; certainly it could cooperate with the former in the Middle East and the latter in Indochina. But if it embraces its wilder and somewhat more left-wing side (with De Gaulle or without; the man could align himself with just about anyone, really), then things will be very different; France will gradually withdraw from the colonies, though retaining some political and economic influence (as with Britain, more so than in OTL, in all the likelihood), decry American imperialism, support Quebecois separatism (which just might succeed in this case; I hear that Cold War can unite a nation's right-wing factions regardless of language, and here that just won't happen) and work to unify Europe. Whatever happens, France WILL play in the Middle Eastern Great Game; if it is a British ally it will probably prop up Israel, but if it is a wild card then it is a wild card. We might see a Franco-Soviet alliance to thwart "Anglo-Israeli neo-imperialism" by propping up Arab nationalists. IMHO the left-wing approach is more likely, as this world's Europe will by definition be more left-wing.
Portugal will go much like in OTL, though possibly even more plagued by Maoist movements, possibly even to the point of revolution in Portugal itself, in which case we will have a fun "North-Korea-in-Western-Europe".
Spain will definitely be more detached from the European community as a whole; Franco will probably be a stalwart American ally.
Italy, in all the likelihood, will turn inwards for the most part (internal strife, economic reform).
Germany will probably have an even better economic miracle than in OTL, but where will it go from there is a difficult question. In all the likelihood, while France concerns itself with Quebec and the Middle East, Germany will rise to led the European Union movement. Close relations with both Eastern and Western European countries will exist; in the event of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe failing, there might even be a "mini-EU" with Germany, Austria, Italy and the Eastern European nations. Anyhow, a recovered Germany will definitely compete with France for European leadership and with the USSR for Eastern European influence, and it may well win out. In the event of major diplomatic defeats and resultant paranoia (btw, how will the absence of a Cold War and a more open Soviet Union affect the development of world economy? Could we get another huge crisis here?
), though, there is a very, very minor possibility of Germany trying to make a third go at you know what...
As a funny thought, the revival of German influence in Eastern Europe might lead to Yugoslavia becoming a pragmatically-authoritarian (i.e. politically quite similar) Soviet Union's main ally.
A later, alternate cold war (or even a WW III) might see Germany, UK, USA vs. France, Yugoslavia, USSR, with China somewhere on the sidelines like Islamist Iran was/could have been in OTL.
The Middle East will see Israel and more conservative Arabic factions supported by Britain, and to a lesser extent USA, while reformist Arabic nationalists align with France and/or USSR. Really not sure about consequences here, except that the latter side will probably fare better than it did in OTL, generally speaking (less American involvement, while the Soviets aren't as tied down elsewhere). Israel won't be erased from the map, but it will face more problems. Nasser might see more success with some of his schemes, and the U.A.R. might even survive. Pro-Soviet socialists might rise to power in Iran, especially if the British undermine the White Revolution, although alternatively they and the Americans, panicked by growing Franco-Soviet influence, might prop the Shah up just enough to make it work.
Perhaps there will be reformed, but fairly conservative pro-American and pro-British monarchies in Iran and Iraq, countered by a socialist U.A.R.
India will probably do rather like in OTL, balancing between various factions while trying to beat up Pakistan. One thought is that the Chinese would be less confrontational towards India, having enough on their hands as the Americans focus on Southeast Asia; perhaps there might be Sino-Indian diplomatic cooperation to thwart this American influence. India definitely will be trying to establish some influence on its own in Southeast Asia and Africa, and in the absence of a Cold War (and thus, a Non-Aligned Movement) it might focus more on making itself into a great power in its own right. Again, really not sure how will it go.
China, as already mentioned, will be further radicalised and generally will be palced into the position of leading the revolutionary movement. Greater clashes with both the USA and the USSR will mean stronger xenophobia, with all that entails in such a state; China might develop into a giant North Korea. But unlike North Korea, it can actually be a threat, and so there might in the end be a climatic war between USA and China, the USSR probably also getting involved if the latter seems likely to collapse, if only to secure its own influence in North Asia. But all that is not very likely.
If reformists still do come to power, they will be more likely to align with the USSR instead of the USA.
Anyhow, I think this is generally NES-worthy scenario, though it definitely needs fleshing out.
Thing is, German capitalits still will try and establish colonies, and German government still will have to follow them, whether reluctantly or not.
