Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
So that would be an example of the correct application of Occam's Razor, then? Don't include what's not necessary?
It was philosophers who invented the idea of the soul in the first place, so I suppose they're entitled to get rid of it again. But philosophers don't deny the existence of the soul simply because they can't find it. They deny its existence (and the vast majority of them do) because the concept of the soul is incoherent, it's impossible to explain how it could interact with the body if they're fundamentally different things, and (perhaps most important) because it just has no explanatory value. If we can explain the workings of the human mind solely in terms of the body (including the brain), as we probably can, then there's no point in imagining that some other entity is involved.
I'm pretty sure that the term Psyche came to apply to butterflies long after it was used for the soul. Its root, like the root of most words for soul, means to blow or to breath.
Breath is of course distinct from mere air. Its material substance may be composed of air, but it has a dynamic structure that serves the purpose of enabling life. It can be thought of as more like a sound wave than the material through which sound happens to be traveling. The soul could thus exist in a very real sense without existing as a separate immaterial substance, but rather as processes immanent within the body. It wouldn't be that far off to refer to neural oscillations, cellular respiration, ect., as the soul. However, it might not be the most useful way to describe such processes once we have a distinct understanding of them.
LSJ said:(See ancient speculations on the derivation, Pl.Cra.399d-400a, Arist.de An.405b29, Chrysipp.Stoic.2.222; Hom. usage gives little support to the derivation from ψύχω 'blow, breathe'; τὸν δὲ λίπε ψ. Il.5.696 means 'his spirit left his body', and so λειποψυχέω means 'swoon', not 'become breathless'; ἀπὸ δὲ ψ. ἐκάπυσσε Il.22.467 means 'she gasped out her spirit', viz. 'swooned'; the resemblance of ἄμπνυτο 'recovered consciousness' to ἀμπνέω 'recover breath' is deceptive, v. ἄμπνυτο, ἔμπνυτο: when concrete the Homeric ψ. is rather warm blood than breath, cf. Il.14.518, 16.505, where the ψ. escapes through a wound; cf. ψυχοπότης, ψυχορροφέω, and S.El.786, Ar.Nu.712 (v. supr.1).)
I know this might be difficult for you to understand, so perk your ear up; challenging theories that aren't controversial at all means you have the burden of proof.
I vaguely recall reading about one study which found that less than 1% of European Jews have the genetic markers which they would have if they were of descended from the Khazars or any other Turkic group. They instead share the genetic markers with other Semitic peoples like Arabs.
So that would be an example of the correct application of Occam's Razor, then? Don't include what's not necessary?
Not sure what most philosophers of that era used as the term with similar significance, but "nous" is a good bet (from noein, which means 'to think').
Seeing as it was you who was challenging, I have no problem with this particular assertion of yours.
Meanwhile your challenge remains without substance. There is no record of systematic genocide/deportation of the entire population from Israel/Palestine (and apparent subsequent repopulation of the agricultural void left by such a catastrophic event) - which seemed to be your contention. So it seems to me that such a challenge belongs to the realm of myth rather than historical reality - until proven otherwise.*
* A slight correction is in order: There actually are confirmed records of organized deportation against the inhabitants of Palestine. However, these occurred around the mid-20th century and are on the record of the state of Israel. If I remember correctly, you were in full favour of said deportations and were of the opinion they had not been conducted thorough enough. Perhaps this may shed some light on your views in these matters.
Plotinus said:I've been trying to make sense of this in my mind since you made this post. I'm having a very hard time of it. Here is the problem.
You're suggesting, if I understand you right, that necessary truths and moral truths (and you seem willing to countenance at least that moral truths form a subset of necessary truths) gain their necessary truth from God, but not from his will - rather, from his nature. My problem is that I just can't visualise what this means. Take the necessary truth that 2+2=4, or the necessary truth that for any proposition P, it is not the case that P and not-P. The truth of neither of these requires an explanation. To understand them is to see that they must be true. What does it mean to say that they derive their truth from anything, let alone from God? What does God add to the equation? What explanatory value do you get from saying that their truth comes from God? ***snip***
It seems to me that once one starts thinking of God like this, you've come very close to making "God" such a general explanation for everything that the word loses most of its meaning. If an atheist says "Logical truths just are true, there's no explanation needed for this" and a theist says "Logical truths derive their truth from God's nature", is the theist actually saying anything that the atheist isn't? Aren't they basically saying the same thing? Hasn't "God's nature" become just a circumlocution for "the way things just are"?
In the line you quote from Thomas Aquinas, he says that God includes all being, and this means that his understanding contains all possibilities. They exist there as the divine ideas, which are really just the divine nature as it relates to things. However, Aquinas would not say that God determines what those possibilities are, either by his will or by his nature. At least, I don't think that's what he would say; perhaps I'm wrong. At any rate, it seems to me that the idea of God you've put forward is more like the Leibnizian one of God as (effectively) logical space.
On moral truths, I would ask this: do you think that an atheist can believe in necessary truths at all? Or is theism the only possible explanation for the fact that it's a necessary truth that 2+2=4 or that a proposition and its negation can't both be true? If you think that atheists can (legitimately) believe in necessary truths, then I don't see why you shouldn't accept that they can believe in moral truths as well (since you're suggesting that moral truths are necessary truths, or at any rate that they all derive their truth from God in the same way). If you think that atheists can't legitimately believe in necessary truths then that seems to me a very implausible claim.
In fact it is often argued that the morality of the jewish religion was a form of distortion of actual morality, and had negative values instead of positive. Basically a religion born out of despair, and not joy or wonder at life. A religion like the one an unfortunate child born in a basement and made to never leave it would have formed.
(@Mouthwash: not sure what you mean, cause if you read his views they very often refer to the jewish religion, while still also very very often being isolated on the christian minor alteration of it which is deemed as virtually equally decadent and negative by Nietzsche. FWIW, Nietzsche obviously did not aim to put down any ethnicity, he was arguing about ethics and the demise of positive values he saw in other cultures, so again i don't see your point).
To be frank, I don't understand how it applies to the Jewish religion. Judaism's laws are directly descended from a tribal code. Sure, you can criticize stuff that the prophets said (which is what I think Nietzsche did), but it seems like Christianity is, in a sociological and theological sense, much more "life-denying" than Judaism, which downplays even the details of the afterlife and considers them unimportant.