[RD] Ask a Theologian V

It was philosophers who invented the idea of the soul in the first place, so I suppose they're entitled to get rid of it again. But philosophers don't deny the existence of the soul simply because they can't find it. They deny its existence (and the vast majority of them do) because the concept of the soul is incoherent, it's impossible to explain how it could interact with the body if they're fundamentally different things, and (perhaps most important) because it just has no explanatory value. If we can explain the workings of the human mind solely in terms of the body (including the brain), as we probably can, then there's no point in imagining that some other entity is involved.

Philosophy should never be about majority or quantities, though..

As for the "soul", its original philosophical term is "psyche", which (afaik) is the ancient Greek term for "butterfly". So by conception as a notion it was given to be something fleeting and hard to follow, but easy to notice it when around.

As for mind/body dichotomies and the like, i think we are way too behind in any research of matter and energy, let alone adding consciousness to the mix, to try to arrive at such conclusions. Only wishful thinking can make one believe he knows that by matter/body we can account for everything in our personal mental existence. In fact that belief is horrible, cause we barely have categories for most of the mental phenomena, so what exactly would anyone be trying to scientifically account for?

Anyway, Herbert-West-Reanimator was probably a better example of the so-called "modern philosophers" centered on materialism, than they are; and arguably far more famous too ;)
 
I'm pretty sure that the term Psyche came to apply to butterflies long after it was used for the soul. Its root, like the root of most words for soul, means to blow or to breath.

Breath is of course distinct from mere air. Its material substance may be composed of air, but it has a dynamic structure that serves the purpose of enabling life. It can be thought of as more like a sound wave than the material through which sound happens to be traveling. The soul could thus exist in a very real sense without existing as a separate immaterial substance, but rather as processes immanent within the body. It wouldn't be that far off to refer to neural oscillations, cellular respiration, ect., as the soul. However, it might not be the most useful way to describe such processes once we have a distinct understanding of them.
 
I'm pretty sure that the term Psyche came to apply to butterflies long after it was used for the soul. Its root, like the root of most words for soul, means to blow or to breath.

Breath is of course distinct from mere air. Its material substance may be composed of air, but it has a dynamic structure that serves the purpose of enabling life. It can be thought of as more like a sound wave than the material through which sound happens to be traveling. The soul could thus exist in a very real sense without existing as a separate immaterial substance, but rather as processes immanent within the body. It wouldn't be that far off to refer to neural oscillations, cellular respiration, ect., as the soul. However, it might not be the most useful way to describe such processes once we have a distinct understanding of them.

Citation needed :) Psyche is not the current term for butterfly, and it was used in classical times to mean that final phase of the ephemeral but beautiful insect, while later on fading away, and was picked up like many other terms by western Europeans when they were naming new seperate branches of science.
Not sure what most philosophers of that era used as the term with similar significance, but "nous" is a good bet (from noein, which means 'to think').
 
According to Liddell-Scott-Jones (which is the standard lexicon for Classical Greek) you are both wrong.

LSJ attempts to give the earliest usage for each known definition. For psyche as meaning butterfly, the earliest reference given is Aristotle's Historia Animalium. If you want to argue that butterfly meaning was original, at the very least I would want literary evidence of pre-Pindar usage (Pindar being the first person recorded in LSJ to use "psyche" as specifically meaning an immaterial and immortal soul). Homer, incidentally uses "psyche" to refer to "life" as well as "ghost."

LSJ actually directly discusses whether it came from "psycho" (to blow/breathe):

LSJ said:
(See ancient speculations on the derivation, Pl.Cra.399d-400a, Arist.de An.405b29, Chrysipp.Stoic.2.222; Hom. usage gives little support to the derivation from ψύχω 'blow, breathe'; “τὸν δὲ λίπε ψ.” Il.5.696 means 'his spirit left his body', and so λειποψυχέω means 'swoon', not 'become breathless'; “ἀπὸ δὲ ψ. ἐκάπυσσε” Il.22.467 means 'she gasped out her spirit', viz. 'swooned'; the resemblance of ἄμπνυτο 'recovered consciousness' to ἀμπνέω 'recover breath' is deceptive, v. ἄμπνυτο, ἔμπνυτο: when concrete the Homeric ψ. is rather warm blood than breath, cf. Il.14.518, 16.505, where the ψ. escapes through a wound; cf. ψυχοπότης, ψυχορροφέω, and S.El.786, Ar.Nu.712 (v. supr.1).)

Essentially the proposed etymology of "soul" from "breathe" derives from Plato. LSJ suggests that Plato is here doing a "fake" etymology for his own narrative purposes and gives as support the fact that in Homer "psyche" is not associated with breath at all but rather blood.
 
Is not the concept of the butterfly the ability to create a "stir" with it's wings to effect things on the other side of the world?

It is putting a material source to the concept of a changing effect.

The wind itself is caused by the slightest of changes in pressure almost to the point of having no material substance, yet there is a logical explanation of how it works.
 
I know this might be difficult for you to understand, so perk your ear up; challenging theories that aren't controversial at all means you have the burden of proof.

Seeing as it was you who was challenging, I have no problem with this particular assertion of yours. Meanwhile your challenge remains without substance. There is no record of systematic genocide/deportation of the entire population from Israel/Palestine (and apparent subsequent repopulation of the agricultural void left by such a catastrophic event) - which seemed to be your contention. So it seems to me that such a challenge belongs to the realm of myth rather than historical reality - until proven otherwise.*

Meanwhile as to your question about a Christian version of the diaspora around the 8th-9th centuries, I've never come across such a particular version of antisemitism in Western Christendom and the only concerted - and partially succesful - conversion attempt of Jews occurred after the unification of Spain in 1492 by the most Catholic kings - so well after the time period specified. If there is any truth to this story, I'd suggest it might be found in the Orthodox realm. But more specifically I'd suggest consulting a history of antisemitism on the matter. Since there are various books on this subject, it shouldn't be that hard to check.


* A slight correction is in order: There actually are confirmed records of organized deportation against the inhabitants of Palestine. However, these occurred around the mid-20th century and are on the record of the state of Israel. If I remember correctly, you were in full favour of said deportations and were of the opinion they had not been conducted thorough enough. Perhaps this may shed some light on your views in these matters.

Something everyone seems to have missed:

I vaguely recall reading about one study which found that less than 1% of European Jews have the genetic markers which they would have if they were of descended from the Khazars or any other Turkic group. They instead share the genetic markers with other Semitic peoples like Arabs.

I was unaware genetic research has now uncovered linguistic markers. I'd be interested to see this revolutionary result which somehow has eluded attention.
 
So that would be an example of the correct application of Occam's Razor, then? Don't include what's not necessary?

I would say so.

Not sure what most philosophers of that era used as the term with similar significance, but "nous" is a good bet (from noein, which means 'to think').

"Nous" meant the intellect, the highest part of the soul (on the Platonic conception of the soul, at least). It wasn't the same thing; thus Plotinus, for example, distinguishes between Nous (the second of his three hypostases) and Psyche (the third). Nous is basically the mind of God, and Psyche is the world-soul.

Psyche in ancient Greek philosophy just means whatever makes something alive. It did not have the connotations of the English word "soul" of something immaterial that can survive the death of the body. Some philosophers thought that the psyche was, as it happened, immaterial and could survive the death of the body, but that's not what the word had to mean, and plenty of other philosophers used it with quite different meanings.
 
Seeing as it was you who was challenging, I have no problem with this particular assertion of yours.

What do you mean it was "me who was challenging?" I can discuss certain aspects of the Holocaust, for instance which particular towns were actually massacred or deported, etc. without questioning the authenticity of the Holocaust itself. You haven't shown how I have a shred of burden of proof in showing that the Jews in Palestine were indeed slaughtered and converted to Islam en masse (a position you previously espoused when it was politically convenient to do so). The only thing that isn't already settled (and most historians still agree to its authenticity) is whether the Jews were taken out of Palestine in large numbers to create the Diaspora.

Meanwhile your challenge remains without substance. There is no record of systematic genocide/deportation of the entire population from Israel/Palestine (and apparent subsequent repopulation of the agricultural void left by such a catastrophic event) - which seemed to be your contention. So it seems to me that such a challenge belongs to the realm of myth rather than historical reality - until proven otherwise.*

Ah, I see. You realized you were in a corner, so now my contention "seems to be" that I was talking about the entire population of Palestine. Which I deny and invite you to quote me on.

* A slight correction is in order: There actually are confirmed records of organized deportation against the inhabitants of Palestine. However, these occurred around the mid-20th century and are on the record of the state of Israel. If I remember correctly, you were in full favour of said deportations and were of the opinion they had not been conducted thorough enough. Perhaps this may shed some light on your views in these matters.

What does this have to do with literally anything? It's just JELEEN being what he seems to think is witty.
 
now that the foolishness has blow over a bit (and I'm not distracted by other things) ...

Plotinus said:
I've been trying to make sense of this in my mind since you made this post. I'm having a very hard time of it. Here is the problem.

You're suggesting, if I understand you right, that necessary truths and moral truths (and you seem willing to countenance at least that moral truths form a subset of necessary truths) gain their necessary truth from God, but not from his will - rather, from his nature. My problem is that I just can't visualise what this means. Take the necessary truth that 2+2=4, or the necessary truth that for any proposition P, it is not the case that P and not-P. The truth of neither of these requires an explanation. To understand them is to see that they must be true. What does it mean to say that they derive their truth from anything, let alone from God? What does God add to the equation? What explanatory value do you get from saying that their truth comes from God? ***snip***

Since God is the first principle from which everything proceeds (since before creation and outside God there is nothing), for something to be a necessary truth (such as one + one equals two) it must in a sense proceed from some essential truth of Gods own nature. Ergo that it is necessary that one plus one equal two, or more implicitly, that there is a necessary order that is not some direct imposition of divine will (rather than such an order being pure chaos where numerical values, or shape and form, are non-existent.) thus to my thinking indicates that the rational necessity of these truths, emerges from the rational nature and being of God (the divine logos, creative reason). Since God "is being" and is reasonable, than everything that surrounds God and proceeds from him as first principle must necessarily comport to that reason. Thus why the universe has cosmic order mathematical and otherwise, since it is a reflection of the divine creative reason. Chaos as such (such as square circles) is anathema to the reason of God, God is reasonable and thus his creation and everything that proceeds from him is comprehensible (even considering the fallen nature of existence and so forth)

It seems to me that once one starts thinking of God like this, you've come very close to making "God" such a general explanation for everything that the word loses most of its meaning. If an atheist says "Logical truths just are true, there's no explanation needed for this" and a theist says "Logical truths derive their truth from God's nature", is the theist actually saying anything that the atheist isn't? Aren't they basically saying the same thing? Hasn't "God's nature" become just a circumlocution for "the way things just are"?

This sounds awfully like an objection of "the theist attributes everything to God, the atheist as brute fact, they describe the same thing therefore the theist attribution is nonsensical" which is logically flawed, since if God is creator than everything in creation does find its ultimate origin in him. I would also say that there is a differentiation, since the atheist conception ultimately falls into the problem of contingency, and the possibility that if there is no God the universe in reality is entirely incomprehensible.

In the line you quote from Thomas Aquinas, he says that God includes all being, and this means that his understanding contains all possibilities. They exist there as the divine ideas, which are really just the divine nature as it relates to things. However, Aquinas would not say that God determines what those possibilities are, either by his will or by his nature. At least, I don't think that's what he would say; perhaps I'm wrong. At any rate, it seems to me that the idea of God you've put forward is more like the Leibnizian one of God as (effectively) logical space.

To say that God would define ideas "by his nature" is just absurd (divine nature is not divine will, its the divines essential ontological character), I would say its more like his nature delimitated the range of ideas he has instituted through is creative will. God for example, could not create that which is anathema to himself such as something beyond the limitations of omnipotence*, or in the case of necessary truths a universe that is unreasonable (*God can't create a boulder he couldn't lift for example, since that is beyond what power itself is able to do, its anathema to the divine omnipotence).

On moral truths, I would ask this: do you think that an atheist can believe in necessary truths at all? Or is theism the only possible explanation for the fact that it's a necessary truth that 2+2=4 or that a proposition and its negation can't both be true? If you think that atheists can (legitimately) believe in necessary truths, then I don't see why you shouldn't accept that they can believe in moral truths as well (since you're suggesting that moral truths are necessary truths, or at any rate that they all derive their truth from God in the same way). If you think that atheists can't legitimately believe in necessary truths then that seems to me a very implausible claim.

An atheist can accept that there is a necessary truth (since a man, as a rational creature, can observe creation and see something is necessarily true and not subject to alteration), I just think he deludes himself as to a necessary truths ultimate origin. He accepts for example that logical order (even if we limit that term to just mathematical necessity) is a necessary and inherent aspect to existence, yet he takes this as a brute fact avoids asking the question of why this is so, and where does necessity originate. The theist of course answers this question by saying God is the first uncreated principle upon which everything is contingent, therefore everything that is contingent upon that first principle is necessarily a reflection of the nature of the divinity (be it mediated by his will, or because something [like chaos or an un-liftable boulder] is anathema to the possibilities of the divine itself, and impossible for it to create)

As to moral truths this consideration is somewhat different. I do think they can accept that there are necessary moral truths, but I think that this acceptance is an unprincipled exception to their atheism which reflects the truth that morality is inscribed into the human nature. I say this because if atheism were true, than there is no necessary moral truth at all (and morality itself would be an illusion), since our own existence would be brute fact with no meaning or purpose (for the universe itself would have no meaning or purpose, and therefore no purpose or meaning could be ascribed to anything within it).
 
^I do not agree at all that one needs to believe in a god so as to think of morality as linked to human nature.
For starters, if morality was not a usual part of human nature, then our world would have been even more a hell than it is now, cause there would have been nothing to stop all of the savage and horrible acts from perpetuating and expanding and reactions to them would be equally (if not more) brutal.

The origin of morality has nothing to do with the old testament/new testament god anyway. Morality was a concept long before that. In general the view that humans are fundamentally (for whatever reason) linked to what we deem as "moral", is there in so many words in Plato, and in concurrent drama you see Antigone declare that "I was born to share love, not hate".

In fact it is often argued that the morality of the jewish religion was a form of distortion of actual morality, and had negative values instead of positive. Basically a religion born out of despair, and not joy or wonder at life. A religion like the one an unfortunate child born in a basement and made to never leave it would have formed.
 
In fact it is often argued that the morality of the jewish religion was a form of distortion of actual morality, and had negative values instead of positive. Basically a religion born out of despair, and not joy or wonder at life. A religion like the one an unfortunate child born in a basement and made to never leave it would have formed.

That sounds like the critique of Christianity, not Judaism.
 
@Kyriakos

One doesn't need to believe in God or more broadly the divine (since I was not saying one had to believe in the Christian conception of God to believe in objective morality) for one to believe that moral principles proceed from human nature. However the question Plotinus asked me is not whether moral principles proceed from, or are associated with human nature (they clearly are), but whether an atheist could believe that there is necessary moral truth (which is to say, whether there is such a thing as moral truth which is universally objective, and which isn't relativistically defined). To this I ascribed yes, but only as an unprincipled exception to their atheism since if there is no creator there is no objective purpose or meaning to the universe, and by contingency anything in it, and thus there could be no such thing as morality save as an illusion people uphold for the ordering of human interactions (to avoid anarchy) and for their own sanity.
 
Thank you, Jehoshua :)

Hm, you are of course correct on there being a very notable distinction between the two you outlined. Would it hold true that there are universally objective moral truths? I think it is true, yes, since i have no reason at all to suppose that a human could find it more moral to cut a man's arm off, rather than say a kind word to him. So, in terms of wide juxtaposition, this is intuitively true in my view. It is another question if it is so regardless of human nature (i think it is not so then). Moreover, a god does not (in my view) have to exist and/or be linked to humans so that an objective morality can exist, cause the latter can be the result of human sentience.

( @Mouthwash: not sure what you mean, cause if you read his views they very often refer to the jewish religion, while still also very very often being isolated on the christian minor alteration of it which is deemed as virtually equally decadent and negative by Nietzsche. FWIW, Nietzsche obviously did not aim to put down any ethnicity, he was arguing about ethics and the demise of positive values he saw in other cultures, so again i don't see your point).
 
(@Mouthwash: not sure what you mean, cause if you read his views they very often refer to the jewish religion, while still also very very often being isolated on the christian minor alteration of it which is deemed as virtually equally decadent and negative by Nietzsche. FWIW, Nietzsche obviously did not aim to put down any ethnicity, he was arguing about ethics and the demise of positive values he saw in other cultures, so again i don't see your point).

To be frank, I don't understand how it applies to the Jewish religion. Judaism's laws are directly descended from a tribal code. Sure, you can criticize stuff that the prophets said (which is what I think Nietzsche did), but it seems like Christianity is, in a sociological and theological sense, much more "life-denying" than Judaism, which downplays even the details of the afterlife and considers them unimportant.
 
To be frank, I don't understand how it applies to the Jewish religion. Judaism's laws are directly descended from a tribal code. Sure, you can criticize stuff that the prophets said (which is what I think Nietzsche did), but it seems like Christianity is, in a sociological and theological sense, much more "life-denying" than Judaism, which downplays even the details of the afterlife and considers them unimportant.

It is a question, but personally i don't think your view on this is correct, and moreover i don't see how Nietzsche argued something similar to that either (since he very clearly names the judaic law and religion as born most probably out of the deepest despair of a moribund nation surrounded by stronger enemies). Imo both Judaic law and christianity are very much filled with negative values, a sort of "virtue of being weak" (including virtue due to being weak, and aspiring to be weak). It would not be, in my opinion, very useful to try to examine which of the two is even more about such a weakness, but surely if that is to be discussed this is not the thread for so specific a debate :)
 
OK, you're right, not thread relevant.
 
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