[RD] Ask a Theologian V

[MilesGregarius]

So do you think he's accurate in assessing Francis as completely deviating from normal Catholic teaching in that regard? And if so, why has Francis become such a widely venerated figure within the Catholic Church?

I think you answered your own question there. Francis seems in many ways to be bringing official Church doctrine more in to line with the feelings of a great many Catholics. He also appears to represent a clergy more aligned with providing hope and comfort to the laity than a clergy primarily concerned with policing the thoughts and behaviors of the laity such as Benedict and even JP II did.

 

[_random_]

I was referring to St. Francis of Assisi, whom White views as strongly heretical. The current Pope Francis wasn't in power when that lecture was given. Although being the namesake of a Pope is certainly another indicator of wide acceptance by church hierarchy.

 

[MilesGregarius]

Sorry. Didn't realize which Francis you were referring to.

As far as why St. Francis is revered despite not toeing the party line per se, few Catholics are bothered by the intricacies of Church doctrine. "St. Francis the paragon of compassion" trumps "St. Francis the (arguably) heretical" for all but the most rigidly dogmatic.

 

[Plotinus]

Francis of Assisi wasn't remotely heretical though. I do think White's wrong to say that he was. His concern for the natural world may have been unusual but I don't think it conflicted with any "teaching" of the church.

On Pope Francis, I don't think it's accurate to say he's "bringing official Church doctrine more in to line with the feelings of a great many Catholics". He hasn't made any alterations at all to official church doctrine, and indeed the power of the Pope to do so is quite limited. What's he done is to emphasise slightly different things which show a bit more understanding of people's situations than Benedict did. Benedict was really out of his depth, I think - an academic thrust into a position of pastoral leadership.

 

[Mouthwash]

This isn't strictly theology-related, but I think it could be useful. Compare moral realism (the viewpoint that moral properties are 'real') and moral anti-realism (the viewpoint that moral properties are not real, at least outside of subjective judgement). If we assume that anti-realism is true, than no moral state exists in the universe. But if we assume the opposite, that moral properties are true and objective, than a moral state does exist. Now since the existence of a moral state is more moral than the nonexistence of such, it follows that moral properties can be objectively real. Thus, moral realism is true by definition.

Do you think this works? Could it be seen as analogous to the Ontological argument?

Even proving the existence of a higher power would be pretty impressive.

One of the common criticisms of Aquinas' arguments for God is that they don't prove God, just something. Which seems to me rather a weak criticism, given that it would still be quite a discovery to show that there must exist a First Cause, Necessary Being, or whatever, even if you can't prove that it has the traditional omni-properties.

I'm really overstating it here. It's just something which if a lot of unwarranted assumptions are taken may lead more or less to our position in the hierarchy of existence, but ultimately doesn't say anything that can be taken as 'evidence'. I'm kind of embarrassed to have jumped to conclusions like that.

More or less, yes. More exactly, the Nicene Creed states that the Son is fully divine. It is less clear that Jesus=the Son or that Jesus/the Son is fully human, though I think that it's fair to say these things are implied. It was the Chalcedonian Definition that set this stuff out more clearly, in particular the formula that Christ is one person with two natures. (Sadly they forgot to say what "person" or "nature" mean, but you can't have everything.)

The difference between Chalcedonian christianity and Monophysitism seems difficult to comprehend. Even if there is something very subtle I am missing between the two doctrines, this goes beyond splitting hairs. Why did these people view each other as heretics?

 

[Arakhor]

I think that if you can ever expect any acrimony over splitting hairs, it's certain to be found in religion.

 

[Tigranes]

I think that if you can ever expect any acrimony over splitting hairs, it's certain to be found in religion.

You have never attended PhD defenses in secular universities then. One time 3 opposing professors grilled poor candidate over his title for over 30 minutes. Just the title. I am kidding you not.

 

[Arakhor]

Isn't that part of the point for a PhD defence?

 

[Tigranes]

The difference between Chalcedonian christianity and Monophysitism seems difficult to comprehend. Even if there is something very subtle I am missing between the two doctrines, this goes beyond splitting hairs. Why did these people view each other as heretics?

My Church and the history of my people in large extent were defined by those perceived differences. I don't see it as necessarily as a bad thing in itself, as St. Paul puts it: For there must be also heresies among you, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you.

There is an ongoing ecumenical dialog between Orthodox (such as Russian or Greek) and Oriental Orthodox (such as Armenian or Coptic) Churches started in the last century.
Both sides already acknowledged that main differences are steaming from historical and semantic peculiarities, rather than being something irreconcilable in essence.

 

[Mouthwash]

I think that if you can ever expect any acrimony over splitting hairs, it's certain to be found in religion.

In Judaism most of the schisms have to do with legal issues, or the proper way of living, or eschatological arguments. (Take Reform/Orthodox as an example, or Sadducees/Pharisees.)

 

[Plotinus]

This isn't strictly theology-related, but I think it could be useful. Compare moral realism (the viewpoint that moral properties are 'real') and moral anti-realism (the viewpoint that moral properties are not real, at least outside of subjective judgement). If we assume that anti-realism is true, than no moral state exists in the universe. But if we assume the opposite, that moral properties are true and objective, than a moral state does exist. Now since the existence of a moral state is more moral than the nonexistence of such, it follows that moral properties can be objectively real. Thus, moral realism is true by definition.

Do you think this works? Could it be seen as analogous to the Ontological argument?

I'm afraid it doesn't seem to me to work. Let me try to set out the argument as I understand it more structurally:

(1) If anti-realism is true, no moral state exists.
(2) If realism is true, a moral state exists.
(3) It is more moral for a moral state to exist than for one not to exist.
(4) So the truth of realism would be more moral than the truth of non-realism (from 1, 2, and 3).
(5) Therefore realism is true.

I don't see how you get from (4) to (5). The only way to do it, as far as I can tell, would be to have an additional premise along the lines of:

(4') The most moral situation is the true one.

If you add that premise in, then the argument is valid, but the problem now is that (4') seems entirely unsupported, not to mention implausible.

So I don't see how your conclusion can plausibly follow from your premises.

In addition to this, premise (3) seems very questionable to me. I don't see why the existence of a moral state should necessarily be more moral than the non-existence of one. I'd have thought that it would be better to have no moral state at all than a very immoral one, for example. And a non-realist would probably hold that the notion of "moral states" beyond subjective opinions is meaningless anyway, in which case your use of this language reflects realist assumptions to start with.

The difference between Chalcedonian christianity and Monophysitism seems difficult to comprehend. Even if there is something very subtle I am missing between the two doctrines, this goes beyond splitting hairs. Why did these people view each other as heretics?

As Tigranes says, they're pretty relaxed about it all now. But the difference between the two was perfectly clear at the time. Chalcedonians believed that Christ had two natures, and Monophysites that he had only one. This wasn't just hair-splitting, though it may seem like it at first glance given that they all accepted the same basic understanding of the incarnation, i.e. that Christ consisted of two basic "bits", the divine Son (his divine nature) and a human bit which was united to it. The dispute was over the status of that human bit - whether it counted as a "nature" or not. The Monophysites thought that "nature" meant a really existent thing, in which case to say that Christ's human bit was a "nature" was to say that it was a thing in its own right alongside the divine nature. This would mean that Christ was really a partnership of two things rather than a genuine unity. And that would in turn mean that humanity and divinity were not really united in him. The Chalcedonians, on the other hand, thought that if Christ's human bit wasn't a human nature then he wasn't really human at all. This would again have the consequence that humanity and divinity were not really united in him.

The vital thing to understand is that this cut to the very heart of Orthodox Christianity. The central idea is that, in the incarnation, humanity is united to divinity, and this makes it possible for human beings in general to unite to God and ultimately become divine themselves. That's what salvation consists of. So any theology that denies the true union of divinity and humanity in the incarnation undermines the basis of Christianity, at least on this understanding of it. That is why people took these disagreements so seriously, and I'd say that, given the presuppositions with which they were working, they were right to do so.

 

[Mouthwash]

I'm afraid it doesn't seem to me to work. Let me try to set out the argument as I understand it more structurally:

(1) If anti-realism is true, no moral state exists.
(2) If realism is true, a moral state exists.
(3) It is more moral for a moral state to exist than for one not to exist.
(4) So the truth of realism would be more moral than the truth of non-realism (from 1, 2, and 3).
(5) Therefore realism is true.

I don't see how you get from (4) to (5).

Accepting (4) requires you to accept that something is objectively more moral than another thing. So (5) ought to be something along that line, while (6) should be the conclusion instead.

In addition to this, premise (3) seems very questionable to me. I don't see why the existence of a moral state should necessarily be more moral than the non-existence of one. I'd have thought that it would be better to have no moral state at all than a very immoral one, for example.

I'm not comparing the moral state that *would* exist to a completely neutral state, I'm saying that it is 'moral' for things to have their moral qualities. For instance, a state of unnecessary suffering and decay ought to be immoral, rather than being meaningless.

And a non-realist would probably hold that the notion of "moral states" beyond subjective opinions is meaningless anyway, in which case your use of this language reflects realist assumptions to start with.

Yes, but I'm using it as a theoretical concept; if it exists, so-and-so. Isn't that how the Ontological argument works?

 

[Atticus]

Doesn't there need to be a moral agent for something to be moral or immoral. For example, it makes no sense to say that a rain is immoral, since nobody is responsible for that. Similarly, the argument would (imo) make sense only if there's someone to blame if the world lacks objective morals (creator, that is).

 

[Plotinus]

Accepting (4) requires you to accept that something is objectively more moral than another thing. So (5) ought to be something along that line, while (6) should be the conclusion instead.

OK, the argument then becomes valid, but it doesn't work because you've smuggled the conclusion into one of the premises, viz.:

I'm not comparing the moral state that *would* exist to a completely neutral state, I'm saying that it is 'moral' for things to have their moral qualities. For instance, a state of unnecessary suffering and decay ought to be immoral, rather than being meaningless.

That's where you've smuggled the conclusion into the premise. You're assuming a realist understanding of "moral" when you say that a world with moral facts is more morally significant than one without. If you assume that morality requires moral facts, then of course that's true. But if you don't then it isn't. Someone who rejected the notion of moral facts would simply deny that a universe with moral facts is more morally significant than one without, because that person would say that morality has nothing to do with moral facts. E.g. they might say that a world containing unnecessary suffering would indeed be immoral, but you don't need to believe in objective moral facts to assert this, because "X is immoral" is not the assertion of a moral fact. If this is so then a world with moral facts (even supposing such a thing to be coherent) wouldn't be any more morally significant than one without, and your premise is false.

Yes, but I'm using it as a theoretical concept; if it exists, so-and-so. Isn't that how the Ontological argument works?

Yes, to a certain extent, but your argument is structurally different because it lacks a key component of the ontological argument, which is the inherent superlative. God is defined as maximally great, or perfect, or whatever, which is supposed to entail that he exists - he has to be the greatest possible thing. But the notion of objective morality doesn't have any counterpart to that element to drive your argument, which is one reason I think it lacks the intuitive force of the ontological argument (though it arguably fails for a similar reason).

Doesn't there need to be a moral agent for something to be moral or immoral. For example, it makes no sense to say that a rain is immoral, since nobody is responsible for that. Similarly, the argument would (imo) make sense only if there's someone to blame if the world lacks objective morals (creator, that is).

I think "moral" is being used more widely than that. It's not just about attributing praise or blame, it's about evaluating whether things are good or not. E.g. an earthquake isn't immoral, in the sense that there's no-one to blame for all the suffering it causes, but it's bad in a wider sense in that the world would be better without all that suffering.

 

[Mouthwash]

That's where you've smuggled the conclusion into the premise. You're assuming a realist understanding of "moral" when you say that a world with moral facts is more morally significant than one without. If you assume that morality requires moral facts, then of course that's true. But if you don't then it isn't. Someone who rejected the notion of moral facts would simply deny that a universe with moral facts is more morally significant than one without, because that person would say that morality has nothing to do with moral facts. E.g. they might say that a world containing unnecessary suffering would indeed be immoral, but you don't need to believe in objective moral facts to assert this, because "X is immoral" is not the assertion of a moral fact.

I don't understand this at all. How could you make moral judgments without believing in moral facts? Am I using bad terminology?

Yes, to a certain extent, but your argument is structurally different because it lacks a key component of the ontological argument, which is the inherent superlative. God is defined as maximally great, or perfect, or whatever, which is supposed to entail that he exists - he has to be the greatest possible thing. But the notion of objective morality doesn't have any counterpart to that element to drive your argument, which is one reason I think it lacks the intuitive force of the ontological argument (though it arguably fails for a similar reason).

I suppose you're right. But I don't see how it's less intuitive; morality is something that either exists or doesn't, while 'greatness' is not, in my opinion, even a coherent concept.

 

[Agent327]

I don't understand this at all. How could you make moral judgments without believing in moral facts? Am I using bad terminology?

What Plotinus is saying, in his usual eloquent manner, is that your argument is circular: "you've smuggled the conclusion in the premise."

 

[Mouthwash]

What Plotinus is saying, in his usual eloquent manner, is that your argument is circular: "you've smuggled the conclusion in the premise."

I'm aware. And I don't comprehend his viewpoint.

 

[Plotinus]

Well, someone might hold that "Murder is wrong" might look an assertion of a moral fact, i.e. a fact about the universe beyond people's opinions, but actually it's only an assertion of social preference and really means something like "Society condemns murder". Someone who thinks this would deny that a world with moral facts is more morally significant than one without, because she thinks that morality has nothing to do with supposed moral facts one way or the other.

(I'm using "moral facts" here to mean non-natural facts about actions or objects rather than people's attitudes, which is what I take it you mean by "objective morality".)

Have a look at this for more on this whole topic.

 

[Agent327]

I'm aware. And I don't comprehend his viewpoint.

Pointing out that your argument is circular is not 'a viewpoint'. It either is or isn't. And I tend to agree with his observation. I don't think there are 'moral facts' or an 'absolute morality'. Morality is always about people, i.e. relative. Consider the proposition 'God is absolutely good'. That doesn't relate to anything unless there are also people who might appreciate it. Without people the 'absolute morality' of God has no meaning (assuming there are no other Gods). That is because morality isn't something absolute, but rather social.

Plotinus is following your line of argument about moral facts, and in doing so, trying to show it is not logically sound. That's very polite of him, but I simply don't see how morality can exist outside of humanity. (See example above.) Holding that moral facts and absolute morality exist, that is a viewpoint. But not the only one possible. There's nothing moral about any fact per se: it is the interpretation of any fact that decides its (im)morality. 'Hitler was responsible for the deaths of millions of people' is, arguably, a fact. But whether there is any (im)morality about that fact hinges on whether you agree that (mass) murder is wrong, i.e. an opinion. Hitler might have felt this was not wrong, but we tend to think it is indeed quite wrong. (Again, opinions.) And yet, there are plenty of people responsible for the deaths of many people, which we generally don't agree being immoral. (Again, opinion.)

 

[Mouthwash]

Well, someone might hold that "Murder is wrong" might look an assertion of a moral fact, i.e. a fact about the universe beyond people's opinions, but actually it's only an assertion of social preference and really means something like "Society condemns murder". Someone who thinks this would deny that a world with moral facts is more morally significant than one without, because she thinks that morality has nothing to do with supposed moral facts one way or the other.

Every time I say "x is wrong" while discussing metaethics I think it should be assumed that it's about an objective moral fact. Talking about morality as a 'social preference' is useful in colloquial language, but what purpose does it serve in philosophy? If you are talking about subjective preferences than you should say subjective preferences.

I'm saying that since the existence of objective morality is, by definition, more objectively moral than its nonexistence, some kind of moral standard must be true. Every time I use the word "morality", assume I'm referring to the realist definition of it.

Pointing out that your argument is circular is not 'a viewpoint'. It either is or isn't.

Semantics. Fine, I should have said 'argument.' And this sentence is somewhat ironic in light of your views on morality.

Morality is always about people, i.e. relative. Consider the proposition 'God is absolutely good'. That doesn't relate to anything unless there are also people who might appreciate it. Without people the 'absolute morality' of God has no meaning (assuming there are no other Gods). That is because morality isn't something absolute, but rather social.

Nope, we're discussing the existence of an objective morality, independent of people's minds.

Holding that moral facts and absolute morality exist, that is a viewpoint. But not the only one possible.

But one that is either true or false. You haven't made any arguments for why objective morals don't exist; you've simply asserted that since different people believe different things, their perspectives are equally valid.

'Hitler was responsible for the deaths of millions of people' is, arguably, a fact. But whether there is any (im)morality about that fact hinges on whether you agree that (mass) murder is wrong, i.e. an opinion. Hitler might have felt this was not wrong, but we tend to think it is indeed quite wrong. (Again, opinions.) And yet, there are plenty of people responsible for the deaths of many people, which we generally don't agree being immoral. (Again, opinion.)

Saying something is immoral is a meaningless statement if morals are defined as opinions. You may as well say that you do not like murder, or that society frowns upon it. Why would we say that making lampshades out of the skin of Jews or Romani is wrong, if we believe that Hitler's opinion was equally valid?

I don't mean this in any condescending way, but the laws of formal logic are useful to understand my point:

2. The law of non-contradiction says that A cannot be both A and not A at the same time and in the same sense.
3. The law of excluded middle says that a statement is either true or false.

Apply these criteria to the statement "murder is wrong."