Atheists: explain where your moral system comes from

Are you just illustrating what I'm saying ?
 
The Golden Rule says that a judge should let a criminal go unpunished, because if the judge were the criminal, the judge would want to go unpunished.
Only if one treats the Golden Rule as mindlessly simplistic. "Do unto others..." doesn't mean "do what others want", and it certainly doesn't mean "reduce morality to a binary relationship between two individuals, neglecting every other living creature in the cosmos". It's a teensy bit more nuanced than that.

I can't help but wonder why people don't think that this sort of superficial criticism hasn't already been made and adressed at some point in the last four thousand years or so. Do they really think that the point their making is novel or incisive? :huh:
 
The only thing it fails against is the abuses of the wording.
You could try to make a more elaborate one, but honestly if someone is going to twist a meaning, it just shows he's not attempting to get the spirit, but only to find a loophole.
Such a person isn't even trying to understand, so why bother ?

I'm sorry, it's not my responsibility to guess what you mean by you words. I can only use the accepted meaning of your words to comment. If "do unto other as you want done unto yourself" means something other than "do unto other as you want done unto yourself," then you damn well better explain it rather than state it as some grand ethical insight. Seriously. My counterexample is an exact counterexample to the claim above. So is Mises'.

I'm not finding a loophole. You are by leaving it as it is and then rejecting counterexamples for not respecting the 'spirit.' Whatever that means. I'm not the one being lazy.

as for Traitorfish, this 'superficial criticism' has never been avoided without rejecting the golden rule. Thus why no modern ethicist will ever entertain the idea of the golden rule as an ethical theory without incredibly heavy qualification and alteration. It either fails my objection(that a crazy person can treat others terribly in an ethical way), or it is trivial because it relies on a separate criteria for goodness other than what you'd like done to yourself.
 
How do you derive ethics from logic? Are you a Kantian?
It is logical to obey laws and social conventions. It would be illogical to ostracize oneself unless the personal gain far outweighs the loss.
 
It is logical to obey laws and social conventions. It would be illogical to ostracize oneself unless the personal gain far outweighs the loss.
That's the logical conclusion of ethical egoism, but it's hardly a self-justifying position. You still have to prove that self-interest is "logically" ethical.
 
This does not address the issue at hand. I am asking not "how do you determine how moral you think an action is" but "is an action moral or not?" Unless you believe you have some kind of special metaphysical power (ie you are a god) then I would hope you do not actually believe your subconscious determines how moral an action is.

Of course my subconscious is able to determine how moral an action is! It has been incredibly accurate so far.. Keeping in mind that I have nothing better to go by, I would have to say that it's been quite an amazingly accurate determiner of moralitical accuracy.

In any case, my object here is not how to address your esoteric OP needs. My object was to describe my position, and I have done so. My position is awesome, so you can accept that, or argue its points.

I await your further correspondence.
 
My moral system comes from common sense. Don't hurt others or do things such as steal and kill. Basically dont do things that if they were done to you unprovoked would piss you off.

I have yet to meet anyone who believed atheists had no morals but i know they exist.

If someone crosses the line and really angers me however revenge is sometimes necessary. :evil:
 
Take a random action B. M(B) is the morality quotient of that action. As M(B) approaches 0, the morality of the action approaches hypothetical evil. As M(B) approaches 1, the morality of the action approaches moral perfection.

An action is more moral when its morality quotient is higher. The morality quotient is determined behind the scenes by my subconscious, which I don't have direct access to, so I couldn't explain the exact mechanism by which M(B) is determined. It is probabliy heavily influenced by past experiences and things I've learned in life

What are the dividend and divisor for the morality quotient?
 
Objective morality comes from what ancient atheists came up with and pinned to higher powers to control the gullible masses.
 
There is this nice phrase "marketplace of ideas".
There is also a marketplace and as soon as physical force enters the equation a battlefield of morality. What I personally view as moral is derived from many factors (as it presumable is with everybody). Culture, family, experiences, opinions about what life should be and how this harmonizes with what life is, my general attitude to life / humans etcetera.

If I meet somebody who differs with me on a moral judgment, I will use rationality to argue with him about this position. However, this naturally is only possible if we have the same idea which purpose morality is supposed serve and how this should affect human interaction and other things.

If we don't, we can argue about that too, but it will ultimately come down to a matter of personal values which are - in my opinion - beyond reason but simply a matter of choice.

I.e.: If someone thinks human life is worth nothing and hence has no moral quarrels with the eradication of it that is his choice. I can express my strong opposition, I can argue this can effect him negatively as well, or how he benefits from a different moral compass or I can try to address his emotions/conscience. But there is no rational argument why this objectively is the wrong decision if this person simply does not care about all those effects or for whatever reason deems them worth it.

If then this person acts upon this idea of morality and murders people, society will try to force him to obey the moral codex protected by said society - which is that murdering people is not only not acceptable, but will be fought. But not because society is right in a rational way, but because society rests upon a different understanding of morality and because it benefits the society to enforce this morality in a way that it deems it worthwhile to also do so.

So in the end right and wrong is not universal, but enforced, at least from where I stand. And IMO this is the way it has to be if one cares about his moral views.

As a consequence I don't claim a firm or superior source for my morality as religions do. My morality is simply what I decided to advocate, and also to defend against other understandings of morality if I want to, like if I see somebody attempting to murder somebody else. Which means in several cases I also approve that moral understandings dismissed by me are suppressed for no other reason than that I like my understanding better for my own personnel reasons. For example when a murder is attempted.

And as I see it to claim that there is some moral "truth" is just dishonest. But of course very convenient.
 
I believe that human beings are social animals and that morality is a form of behavior designed to increase happiness and well-being within those societies. I rely on emotional responses to determine what effect my actions will have on others, and rely upon reason to establish a way of behaving that will maximize the happiness and health of all while mitigating harm.

The code isn't terribly complex: it can be boiled down to the golden rule, which is why said rule appears in virtually every moral system, whether philosophical or religious.
 
The Golden Rule says that a judge should let a criminal go unpunished, because if the judge were the criminal, the judge would want to go unpunished.

If your ideal of a judge is a person who believes that his own crimes should go unpunished, I hope that you never get any job in the judiciary! :eek:

As Traitorfish mentioned, you really got that one wrong. The judge should do unto the criminal what he would have done to himself had he (the judge) committed the crime. Because the judge believes (or so we are supposed to hope of judges) that crimes be addressed/punished, he would justice this criminal fairly - as he would judge himself for the same crime.
 
Morality, ethics, etc... are not objective, they are subjective standards - different people are going to apply their own standards subjectively to any given situation. Self-interest is a good place to start when you look at actual behavior of people. Contre made some very good posts I'd agree with otherwise.
 
Morality, ethics, etc... are not objective, they are subjective standards - different people are going to apply their own standards subjectively to any given situation.

But not everyone is right, thats where objectivity enters the picture - the objective (real, true) morality trumps false subjective morality.

good post inno

but what if the judge is a nutcase? Like some judge who thinks pot smokers should spend years in cages and would hold himself to that standard?
 
My moral system is to be nice to nice people and to be nasty to nasty people but dont actually hurt them 'cause that aint nice. But if you think a nasty person can be nice try to not be so nasty to them. And dont do things to people you dont really want done to you.

Its just common sense Id think.
 
There are a fair few problems here. You're saying that you can't have normative ethics without objective morality. But what do you mean by "objective morality"? It's objectively a true fact that (say) most of us think that murder is immoral. Is that what you mean by objective morality? Or is there something more to it than that? You need to specify what it is you're asking for, at least on that score.

If you're asking for "moral facts" and a justification of their existence then I think you'll be disappointed because it's pretty controversial among meta-ethicists whether moral facts exist at all - even among those who believe in objective, normative moral statements. This is, at root, because it's hard to see how you can derive normative imperatives from facts in the first place.

For example: suppose that moral facts exist and suppose that it is an objective moral fact (whatever you think that means) that murder is wrong. Does that give me an imperative not to murder? It's hard to see how it does. To say that I shouldn't murder isn't really to state a fact in the first place - it is to insist upon a certain way of behaving. How do we derive the ought of "I shouldn't murder" from the is of "Murder is wrong"? How do we derive a value from a fact? Considerations such as this seem to me to suggest that "moral facts" are explanatorily useless for basing normative ethics upon. Even if they exist, they don't explain the normativity of ethical values. So why suppose that they even exist at all, let alone that they are required for normative ethical values?

It seems to me that you're assuming, without argument, some form of cognitivism about moral statements; but of course that is very controversial. I think today that most meta-ethicists would reject simple cognitivism - just as they would also reject the simple non-cogntivism that was all the rage in the 60s, when people thought that "Murder is wrong" translated to a simple non-cognitive expression of disgust at the thought of murder. The problem is how to recognise both the cognitive and the non-cognitive elements of moral statements, and there is no generally accepted theory of how to do this.

As for the question how normative ethics can be derived without God: I'd start by turning that question around and asking what God would add to the equation. You said:

Gogf said:
God helps because religion uses the deity as a source of truth, and therefore justifies the existence of objective morality as flowing from god and our access to it as coming from communication with god.

But that isn't true, because of the Euthyphro problem. In the context of this discussion we can rephrase that problem like this:

Suppose God says that murder is wrong. Now, we can ask: does God say that murder is wrong because murder is wrong? Or is murder wrong because God says that murder is wrong? Suppose we go for the first of these. In that case, the wrongness of murder does not derive from God at all; rather, murder is wrong for some other reason, and God's prescription is based upon that reason. So appealing to God doesn't explain the wrongness of murder.

Suppose we take the second option, then, and say that murder is wrong simply because God says it is. Well then, why does God say it's wrong? Does he do so arbitrarily? Might he just as well have said that murder is right, or even ordered us to murder? If this is so, then God's decisions are arbitrary and he is no better than a tyrant whose whim is law. In fact classical theists have always thought that God is rational and good: everything he does, he does for a reason, and he always does the best possible thing that he can. If that is so, then he must forbid murder (as opposed to command it) for a reason, and it must be good that he forbids it (rather than commands it). But if that is so, and there is a good reason for his forbidding rather than commanding murder, then that reason (whatever it may be) is what makes murder wrong rather than right. And so, once again we find that the explanation of morality cannot lie in God's command, but in something else, which God's command merely reflects.

Sensible theists such as Leibniz have always been well aware of this and avoided any divine command theory as a result.

There is a second reason why God doesn't work as a grounding for morality, and that is the same reason I gave at the start, which is that it is hard to see how you can derive normative strictures from plain facts at all, whatever those facts may be. Suppose that we say that murder is wrong because God says so. Does that give me any moral reason not to murder? Of course it may give me some reason not to murder (to avoid divine punishment) but that is no different in kind from refraining from murder because of fear of the police; it's not a moral reason. It seems to me that saying "God forbids murder" is as motivationally inert as "Murder is wrong" in the first place. It adds nothing.

So as I see it, appealing to God adds absolutely nothing in meta-ethics. Theists, atheists, and everyone else are in exactly the same boat when it comes to explaining what moral statements are and why they are normative, if they are.

So how can one derive normative morality at all? Well, as you no doubt know, there are lots of possible ways. One answer, or non-answer if you prefer, is that you just can't. Moore's famous "open question" argument purports to show this: take any (natural) factual claim about a certain thing or action that you like, and it remains an open question whether that thing is good. He concludes that "goodness" is a basic and non-natural property. It isn't based upon anything else, it just is. If that's the case, then trying to find a basis for normative morality is just wrong-footed from the start; it can't be done because goodness (or rightness, if you prefer) is basic and not based on anything. It just is.

It seems to me that utilitarianism gives a sensible starting point for moral reasoning, but of course it still assumes that (something like) "bringing about the most happiness" is the right thing to do; it doesn't explain why that is the right thing to do or tell us, indeed, what "right" means. But that's because it's an ethical theory, not a meta-ethical theory. It seems to me that you're asking for both of these at the same time. I think that a utilitarian could consistently say something like the intuition that it is right to bring about the most happiness is basic and cannot be grounded on anything else, and she can say that this can be the basis of normative morality without having to explain what "X is right" actually means. After all, the latter is the task of philosophers of language, not of ethicists.

I would also say that virtue ethics seems to me to offer a plausible way to ground ethics (of some kind) in natural facts, namely the facts about what makes human beings flourish. Virtue ethics focuses on the character habits that are most conducive to a happy life, and recommends actions on the basis of whether they bring about those habits or not. Of course, once again we hit the fundamental distinction between doing things for a moral reason and doing them for a non-moral reason. If my choosing not to murder someone solely because I'm scared of getting caught is a non-moral reason for refraining from murder, then so too, my choosing to inculcate a generous character in myself because it will lead to a happier life for me is a non-moral reason too, and it is hard to see why there is a moral imperative upon me to do so. But then a virtue ethicist might simply argue that thinking in terms of moral imperatives of that kind is the wrong way to think about it in the first place. It is hard to find such imperatives in the work of the great virtue ethicists of the past such as Aristotle and Aquinas; these were not the questions that interested them.

Anyway, you should start your search for answers to these questions here, noting that other than the discussion of the Euthyphro problem at the start, God is not mentioned, for the good reason that God is irrelevant to the question. So you can treat it as an atheistic approach to the question if you want.

Akka said:
Because morality is about acting good or bad, and the Golden Rule is exactly that : telling you if what you do is good or bad.

I think you've misunderstood what he's after: he wants to know why atheists think that their moral systems do tell you what's good or bad. Citing the Golden Rule (or any other moral precept) doesn't answer that question. Why is it right to do to others as I'd have them do to me? What does it mean to say that such actions are "right" at all?

Also, I agree entirely with Orange Seeds that the "Golden Rule" is a very poor moral compass anyway, for the reasons already given, and this is why it does not, in fact, appear in most rigorous ethical systems. I'd dispute the claim that it appears in most non-rigorous ones, in fact; one can find it in various religions only by interpreting it so loosely that a wide variety of rather different moral strictures are all considered to be equivalent.
 
If your explanation consists of an appeal to moral intuitions, please explain why those moral intuitions have access to some sort of objective moral truth. Please also clarify what it means for an ethical statement to be true and what it is that makes these ethical statements objectively true.

Evolutionary theory. Social creatures, such as humans, evolve morality to maintain social cohesiveness, by rewarding prosocial and punishing antisocial behavior.

Because moral behavior is an adaptive trait, it is logically desirable. Furthermore, as previously alluded to, the "conscience," an innate sense of right and wrong, is part of our genetic inheritance.
 
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