Alternate History Thread IV: The Sequel

Dachs just got my foriegn policy hard :mischief:
 
So how about that Berengar? Okay, so he himself maybe wasn't much good at all, but I wonder if it was possible at some point in the Dark Ages to create a Holy Roman Empire that is actually Roman, or at least based somewhere closer to Rome? On a related topic, is it conceivable to keep the OTL HRE in its broken pre-Otto state for longer? Several smaller, but relatively more centralised Germanic kingdoms (OTL duchies) without a higher imperial framework might be interesting as well.

Germany sans Arnulf?
 
So how about that Berengar? Okay, so he himself maybe wasn't much good at all, but I wonder if it was possible at some point in the Dark Ages to create a Holy Roman Empire that is actually Roman, or at least based somewhere closer to Rome? On a related topic, is it conceivable to keep the OTL HRE in its broken pre-Otto state for longer? Several smaller, but relatively more centralised Germanic kingdoms (OTL duchies) without a higher imperial framework might be interesting as well.

Germany sans Arnulf?
Taking away Arnulf does mean Berengar can beat Guy of Spoleto in the late 880s. That's another solid two decades of (one would assume) uninterrupted rule over Italy. He could do a lot with that. Wasn't there some project for him to invade southern Italy during his imperial reign? If so, that could mean either a junction with the 891 Byzantine 'Longobardia' expedition of Symbatikios or infighting with them (the latter would kind of suck maybe?). Assuming a historical Zautzes, Leon VI will be distracted by Bulgaria soon anyway, so if there would be a time for Berengar to make a temporary alliance with the Byzantines while their army is about (to smash the Muslims) and then brutally stab them in the back when they leave, it would be then...of course, then you run into the problem of him being a damned incompetent. :p

Also without Arnulf, you get increased Norse and Magyar raiding in Germany. Keeps 'em down for a bit longer. I think it's got a reasonable chance. I'm at a loss as to how internal German power struggles would work without Arnulf though.
 
Arnulf seems to me to be one of the most underappreciated monarchs ever, really. Both his personal kickassness (ita ut cadaveribus interceptum alveum amnis siccum appareret) and his historical significance call for far more recognition than what he currently receives.

Not sure about what would've happened without him, but that little bastard Bernard probably would have become the heir after all, which would've gone horribly wrong very fast. The local dukes would've taken over from there.
 
I wrote part of a timeline ages ago that had as early side effects no Arnulf, an Italian empire and a permanently fractured Germany. Never posted it and now I can't seem to find it.

but that little bastard Bernard probably would have become the heir after all
Doubt it. Arnulf only got away with it because the East Frankish nobility were not going to let that happen. Without him, they'd just find someone else. The kid in Provence, perhaps.

Taking away Arnulf does mean Berengar can beat Guy of Spoleto in the late 880s.
Other way round, surely.
 
Actually, no. What we need is the opposite: Norman Sicily never rising in the first place. Eventually German crusaders conquer it all instead (probably if the Kaiser does achieve temporarily safe hegemony in Italy, and wants to consolidate by declaring a campaign to defend the puppet Pope and then securing the south). Then we have Swabians instead of Normans as the feudal elite of southern Italy, with all that might or might not imply.
 
Actually, no. What we need is the opposite: Norman Sicily never rising in the first place. Eventually German crusaders conquer it all instead (probably if the Kaiser does achieve temporarily safe hegemony in Italy, and wants to consolidate by declaring a campaign to defend the puppet Pope and then securing the south). Then we have Swabians instead of Normans as the feudal elite of southern Italy, with all that might or might not imply.
Hey, "no Norman Sicily" sounds awfully familiar. I wonder if anybody's done that before and if so if somebody could tighten it up and extend it somewhat.
 
Sooooo. Osman II. I hear he had some kinda plan to relocate to Cairo, recruit tons of conscript musketmen from Anatolia and Syria, and clear out the janissaries. Too bad he died in the summer 1622 revolution. What if it works?
 
Sooooo. Osman II. I hear he had some kinda plan to relocate to Cairo, recruit tons of conscript musketmen from Anatolia and Syria, and clear out the janissaries. Too bad he died in the summer 1622 revolution. What if it works?

Gimme a 100 or so years will ya?

Would it be genius or the opposite for the Sultan of a Turkish dominated Empire to relocate himself away from that Turkish power base?
 
Gimme a 100 or so years will ya?

Would it be genius or the opposite for the Sultan of a Turkish dominated Empire to relocate himself away from that Turkish power base?
Yeah, because thinking in terms of an ethnic power base is definitely not anachronistic at all. :rolleyes: In addition, the move to Cairo would have reinforced the claim to the caliphate, as Istanbul was a relatively Christianized place in the middle of the half-assimilated Anatolia and the barely-assimilated-at-all Balkans. Plus, the move wouldn't have to be permanent - somebody who knows more than I do about the Empire could talk about that.
 
Yeah, because thinking in terms of an ethnic power base is definitely not anachronistic at all. :rolleyes: In addition, the move to Cairo would have reinforced the claim to the caliphate, as Istanbul was a relatively Christianized place in the middle of the half-assimilated Anatolia and the barely-assimilated-at-all Balkans. Plus, the move wouldn't have to be permanent - somebody who knows more than I do about the Empire could talk about that.

I was honestly asking, no need for the :rolleyes: nonsense!
 
Dachs is right, it was not a "Turkish dominated Empire" with a "Turkish power base". Though by the 17th century, some of its earlier interethnicism has been lost, as far as I could tell the main powerbase was still that of the Sultan's (multiethnic) slaves: the bureaucrats and the Janissaries, and if the Janissaries are bad then you might as well rely on the bureaucrats and on the weaker local elites (because even the Mamlukes are weaker than the Janissaries and likely to be eager to please if it's the way to courtly power). As to the Turkish timariots, by this point they were as bad any other regional elites.

Relocating to Cairo would've been a good move. Sure, that would be neglecting the Balkans, but by then I'd say the Ottomans mainly ran out of steam there. Meanwhile, you could conduct wars with the Persians as well as from Constantinople if not better, and you could try to revive the fleet and in the long-term maybe even the maritime commerce. You certainly could push back the Portuguese while they're down, and maybe even ally with the Dutch. We need more Egypt-based empires out there, anyway.

On the other hand: won't the Janissaries rebel and elevate someone else on the throne in Constantinople? Might this lead to a split of the Ottoman Empire, or just a civil war?
 
On the other hand: won't the Janissaries rebel and elevate someone else on the throne in Constantinople? Might this lead to a split of the Ottoman Empire, or just a civil war?
Probably. I'm assuming that, unlike OTL, Osman II manages to escape the city on 18 May 1622, probably with the grand vezir and the sheikhulislam (Suleyman Agha and Esad Efendi). He gets to Asia and sets up shop in Egypt, recruiting as he goes. Meanwhile the janissaries are going to be pissed, and will likely elevate the former emperor Mustafa I, who is in his early thirties, just as in OTL. Civil war is highly likely, but the Ottoman Empire has a couple of things going for it. The Habsburgs are clearly busy, and Poland-Lithuania also has its own problems. So the only major opportunistic attacks are going to be made by ma boi Shah Abbas, who'll go after Ottoman Mesopotamia. That's peripheral, and I don't know if he'll be able to make a significant impact on the civil war; perhaps he could try going all the way over to Syria and Anatolia, but that'd be at the end of his logistical tether and he just wants Mesopotamia anyway. Anyway, the janissaries are probably not going to be a match for numerous, gun-armed provincial conscripts. In addition, Abaza Mehmed Pasha is sympathetic to the Osmanlik cause and will provide aid in Anatolia. Might get a two or three year civil war out of this, at most? Murad IV would be helpful to Mustafa's cause, if he were old enough...but right now he's ten years old. Not going to be leading any grand armies to destroy Osman any time soon.
 

Faded Glory

Prelude
Chapter 1


Chapter 2: Death of a Salesman Sickman


“The country is falling to pieces – who can say when?” –Czar Nicholas, 9 January 1853


With the passage of the Religious Freedom Edict of 1856 the Ottoman Empire guaranteed a measure of religious freedom, abolished the capitation tax on non-Muslims, and allowed non-Muslims to become soldiers. It seemed to be a great victory for the reformers in the Empire, and indeed it was. But unfortunately for them, they had built their great tower of reform on a bed of sand. Even before their abandonment by the western powers at the Vienna Conference, there were those in the empire who were suspicious of the westernizing steps the reformist sultans had adopted. After the conference, this sentiment spread as disillusionment gripped the empire, spread by Muslim clerics. Westernphobic tendencies were enflamed, and more and more the measures of reform passed by the Porte were barely acknowledged, let alone enforced by those outside of the capital. But the reformers were not the only reason for Turkish distrust and hatred of their government. Running costs of the Dolmabahche Palace drained two million British pounds a year from the treasury. For comparison sake, the richest province Egypt, gave a yearly tribute of 360,000 British pounds to the Ottomans. Additionally, adjoining domestic palaces were renovated or built.

Predictably enough, when the Religious Freedom Edict was passed, it was accompanied by xenophobic inspired unrest. For the Turks, who had long been losing faith in their government, this was the last straw. The anti-westerners found as their champion the sultan’s own half-brother, Abdulaziz, who by nature found himself suited to the pre-reformed Sultanate. A palace coup succeeded, and in the ensuring commotion, many reformers, such as the Grand Vizier Mehmed Emin Ali, were killed by the rioting crowds.

That, however, was not the end of the matter. The violence in the capital was only a small part of the wider violence that swept the Empire. In Europe, violence erupted between the European and Christian subjects and the Turkish subjects. The worst of this violence occurred in Belgrade, where the Turkish commander ordered the town to be bombarded after crowds had seized control over two of the city’s gates. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, violence erupted between the Maronites and the Druze. The Maronites were an Eastern Catholic group in full communion with the Pope and who were guaranteed protection by the French. The Druze, meanwhile were the ruling Muslim elite. In Egypt,
Muhammad Said, who had replaced his nephew Abbas Hilmi in 1854 as Viceroy of Egypt seemed content to allow events to take their own course with minimal interference. Thus, though not actively encouraging the rebellion throughout the Ottoman Empire, he did nothing to stop it.

The European powers each had their own way of dealing with this new crisis. Russia was suspected of inflaming Slavic hatred of the Ottomans and funding resistance in Serbia and elsewhere. Austria, meanwhile, looked on with great alarm at events, fearing an increase of Russian influence in the region would upset their alliance. Brittan was also alarmed by Russian influence, with fearmongers among them promising that Russia would use this latest crisis to capture Constantinople itself. Britain was also alarmed by France’s movements, as France had threatened to send a large force into Syria in order to protect the Maronites.

In this climate, fear of what actions other nations might take were just as crucial in the decision making process as actual nation’s movements. Thus, for example, an alarmed Britain heard calls from some members of Parliament to invade Constantinople to secure it before the Russians did. These fears were only compounded by local actions by various nations, some of which were taken without the knowledge or authorization of the home governments. Thus, for example, the British fleet was called to Constantinople in order to “show the flag” to discourage both the Turkish anti-reformers from harming British citizens as well as Russia from taking advantage of the situation.

With the situation deteriorating so rapidly, however, the European powers, despite their suspicions of each other, were forced to work together. At the Berlin Conference, the Europeans attempted to display a united front. Because of mutual distrust, no agreement was made on overthrowing the current anti-western regime in Constantinople, as no power wanted to see the armies of another power close to that vital region. Great Britain promised to restore order in Cyprus and Crete; France in Syria and Palestine; Austria in Bosnia and Serbia; and Romania and Bulgaria gained their independence. Egypt was desired by both Great Britain and France but it was made independent instead, as both countries desired anything other than the others presence in Egypt.

Of course, the Ottomans did not accept this dismemberment of their country. Armies spread out from all directions from the capital, confident in their coming victory. Such confidence would mirror the confidence of Republican France when they fought to preserve their freedom 1790s against a similarly formidable coalition, though of course the anti-western Ottomans would not have realized that. Regardless, the Ottomans failed to produce similar military victories, failing to concentrate on any one theatre and so losing in them all.

A postscript to the war occurred when the Bulgarians defeated the Turkish forces at Andrianople. The advancement of Bulgarian forces provoked the always present British fears of a Russian Constantinople, believing that Bulgaria and Russia were in league. This provoked a combined French-British show of force, combined with heavy diplomatic pressure by Austria. Russia, fearing that her gains in the region might be undone if war between the powers were to occur, added its pressure to Bulgaria, resulting in Bulgarian armies halting.

While Russians relatively conservative foreign policy on this issue ensured peace, it was an uneasy peace. The Balkans in particular were a mess. Bosnia and Serbia did not care for their new overlords, while Greece, Bulgaria, and the Ottomans had borders which satisfied none of the three. The crisis had betrayed fundamental distrust among the European powers, though these had of yet not led to war. The question of Egypt divided Britain and France, the issue of the Balkans divided Russia and everyone else, and the Turks were a wildcard who trusted no one and were trusted by no one. Meanwhile, Constantinople remained the golden apple lying in the midst of the councils of Europe.
 
Of course, the Ottomans did not accept this dismemberment of their country. Armies spread out from all directions from the capital, confident in their coming victory. Such confidence would mirror the confidence of Republican France when they fought to preserve their freedom 1790s against a similarly formidable coalition, though of course the anti-western Ottomans would not have realized that. Regardless, the Ottomans failed to produce similar military victories, failing to concentrate on any one theatre and so losing in them all.
.

Damn, I was holding out hope that this would take an insane turn for a second. :mischief:
 
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