Ask a Theologian III

[uppi]

Indeed, it's also important to bear in mind the distinction between laws of physics as they actually are and laws of physics as we understand them. Any physical law that science has deduced is just a model, reflecting what we have observed to happen and what we predict will happen. They are all subject to revision, depending on future observations - even incredibly well established ones like the inverse square law of gravitational attraction (it's just that future observations would have to be pretty startling to undermine laws such as that). They are "laws" in the descriptive sense, meaning that they describe what is always observed to happen, not in the prescriptive sense, meaning that they determine what must happen. So any of these laws might turn out to be incomplete or even plain wrong - at least in theory - and that goes for the law of the conservation of energy.

Good point, and the example of the inverse square law of gravitational attraction is a good example, because in fact it is wrong and has been replaced by General Relativity. For most uses the old law remains an accurate approximation, but there are situations, even classical problems like the trajectory of Mercury, where it fails.

But one has to keep in mind that (if you want to stay in the realm of physics) a new theory with new "laws" must be able to reproduce the current "laws" at least as a limiting case. So a mechanism for a violation of energy conservation must be able to explain why we observe energy to be mostly conserved.

Of course, if you assume a God that can alter the laws of physics at a whim, all bets are off and anything (maybe except for the logical impossible) can happen.

 

[Plotinus]

Is God real?

If by that you mean, "Is there a God?" I would say probably not, but we cannot be certain.

Of course, it depends on what you mean by "God". If you mean merely something beyond the physical, it seems to me perfectly possible that something like that exists, although again it is hard to see how we could know. The physical world is just what we're capable of perceiving and understanding (in some ways). There could be something beyond that.

However, while that may be a reasonable thing to suppose, it seems to me a lot less plausible to suppose that it would be personal in any way. Persons, as we experience them, exist in the physical world - they are physical beings that have appeared in the physical universe as a result of the operation of physical laws. So it's hard to see why, if anything non-physical exists, one would be justified in thinking that it's a person, any more than one would be justified in thinking that it's a blancmange. Of course, just because all the persons we know of are physical does not, in itself, mean that non-physical persons are impossible. On the contrary, there seems no contradiction in the supposition. But it does mean that we'd need very strong reasons to suppose that there were a non-physical person, just as a non-physical blancmange might be conceivable but that fact alone does not make it plausible to suppose that one exists.

I think that the God of classical or Anselmian theism is unlikely to exist, but I waver in how unlikely I think it is.

Wait, how can you be a Calvinist who doesn't believe in Perseverance of the Saints? Doesn't like the whole doctrine depend on it?

Yes, as I said above the "five points" of Calvinism do seem, at least to me, to hang together. But when I said "Calvinism" in that post I meant it in the broad sense of the traditions which are influenced by Calvin rather than just five-point Calvinism.

Also, I may have asked this before (I think it was in my post that I lost) but if I did ask it, it was never answered so: I once had someone tell me they believed in Irresistable Grace but NOT Unconditional Election. Is there any logical way to hold this view? And have any theologians held it?

I just answered that, in post 695.

EDIT: I just realized that I posted two times in a row. Feel free to merge these posts, I forgot to just edit them.

I have merged the posts, but I don't think it's enormously helpful to guess what my answer to someone's question will be, and then answer it yourself... This is Ask A Theologian!

Consequentialist ethics are not nearly as compatible with Christianity (especially Calvinism) as are Virtue Ethics or Deontology.

I'd be interested to know why you think that.

Does the Bible state in clear words different degrees of reward? (I agree they exist but I'm not sure where its found.) I do agree there are at least three (Possibly more) degrees of punishment though.

Matthew 11:21-24; Matthew 16:27; Mark 10:40; Luke 12:42-48; Luke 19:11-27; Hebrews 20:29. How "clear" you think those are will vary, of course. Because neither the authors of those books nor Jesus himself were necessarily thinking in terms that translate neatly to later Christian theology.

Also, what is consequentionalist ethics?

Consequentialism is the philosophical ethical theory that what makes an action right or wrong is its consequences. An action that results in good consequences is a good action, and one that results in bad consequences is a bad one.

There are many, many varieties of consequentialism. For example, some consequentialists think that what makes an action right or wrong is not its actual consequences, but its probable consequences, or perhaps the consequences that the agent expects. Some consequentialists think that each action is made right or wrong by the consequences (or expected consequences) that that action itself has (this is called act consequentialism), but others think that each action is made right or wrong by whether it conforms to a rule, the keeping of which has good or bad consequences (this is called rule consequentialism). Rule consequentialism has the odd result that, on this theory, it may well be the right thing to do to perform an act which has bad consequences, provided that performing that act involves adhering to a rule which overall has good consequences (e.g. following the rule "never tell a lie" may have better consequences than not following it, so one should never tell a lie, even though telling this lie will have bad consequences). Also, some consequentialists think that there is only one right (or morally acceptable) thing to do in any given situation, namely the action which will have the best consequences; but others, known as satsificing consequentialists, think that there may be a range of morally right things to do in any given situation.

Most consequentialists are utilitarians, which means that they consider the consequentialists as objectively as possible - i.e. the best action is the one that has the best consequences irrespective of persons. So whether the consequences are good for me or not (as opposed to good for someone else) is irrelevant to its moral value. Again, there are many different ways in which utilitarians rank actions - i.e. they have different criteria regarding what counts as good and bad. Classic utilitarianism holds that goodness and badness consist solely of pleasure and pain, so a good action is one that produces more pleasure than pain, and a bad action is one that produces more pain than pleasure. But other utilitarians have rejected this and thought that there are other criteria for ranking consequences.

Also, I should point out the difference between Perseverance of the Saints and Eternal Security. The latter essentially says you can do what you want and still be a Chrisitan, even if you turn your back on it, you still won't lose it. Perseverance of the Saints says if you turned your back on it, its evidence that you never had it.

I can't say I see a difference at all. Under what circumstances could one of these doctrines be true and the other not?

Good point, and the example of the inverse square law of gravitational attraction is a good example, because in fact it is wrong and has been replaced by General Relativity. For most uses the old law remains an accurate approximation, but there are situations, even classical problems like the trajectory of Mercury, where it fails.

But one has to keep in mind that (if you want to stay in the realm of physics) a new theory with new "laws" must be able to reproduce the current "laws" at least as a limiting case. So a mechanism for a violation of energy conservation must be able to explain why we observe energy to be mostly conserved.

Of course, if you assume a God that can alter the laws of physics at a whim, all bets are off and anything (maybe except for the logical impossible) can happen.

Yes, these are all very good points.

 

[Atticus]

Sorry, this is a bit tangential, but anyway...

But one has to keep in mind that (if you want to stay in the realm of physics) a new theory with new "laws" must be able to reproduce the current "laws" at least as a limiting case. So a mechanism for a violation of energy conservation must be able to explain why we observe energy to be mostly conserved.

Are you familiar with Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions? Kuhn says that in general the new theories are incommensurable with the old ones, they speak in whole different terms, and even the questions they regard as relevant are different. The skip from Newton to Einstein would probably be weak case of this, but for example before Newton the question "why do things fall?" considered good one, and after him it was only "how do things fall?"

I don't exactly remember the examples Kuhn gave on this subject, they were mostly from biology and electromagnetism, IIRC. I also got the feeling that he needed this incommensurability for his own theory about the theories to work, but anyhow, the book is a good read. Kuhn himself was physicists btw, to increase his credentials.

 

[uppi]

Sorry, this is a bit tangential, but anyway...


Are you familiar with Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions? Kuhn says that in general the new theories are incommensurable with the old ones, they speak in whole different terms, and even the questions they regard as relevant are different. The skip from Newton to Einstein would probably be weak case of this, but for example before Newton the question "why do things fall?" considered good one, and after him it was only "how do things fall?"

I don't exactly remember the examples Kuhn gave on this subject, they were mostly from biology and electromagnetism, IIRC. I also got the feeling that he needed this incommensurability for his own theory about the theories to work, but anyhow, the book is a good read. Kuhn himself was physicists btw, to increase his credentials.

No, I am not familiar with his work. My first reaction based on your description is twofold: One the one hand, I think it is sort of the definition of a scientific revolution that it speaks in different terms and uses a different viewpoint and framework. To be revolutionary, a new theory has to discard the cruft of the old theories and put all things into a new (and hopefully more elegant) perspective.
On the other hand, I think that to be scientific there needs to be one connection between the old and the new theories and that is their connection to observations made about nature. A new theory might offer a better explanation and use different terms, but in the end it has to describe the same observations as the old ones.


But to avoid getting too much off-topic: Are there revolutions in theology, where new viewpoints totally alter the structure of theology afterwards? If yes what would be examples of such revolutions? Would you consider the Reformation movements as such a revolution?

 

[Quackers]

Can you sin in heaven?

 

[Whiskey_Lord]

Satan sinned in heaven, apparently.

 

[GamezRule]

Then God made hell. However, you can't leave heaven supposedly, so if you do sin in heaven, what happens?

 

[Plotinus]

But to avoid getting too much off-topic: Are there revolutions in theology, where new viewpoints totally alter the structure of theology afterwards? If yes what would be examples of such revolutions? Would you consider the Reformation movements as such a revolution?

I would say that in theology there are indeed revolutions which bring about completely new ways of looking at things. However, when this happens, the old ways don't go away. Instead, the new viewpoint coexists with the old one. This is why, as history progresses, theology becomes ever more complicated, as more and more viewpoints emerge, but the old ones don't necessarily become obsolete. That's one respect in which it differs from science.

Actually in that respect theology is no different from most of the humanities, and indeed from culture in general.

So the Reformation would certainly count as such an occasion - indeed, perhaps more than one. Others would be the combining of Christian theology with Greek philosophy that occurred in various stages between the second and fifth centuries; the theology of Augustine; the rediscovery of Aristotle in the Middle Ages; and the theology of Schleiermacher and the rise of liberal theology in the nineteenth century. Those are perhaps the major ones but of course there have been many more minor ones. In each case, new ideas are generated which subsequent thinkers have to take into account, whether they agree with them or not.

Can you sin in heaven?

That depends on what you mean by "heaven", but probably not. Augustine said that in the resurrection life - if that's what you mean - human beings will not have the ability to choose sin, but this represents a greater freedom than the ability to choose it.

Satan sinned in heaven, apparently.

Only if you think "heaven" is where Satan was. Origen thought that before creation all souls - whether human, demonic, or angelic - were united to God, but all of them (apart from one) sinned and fell away from him to varying degrees. The world was created to catch them and provide an arena for them to recover their goodness, and ultimately they will all be united to God once again. A problem with this view is that it doesn't explain what's to stop them all from sinning again.

 

[uppi]

I would say that in theology there are indeed revolutions which bring about completely new ways of looking at things. However, when this happens, the old ways don't go away. Instead, the new viewpoint coexists with the old one. This is why, as history progresses, theology becomes ever more complicated, as more and more viewpoints emerge, but the old ones don't necessarily become obsolete. That's one respect in which it differs from science.

But some viewpoints do become obsolete, don't they? Are there viewpoints which have been defeated so soundly, that nobody doing serious theology dares to pick them up? And I guess, there are probably viewpoints that would still be tenable, but they are so unpopular that you won't find anyone seriously defending them. (Except for a few crackpots that are not interested in an honest discussion as they exist in science).

Or am I wrong and for almost every viewpoint there is someone seriously trying to defend it?

 

[Whiskey_Lord]

So the world is god's trash receptacle, where the trash waits before it is thrown into the furnace. Got it.

 

[Sveon]

What about St. Peter being a man with a vision, and he made it all up? Only explanation that makes a lick of sense.

 

[Dachs]

Plotinus, how much do you know about the language of holy war used by the Carolingian Empire? I half-remember asking you something similar about Sergios, Herakleios, and the Last Persian War, but don't recall anything about the stuff Charlemagne was saying about his Avar and Saxon wars and so forth.

So the world is god's trash receptacle, where the trash waits before it is thrown into the furnace. Got it.

No, just New Jersey.

 

[_random_]

Only if you think "heaven" is where Satan was. Origen thought that before creation all souls - whether human, demonic, or angelic - were united to God, but all of them (apart from one) sinned and fell away from him to varying degrees. The world was created to catch them and provide an arena for them to recover their goodness, and ultimately they will all be united to God once again. A problem with this view is that it doesn't explain what's to stop them all from sinning again.

Did Origen ever address this issue? I seem to recall a critic of his describing an infinite cycle of fall and reunion in Origenism.

 

[Plotinus]

But some viewpoints do become obsolete, don't they? Are there viewpoints which have been defeated so soundly, that nobody doing serious theology dares to pick them up? And I guess, there are probably viewpoints that would still be tenable, but they are so unpopular that you won't find anyone seriously defending them. (Except for a few crackpots that are not interested in an honest discussion as they exist in science).

Or am I wrong and for almost every viewpoint there is someone seriously trying to defend it?

You could say that heresies are viewpoints that have (mostly) become obsolete. You won't find many people defending Arianism or Nestorianism, for example - although you'll certainly find people accusing other people of defending them.

Any viewpoint is tenable to some degree, but they can be killed off if either (a) the assumptions which underlie them are shown to be so defective that no-one is going to want to defend them, or (b) the cultural context in which they arise itself becomes obsolete. For example, Valentinianism may have been viable in the second or third centuries, but it's hard to imagine anyone believing it today, simply because the kind of mythology it used is basically incomprehensible to the modern mind.

So the world is god's trash receptacle, where the trash waits before it is thrown into the furnace. Got it.

What are you talking about?

What about St. Peter being a man with a vision, and he made it all up? Only explanation that makes a lick of sense.

Made what up, exactly? Christianity doesn't derive from Peter alone.

Plotinus, how much do you know about the language of holy war used by the Carolingian Empire? I half-remember asking you something similar about Sergios, Herakleios, and the Last Persian War, but don't recall anything about the stuff Charlemagne was saying about his Avar and Saxon wars and so forth.

I'm afraid I don't know anything about that, but I'll see if I can find out.

Did Origen ever address this issue? I seem to recall a critic of his describing an infinite cycle of fall and reunion in Origenism.

I don't think he did address that. So he does, perhaps, leave open the possibility of an infinite cycle of that kind, but certainly he doesn't defend such a view. Origen believes in a very long cycle of universes, but not an infinite one; if there were to be a cycle of cycles of universes it would get too huge to comprehend!

 

[GhostWriter16]

I can't say I see a difference at all. Under what circumstances could one of these doctrines be true and the other not?

Eternal Security is, or at least, I've been taught that it is, basically saying once you've done whatever you would say is necessary to become a Christian, you're good no matter what, even if you commit apostasy you are still good. On the other hand, Perseverance of the Saints means that if you're life shows clear evidence you are not saved according to the Bible, you were just never saved in the first place.

And of course, thank you for the answers!

EDIT:

I don't know if any theologians have believed this, because I don't really know much about the history of Calvinism (I must admit I find pretty much everything about the Reformed tradition, from its history to its theology, deathly dull and unsympathetic). As I understand it, Arminians - including Wesleyans, if we count them as Arminian - hold the doctrine of Total Depravity but reject the other four, at least to some degree, but I don't know if anyone has rejected just the two you mention and held the others.

It doesn't seem a contradiction to me, at least not in the way you suggest. Unconditional Election means that when God graciously saves someone, it is not on the basis of any kind of action or merit on their part. Irresistible Grace means that when God graciously saves someone, that person is definitely saved and nothing they can do will un-save them.

So it is surely conceivable that God could choose to save people on the basis of how good they have been in the past (if so, the doctrine of Unconditional Election would be false), but once he has made that decision, nothing they subsequently do could reverse or counteract God's decision (if so, the doctrine of Irresistible Grace would be true).

However, it seems to me that to believe in Total Depravity but to reject Unconditional Election is, if not a contradiction, at least rather implausible; this would involve saying that although all actions are sinful, God neverthless saves some people on the basis of their actions, but not others. Of course, the doctrine of Total Depravity does not involve saying that all human actions are equally bad (that would be the highly implausible doctrine of Utter Depravity), so it could be that God could rank people on the basis of their actions even though all those actions are sinful; but then it seems to me that the notion of "sin" as something distinct from "morally wrong" becomes very weak. I can understand the notion of "sin" as something distinct from "morally wrong" if, say, "sin" means an act that God disapproves of; but to reject the doctrine of Unconditional Election is to say that God does approve of some acts; which would seem to mean that not all acts are sinful after all, at least not in that sense. In which case, in what other sense could they be sinful? If to perform a sinful act doesn't mean to do something morally wrong, and it doesn't mean to do something that God disapproves of, what does it mean?

For that reason, it does seem to me that the five points of orthodox Calvinism hang together quite well. To hold some but not others isn't impossible but it would require a bit of fancy footwork to explain how the system is consistent.

Most Christians I know of accept at least one of the points, yet only a few accept all five.

What is the difference between Total and Utter Depravity?

BTW: I would define Total Depravity as meaning that man, on its own, cannot choose to do good in his heart (Which Jesus stresses is more important or at least as important as the actions.) So the way I see it, according to this doctrine, I could choose to help the poor man down the street, but if I did, my motive would be selfish since it was not for Christ and so, in my heart, was still sin.

Does that make sense? And how close is it to the correct definition?

Also, where are we getting the doctrine that God saves people "Based on how good they are?" Jesus specifically states repentence and belief, not good works, make Salvation. James then makes it clear that once you are a Christian, if your faith is to be real, you will have works.

Also (Unrelated, but related to something you said awhile ago), I recall you saying Pelagian believed that everyone was always in control of their own state of Salvation or Damnation. If sins after Baptism could never be saved, how is this so?

 

[Plotinus]

Eternal Security is, or at least, I've been taught that it is, basically saying once you've done whatever you would say is necessary to become a Christian, you're good no matter what, even if you commit apostasy you are still good. On the other hand, Perseverance of the Saints means that if you're life shows clear evidence you are not saved according to the Bible, you were just never saved in the first place.

All right, I think I see a distinction there. Perserverance of the Saints sounds suspiciously close to Messalianism to me (this is the heretical view that, if you're not consciously aware of the activity of the Holy Spirit in your life, he's not there).

And of course, thank you for the answers!

Most Christians I know of accept at least one of the points, yet only a few accept all five.

That's interesting. Most of the Christians I know wouldn't accept any of them. In fact I'm not sure I know any Christians who accept any of them.

What is the difference between Total and Utter Depravity?

As I understand it, Utter Depravity is the doctrine that everything we do is as sinful as it could be. (Or it may be that everything that we do is morally wrong as well as sinful.) That's distinct from the doctrine of Total Depravity, which is only that everything we do is sinful.

BTW: I would define Total Depravity as meaning that man, on its own, cannot choose to do good in his heart (Which Jesus stresses is more important or at least as important as the actions.) So the way I see it, according to this doctrine, I could choose to help the poor man down the street, but if I did, my motive would be selfish since it was not for Christ and so, in my heart, was still sin.

Does that make sense? And how close is it to the correct definition?

As I understand it, that is pretty much it. It effectively means that everything we do is sinful, although not everything we do is wrong.

Also, where are we getting the doctrine that God saves people "Based on how good they are?" Jesus specifically states repentence and belief, not good works, make Salvation.

I don't think Jesus said that. In fact, if you actually read the Synoptic Gospels, you will find that Jesus almost never mentions repentance. Mark 1:15 has Jesus calling upon people to repent, but this is Mark's own summary of Jesus' message rather than Jesus' words, and it seems that at this point Mark is basically attributing to Jesus the same message as John the Baptist (who certainly did call upon people to repent). The Gospels generally portray Jesus as happily mixing with sinners but not telling them to repent - instead he accepted them as they were (although of course some of them are portrayed as repenting, such as Zacchaeus). This would explain the hostility shown towards Jesus by other religious figures, since if he'd spent his time telling sinners to repent they would have approved of that, but spending time with sinners and not telling them to repent is another matter. (See Mt. 11:19.)

There are plenty of passages in the Gospels that teach salvation by works, or at the very least, salvation on the basis of works - especially in Matthew. E.g. Mt. 7:21-23; 10:40-42; 12:50; 13:47-50; 16:27; 18:23-35; 25:31-46. Of course there are many references to "faith" as well, but whether that means belief isn't so clear.

James then makes it clear that once you are a Christian, if your faith is to be real, you will have works.

I don't think that James makes that "clear". I think that James says that salvation is on the basis of works, but Christians who deny salvation by works have traditionally interpreted that to mean what you said. That may be a possible interpretation but I don't see how it's a "clear" one.

In any case, you can't assume that Jesus and James were even both talking about "salvation" at all. How often is Jesus represented as talking about that? Hardly ever; he talks mostly about the kingdom of God. Of course, Christians who are used to the concept of "salvation" from other parts of the New Testament interpret these sayings, or at least some of them, as referring to the same thing. But why assume that? The whole "salvation" issue is something of a post-Jesus phenomenon, I think. In fact I would say that it is, to some extent, a modern phenomenon. The New Testament doesn't talk about it all that much and the church fathers and medieval theologians were not, for the most part, particularly interested in it. It seems to me that it's the Protestant tradition, especially the Reformed tradition and those influenced by it, who are obsessed with the question of what salvation is, how one becomes saved, and who the saved are. (Which is rather unbiblical; note that Paul, for example, when he talks about salvation, invariably regards it as something future - so one may hope to become saved, but one is not described as "saved" now.) But trying to shoehorn biblical texts that use all sorts of different kinds of vocabulary into that one issue, and that one vocabulary, doesn't seem to me the right way to proceed. It's better to try to understand each text in its own terms. In which case, one shouldn't ask what Jesus said about "salvation" in the first place; one should ask what Jesus said about the kingdom of God.

Also (Unrelated, but related to something you said awhile ago), I recall you saying Pelagian believed that everyone was always in control of their own state of Salvation or Damnation. If sins after Baptism could never be saved, how is this so?

I suppose the idea is that we are always in control of our state of salvation or damnation unless we voluntary give up that control. I don't know what Pelagius would say about someone who sins after baptism and subsequently repents and wants to live a good life again, but it does seem as if his theology is unable to accommodate the notion that such a person could be saved.

 

[Elrohir]

If I could interject --

I recall hearing a description of Judaism as a very ethnocentric and geographically based religion and paradigm concerning God. I remember the lecture saying that at the time of Abraham, who was apparently a polytheist, the majority belief was that the Abrahamic God was tied to the land of Israel intimately and was considered the place where God was. And in fact the God Abraham worshipped was considered the chief deity in a pantheon of gods. By being tied to a region, if a Jew were to leave Israel, it was like leaving the territory in which God resided, and explains the attachment to the Temple in Israel and why it was such a tragedy that Jews were dispersed across the world away from Israel/God. This sentiment of geographical regions being tied to god(s) sounds very much like Hindu beliefs as well.

My (overly long) post:

Spoiler :

I think it's extremely difficult to make claims of this sort, and I honestly don't think the evidence supports it terribly well, on the whole.

I think we first need to acknowledge that the main impetus for Judaism being an ethnically and/or geographically based religion comes from the Temple period. Following the destruction of the Temple, it obviously changed away from it, and during that period it makes sense that those in charge of the Temple in Jerusalem would want to emphasize Jerusalem's place as a necessary site of worship, for the purposes of controlling the worshipers of the day. This can be seen in particular with the tensions between religion of the Jews in the South, centered around the Temple, and the Samaritans, who worshiped elsewhere. The exact specifics of how Judaism was before the Temple period are hard to historically pin down, but I think we can make the following practically tautologous statement: given that they had the Pentateuch at the end of the Temple period, either the Pentateuch originated within the Temple period, or originated before it. (Or a combination: it originated before it, and was modified in it) This seems rather reasonable to assume.

So while we can't exactly say what Abraham or Moses believed (Or, historically, whether they existed), we can at least get a decent picture of what Jews in the early to mid first millennium BC thought on the subject. And I think, overall, that's a mixed picture, as they seemed to have believed that Israel was a chosen people, but that Yahweh was not exclusively worshiped by Jews; and that other gods may or may not have existed, but Yahweh was greater.

The first part -- that Israel was a chosen people -- is hardly controversial, so I'm not going to go into it. But the textual evidence that non-Jews worshiped Yahweh too is actually pretty decent. Moses' father in law, Jethro, the priest of Midian, (Or Reul, depending) seems to have worshiped Yahweh, although not exclusively. (In Exodus 18:11 Jethro says, "Now I know that the LORD is greater than all other gods, for he did this to those who had treated Israel arrogantly.") There's very little reason to believe that he was a Jew -- Moses supposedly married a Kushite (Someone from the Sudan -- see Numbers 12 for a really interesting passage where Moses' siblings get smacked down for not liking it), which would mean in order for Jethro to be a Jew, Moses would have had to had picked up a second wife somewhere, and not mentioned it anywhere in the Pentateuch. This is supported by some interpretations of the really, really weird passage in Exodus 4:24-26, in which it seems -- it's really weird and not clear at all -- that Zipporah, Moses' wife, disapproves of circumcision. The simplest explanation for that would be that her family didn't practice it.

When you add all that in with other Biblical stories -- like Job's worship of Yahweh (In the pre-Temple period, too, although the story seems to have been written fairly late) -- and it certainly doesn't seem like there was much of an idea that Judaism was, at least initially, an ethnically based religion.

And given that God was said to have guided the Jews to Israel from Egypt, and then rescued them from Babylon, I'm really not sure where the idea that God was geographically limited comes from. I suspect it's a misunderstanding of the emphasis on centralized worship at the Temple in Jerusalem -- they did seem to have a pretty strong idea that the Temple was where you were supposed to worship, and you couldn't really worship God properly away from it. (At least, once the Temple existed -- they didn't seem to have any problems with the Tabernacle that was said to precede it, or even just random mountains or piles of stones before that) And there was the idea that God "resided" in the Holy of Holies, to some extent. But that wasn't because of the geography, but because He liked Israel, and that's where He decided they should live. (Remember, God was supposed to have brought them there, and He was also supposed to have watched over Abraham as he traveled from Mesopotamia to Egypt and so on.)

In short: I really don't think you can make clear historical arguments about what Moses or Abraham believed, because we can't historically prove that they existed. But there were quite old ideas that Judaism was not strictly ethnically or geographically based, and given that that actually ran counter to a lot of the political motivations that the priesthood and monarchy would have had at this time, there has to be a reason they didn't really edit those old texts.

I've rambled on for quite too long, but I hope that at least gave you something to think about. I spoiled this, Plotinus, so it wouldn't take up a whole lot of room -- sorry for hijacking your thread!

Also, Plotinus -- you've may have answered this already, so I apologize if so -- what can you tell me about the historical doctrine of limbo? The impression I got is that it came about post-Augustine. Were there pre-Augustinian conceptions of limbo? Do you know who is credited with the first real formulation of the idea of Limbo?

 

[Eran of Arcadia]

Plot, I seem to recall that you mentioned that theologians/anthropologists/whomever distinguish between "religion" and "magic". What is the difference? I had thought there was no agreed-upon definition of "magic" in this context (colloquially, it means "invoking forces I, the speaker, don't believe in" and is pretty much always used pejoratively).

 

[burleyman]

This is a difficult and controversial question, since Augustine's views on this matter were complex and evolving. As I understand it, Augustine believed that all human beings (other than Jesus) are sinful, in two senses

Did Augustine believe that Mary was sinful? If she was born free of Original Sin, does that mean or imply that she did not sin?

 

[Japanrocks12]

Which historical Christian groups believed in salvation by good works? I've only ever heard of people rejecting it in favor of salvation by faith alone.