LightSpectra's posts are really the only ones that address the topic at hand, so I'll try to focus on those:
The earliest authoritative interpreters of the text say he was, which is why the text is translated as it is today.
I'm not sure what makes them authoritative. But the point here is not really what Paul's view was. I'm quite happy to accept that Paul intended to criticise homosexuality in the broadest terms you like. What I originally said is that
the Bible isn't clear on the matter. Paul may well have been opposed to homosexuality, but he didn't express himself as clearly as saying "homosexual acts are wrong". Rather, he wrote various bits and bobs which we may interpret (with greater or lesser legitimacy) as reflecting the view that homosexual acts are wrong.
The "sin of Sodom" doesn't refer to the attempted rape of the angels, since the angels came to cull the city because it was already sinful.
But in
this post you quoted an article arguing that "the sin of Sodom" was the attempted homosexual rape of the visitors, and specifically that it was the homosexual nature of this attempt, rather than the rape aspect, that was the sinful part. You can't have it both ways! If the "sin of Sodom" was something that occurred
before the visit of the angels, then it wasn't anything to do with the attempt to rape them, so you can't appeal to that part of the story to support the claim that it had anything to do with homosexuality or indeed sex at all. If, conversely, their sin was the attempted rape, then common sense would suggest that the fact that it was attempted rape was quite enough to render the act sinful, without the need to bring in the homosexuality (had the visitors been female, the behaviour of the citizens would presumably have been sinful and worthy of condemnation too, wouldn't it?).
Both Hebrew and Church Father authorities understood the sin of Sodom to be homosexual perversion of sexual acts. It's clearly nonsense to attempt to refute this by only using scriptures utterly removed from context. It's essentially Sola scriptura, and it'll get you to any conclusion you want.
Certainly one must read texts in context; but I dispute the notion that the best context in which to read them is (much) later Christian commentary. That doesn't make me a proponent of
sola scriptura. Here are a number of possible approaches one can take:
(1) For a Christian, all that matters is what the Bible says on this matter, and no external interpretation is required.
(2) For a Christian, all that matters is what the Bible says on this matter, but our interpretation must be guided by later Christian tradition.
(3) For a Christian, what the Bible says matters, and what later Christian tradition says matters, too.
You seem to be pushing for (2) here and accusing me of (1). But what I've said could be equally compatible with (3). The difference between (2) and (3) is that (2) relates the Bible and Christian tradition by retaining the Bible as the source that matters, and making later tradition merely its interpreter. But (3) makes later tradition a source in its own right. So on (3) one might reject, say, John Chrysostom's interpretation of the Bible's passages on homosexuality (i.e. one think think that he simply interprets them wrongly, purely as an exegetical question), but nevertheless actually agree with Chrysostom's comments on homosexuality.
Of course, I'm not endorsing any of these positions myself.
Okay. Are we settled on the matter then?
I'm quite willing to accept that the patristic writers mentioned thought that homosexuality was wrong. But I'm not going to concede that this means that orthodoxy requires that one agree with them. Patristic writers said all kinds of things that orthodoxy subsequently rejected or at least did not officially require.
Yes, Arnobius of Sicca, also known as Arnobius the Elder; I assumed that it was this Arnobius that your source was referring to (Arnobius the Younger was a fifth-century commentator on the Psalms and a lot less interesting). I was surprised because Arnobius of Sicca is not exactly a doctrinal authority. He was a convert to Christianity who seems to have written his
Adversus nationes not long after conversion; it consists not so much of a defence of Christianity as an attack upon pagan religion. One theory is that his bishop ordered him to write it as a demonstration of his renunciation of his former views. At any rate he says a number of highly unorthodox things in the course of this attack, including that God couldn't have created human beings (since they are so wretched) and that the human soul is not naturally immoral (not an unorthodox claim in the strict sense but a very unusual one for an ancient Christian). The only characteristically Christian doctrine he defends is the divinity of Christ, but he has nothing to say about his humanity and indeed shows no knowledge of his life other than his miracles. He also doesn't mention the Holy Spirit. He also shows no knowledge whatsoever of the Old Testament and very little of the New, and the only Christian he mentions is St Peter. All of this is rather interesting as evidence of what an intelligent pagan convert to Christianity might have considered important aspects of his new religion at the start of the fourth century; it's also interesting because Jerome tells us that Arnobius was the teacher of Lactantius, who also had some decidedly unusual views (such as the notion that the Trinity consists of the Father, the Son, and Satan). But it also means that Arnobius is hardly an authority, even apart from his obscurity (I never heard of him in two years of studying the patristic period at postgraduate level, and only encountered him later when compiling an encyclopaedia of early Christian writers). So to see him listed as a "church father" is rather strange.
Practicality is what enables us to live in the world we live in. By saying "forget practicality" you're making the question senseless. Yes, I think that if there were a way to penalize uncharitable dishonesty in the same practicality that a parent does to a child, it should be done by the state. But there's not, so that's a moot point.
But as a philosopher yourself you must be aware that sometimes it's helpful to strip away questions of practicality because it helps us see what our motives are. There's a big difference between saying that something shouldn't be illegal because it would be impractical to make it so, and saying that something shouldn't be illegal because it would just be wrong to make it so quite apart from the practicalities. I asked the question because I wanted to know
why you thought it undesirable to make lying illegal - whether it's just because of the impracticality involved, or because of other reasons too.
I take it from your answer to the adultery question, though, that you think that, ideally, any sinful action should be illegal (questions of practicality aside). In other words, if there are any sinful acts that you
don't think illegal, it's because of issues of practicality, not because of any ideological reason. That is at least consistent but I find it a hard view to sympathise with.
Christian morality isn't solely rooted in divine revelation. If it were, then the answer would be no, as God only chooses to reveal His truths in certain manners at certain times, and thus there would be no fair way to enforce it. But it's also a matter of fact, I think, that Christian ethics can be demonstrated both metaphysically and sociologically to be the best system, which thus justifies all but the spiritual aspects being incorporated into law. When you subtract the theological aspect, Christian ethics essentially boil down to natural law.
Of course I don't think that that is true; partly because I find the arguments which have been used to defend Christian ethics (by which, I take it, you mean Catholic and specifically Thomist ethics) to be poor (as I outline below), and partly because no system of ethics can really claim to be
demonstrable, if only because none commands general assent among either lay people or ethicists. I mean, if Christian ethics were really rationally demonstrable as superior to all alternatives, then wouldn't we all be adhering to them anyway, whether we're Christians or not? The fact that Christian ethics is championed only by Christians - and only some of them at that - seems to me to undermine the claim that it's just rationally better than all alternatives irrespective of whether you're a Christian or not.
The definition of "good" is "purposeful."
That seems very strange to me. I can't see any good reason to think this. I can see that one might think that being purposeful is a prerequisite to being good, but that wouldn't mean that to be purposeful
is to be good; clearly people and things alike can have evil purposes.
All beings have a purpose by nature (inductive insofar that every being is doing something simply by existing; deductive insofar that the Creator made every being with a divine intent of it fulfilling its Final Cause), and so everything that exists is good.
All right, I'll grant this, given the claim that everything is created by God.
Evil or badness is therefore a lack of being, or a lack of purpose.
I have to say I've never been impressed by this argument. It depends upon the supposition that something cannot be both good and bad at the same time. But it seems to me at least plausible to suppose that it can, since one thing can have different capacities or purposes. I'm sitting on a plastic chair; it's a good chair but bad firewood.
To say that evil is a lack of purpose might seem to follow from your definition of good as purpose, but as I say, that strikes me as an extraordinary definition to start with.
Now your claim that evil or badness is a lack of being might follow if you could show that goodness is identical with being, but you haven't shown that. You said that all things that exist are good (because God wouldn't have created them without a purpose, and having a purpose is good). Yes, that follows from the premises. But it doesn't follow that existence and goodness are the same thing; it follows only that all existing things are good. It leaves open the possibility that non-existing things could be good too. (E.g. Mr Pickwick is good, but he doesn't exist; if God had chosen to actualise him, he would have done so with a purpose and he would certainly have been good then; one might think that Mr Pickwick isn't good enough for God to have chosen to actualise him in preference to the possible beings that he
did actualise, but it doesn't follow from that that Mr Pickwick isn't good at all.) And even if it turned out that the set of good things is identical with the set of existent things (so that nothing existent is not good, and nothing non-existent is good), it still wouldn't follow that goodness is the same thing as existence, only that these properties happen to be instantiated in the same entities.
Now, as the Creator made every being with purpose (otherwise He would not have made them), we can say that the Final Cause of all beings is the Creator Himself.
No, that doesn't follow. Yes, we'll grant that God makes everything that exists with a purpose; but why it should follow from that that God himself is that purpose, I can't think. If I make a Civ scenario I certainly have a purpose in so doing, but I myself am not identical with that purpose (in fact I'm not sure what it would even mean to say that I am). To put it in Aristotelian terms, you're saying that all existent things have a final cause, and that God is their efficient cause. That doesn't entail that God
is their final cause, only that he had the final cause in mind when he made them.
Therefore, the nature of being is to incline towards the Creator, i.e., God. Humans are only capable of evil because we have free will and reason, which allow us to contradict our purpose of inclining towards God.
Well, clearly I don't think that that follows from your premises, for the reasons given above. At least, if it does follow, you haven't shown that it does.
While I will not tell you you are not a Christian, you definitely don't take the Bible very literally, and as such Plotinus' point would not apply to you. Also, from our discussions you sound like more of a Universalist than a Christian (Read the narrow way passages to see why they are exclusive.)
Being a Christian and being a universalist are absolutely not exclusive. If they were, then
St Gregory of Nyssa would not be a Christian, since he was very definitely a universalist. A definition of "Christian" that makes one of the most important and revered saints of all time not a Christian is a definition in serious need of revision.
I have talked about Christian universalism in
my theologian threads plenty of times, so if you want to ask about that, feel free to do so there.
As for Paul "Not being the leading Christian", yeah he kinda was.
No, he wasn't. The main Christian leaders in his day were James and Peter. The fact that Paul feels the need to insist upon his own authority as an apostle frequently in his letters makes it quite plain that plenty of Christians didn't think much of him. He seems more important in retrospect because his letters survived to be so influential. Of course he
was important, but he was certainly not the leading Christian.
The only political issue the Bible is clear on is abortion:
http://www.covenantnews.com/cspa990830.htm
I don't think the Bible is so clear on it as you suggest. The article you link to is a bit feeble - it cites Exodus' punishments for those who, while fighting, injure pregnant women and cause miscarriages, but that is hardly a clear condemnation of abortion in itself, only of accidentally causing a miscarriage in someone who doesn't want one. (And how often would that situation happen?) Plus I'm always suspicious of authors who try biblical interpretation using the AV. Scholarship's moved on just a tad in the past four hundred years.
The early Christians, incidentally, were certainly unanimously opposed to abortion, but I don't think they thought that this was because the Bible condemned it; they just thought it was wrong.
The ceremonial law was fulfilled in Christ, but the moral law still applies.
I don't think that's a biblical distinction. I don't believe that the New Testament distinguishes between different kinds of "law" in that way; on the contrary, Paul, at least, always talks simply of "the Law" and indeed in Galatians argues strongly that you can't pick and choose parts of it. The Galatians thought they should require circumcision and none of the rest of the Law; Paul tells them that if you enforce one part of the Law (circumcision) you are bound to keep the whole of it (Gal. 5:2-4).
However, that does not mean we need to enforce it, and of course, non-Christians aren't going to follow all of it because there is no reason for them too.
That I agree with.
Thus, Scripture affirms its own authority. For a Christian, that should be enough.
You might as well say that the Pope affirms his own authority, and for a Christian that should be enough. Christians have a vast range of attitudes to the Bible, not all of which involve thinking that everything in the Bible is true. For many Christians, the text you cite proves nothing other than that the author of 2 Timothy believed that some texts were divinely inspired and useful for teaching purposes. It doesn't follow that he was thinking of the same texts that we mean by "scripture" or that he was right in his assessment of them.
However, I don't see how you can say that you don't believe the Bible is true but that you are a Christian.
You said yourself that you think a true Christian is someone in a direct relationship with Jesus. That doesn't presuppose any particular belief about the nature of Bible, its authority, or its truth.
Christianity covers pretty much the entire possible range of sexual morality, I don't think any one is more legitimately "Christian" than any other.
That is absolutely right. There are even Christian swingers.
I must say that I do agree that the Catholic position on contraception is hopelessly inconsistent; it can't possibly be correct. To suppose that
all contraception is intrinsically sinful and should not be used seems implausible, but it is not inconsistent. But to suppose that contraception is intrinsically sinful but nevertheless to say that some methods (i.e. the rhythm method) are nevertheless all right because they don't use any artificial aids seems just daft. It's like saying that murder is wrong, but as long as you strangle someone with your bare hands and don't use any artificial aids to kill them, then that's OK. This inconsistency suggests to me that the whole policy is not really based upon clear reasoning but on a non-rational fear of sexuality and the association of sexuality with pleasure, and that the arguments against engaging in sex just for pleasure are really post-hoc rationalisations of this fear, and not really thought to be compelling even by those who use them. That's why they can just override these arguments (because of pastoral exigency) by allowing for "natural" methods of contraception, even though they are ruled out by the same arguments. David Lodge's
The British Museum is falling down gives a satirical but very striking picture of the havoc that this kind of thing has actually caused in people's lives.
I don't think that's a very good response -- from a certain point of view, it does make sense to ban alcohol, along with hard drugs. (And cigarettes, and perhaps fast food, from closely related perspectives) That's only a strike against this sort of argument if they have a very baseline belief (Some sort of ethical premise) that drinking alcohol is OK. Otherwise, it's an interesting consequence of that line of thinking, but hardly an argument against such thinking.
. I do think that LS's position is more internally consistent then you give it credit for - and he's serious about the contraception and masturbation stuff. 
