Is consolidation of industry good?

Is consolidation of industry good?


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Cheezy the Wiz

Socialist In A Hurry
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By the consolidation of industry, I mean that agglomeration of markets by companies which occurs by both choice, as in mergers or buy-outs, and also without, as by consumers' choice. There are obvious benefits and detractions from such an event (as there are with most things), most of which I've tried to outline below. For purposes of this thread (or at least the OP), let it be assumed that I agree with the assumptions that commonly form the folklore surrounding the logic of capitalist markets. I say this so as to save myself the time and patience of having to write a disclaimer every time I make such a statement for the purposes of framing a point, and because I don't want to get into an epic squabbling match about whether I really believe assumption X or not.

First and foremost is the question of efficiency. By definition, if one company does more business than another, and earns a larger share of the market than another, then it is more efficient. This is why consumers chose them, or why their profit is larger because of better finance management, with the end result being the same (though both are certainly required to be considered "successful") The logic of the market also assumes that this will be the best product available, because it most balances the efficiency of cost of production with the quality that satisfies consumers, as compared to the competition.

However, there comes a price with success. An expanded market for a company means an expansion of business, which means an expansion of the people who run the business. This is the beginnings of bureaucracy. There are two schools of thought on this. The first is that a larger operation is more efficient, and the second is that the larger an operation gets, the less efficient it becomes. I will address the second argument first, for its ease.

It is primarily ideology that declares bureaucracy to be inefficient. I don't mean to be facetious, since I'm trying to give different positions equal air-time, so to speak, but I really cannot think of even a caricature of an argument in defense of this position. It seems to be almost one of faith, that it is so because someone thinks so. I suppose it could be the increasing distance of decision-making from production, but I address that point very soundly in the next part, such that the only argument against the fact could be that a badly formed bureaucracy would be inefficient compared to a better-formed one, but that's basically a tautology. It's all about leadership decisions and structure, and I don't think anyone will argue with that.

As to the other side of the coin, it is a very large one. First, assuming the agglomeration above results from mergers and buyouts, there are probably less competitors in the market than before, which makes it easier for the government to regulate. The government already encourages de facto monopolies in certain industries precisely for this ease of efficacy (see: electrical companies). This consolidation is also more efficient in the use of both people and resources, as less competing firms means less redundant personnel structures and resource usage, in both production and management aspects.

There is another point as well: the above described consolidation is of horizontal businesses, but vertical consolidation is arguably even more efficient. This when a firm seeks not control of its specific market, but rather seeks to control all the various parts of the production process of its good, such that it can, from mine to market, function with relative independence from competitors. Think Standard Oil versus Carnegie Steel. This type of consolidation is arguably more efficient than horizontal, since the company can "buy" and "sell" to itself, eliminating middlemen and distributors, and streamline the entire process.

The creation of bureaucracy that results from the need to manage such an increasingly large enterprise is not, as mentioned above, a mark of inefficiency, but rather what helps make things more efficient, and this level of organization is what facilitates the increased success of a business. Weber certainly thought so at any rate. It is necessary on every level. I mentioned above the fear of possible inefficiency that results from the increasing distance of decision-making from the production process. This is the essential criticism of a centrally-planned economy such as the Soviet Union's. However, as Galbraith was careful to observe, the successful modern firm does not make this mistake, and unsuccessful modern firms often do. His pivotal example is Ford Motor Co. during the last decades of Henry Ford's life. Ford feared losing even the slightest amount of control over his company, so he refrained completely from sharing any of his decision-making power. He routinely fired people who had worked through the ranks and that he feared were, actually or possibly, arrogating some of his power or responsibility. Because of this, his company suffered enormously. Upon his death, the decision-making about essentially all parts of the company was quickly returned to the democratically-driven decision-making teams of experts at all levels of the company (except production, obviously: they weren't communists after all), and Ford Motor Co. rather quickly regained lost ground. Galbraith made the point that under Mr. Ford, the company was operating in a way essentially identical to the Soviet planned economy, with Ford playing the role of GosPlan. But FMC escaped this trap by delegating decision-making to where it needed to be: in proximity to production to facilitate changes and updates as needed. Ford Motor Company was not the model upon which this technostructure was built, but it is one highly illustrative example of how essential this "naturally-occurring" phenomenon is to modern business practice in all but the smallest of operations. I say naturally-occurring because it was a natural outgrowth across all industries as both technology and size became increasingly complex, and the need for such expert teams to manage once one person could no longer possibly be expected to be an equivalent expert in so many fields, or to handle so many decisions in an equally informed way, as these committees could. It is the way that modern productive companies function. I say that because I don't think financial firms like trading or investment firms need such expertise, but I'm sure Whomp will be happy to correct me on that. He ought to love this thread, what with me citing Weber and Galbraith (and Schumpeter, too! Just you wait).

Standardization is another obvious aspect of consolidation. The rise of Wal-Mart and Target means the end of many mom and pop shops. Is that good? Here there is real ground for contention. Some can say yes, because the product and the experience becomes more predictable, and predictability leads to greater efficiency. However, that standardization also means a loss of "local flavor," which can be considered an aspect of culture. This should remind readers of Weber's Iron Cage of social rationalization and standardization. I know I certainly choose small local restaurants over big corporate chains whenever I can. Variety is to many people the spice of life. But it is not outside of a big corporation's potential to localize production of vernacular tastes: one example is my company, whose Washington area shops are the only ones in the company to sell a specific product during the Cherry Blossom Festival, a local cultural event. Another is McDonald's sale of kosher foods in Israel, or non-beef foods in India. While neither of those examples are quite to the level of regional flavor that a locally-owned restaurant can produce, it does hint that such a thing is possible on some level.

In that direction, locally-owned businesses are more involved in their communities, because the people who own them and who work in them are from the area. That type of decentralization can be more efficacious towards local efforts to combat specific problems, or to change appearances, or whatever the case may be. It makes businesses more responsive and responsible to their local community. I doubt communities could have such an impact on a mega-corporation because of the one branch that exists in their town. But that may also be a necessary consequence of globalization, whether it occurs in one form or another.

And finally, the end result of consolidation is monopoly, the ultimate agglomeration. Being a superlative themselves, monopolies have access to being either supremely efficient or supremely inefficient. As with bureaucracy as a whole, it comes down to management and structure, but with a monopoly also purpose. A monopoly can be maximally efficient because parallel efforts within the industry have, by definition, been removed entirely. There are no directly analogous "competing" products, in the sense that a Mustang competes with a Charger, such that each product's producer has the ambition to create the cheapest/best quality product possible, to edge out the competition. However, there may certainly be internal competition between products, such as a Mustang competing with a GT or Shelby - the least or most expensive might not be what customers choose most/least, it's all about what they want. In this sense, the customer still makes the same decision about the balance of price and quality, just without the same threat of loss of money to a competitor as existed previously, though they could certainly still be deprived of money if the customer chose to purchase no product at all, for whatever reason, which still remains within the realm of possibility for all but the most essential products - electricity, food, health care, et cetera.

There is also the concern: do monopolies or near-monopolies quash innovation? The standard capitalist model is that better products continually replace inferior ones, because consumers will naturally and rationally choose them in the market. But with a monopoly or commanding share of the market, how is that possible? Similarly, the bigger a company gets in an industry, the more its internal problems become national concerns. Even if it were possible for a small firm to begin to put the enormous one out of business, that large one might have become "too big to fail," either because of its enormous payrolls, or because it provides a what has become essential to society's "way of life." This could also prevent the so-called creative destruction which replaces old industries with new ones. In an ideal world, the payrolls would just "transfer' over to the new companies as their jobs became redundant, but that's assuming that 1. they have the training to perform the new jobs, and 2. that the change is gradual and that a sudden implosion doesn't happen. Something like that, if it happened to a Too Big to Fail company, would be catastrophic for huge numbers of people.

Which begs the question: what should be done with a company that has been so successful as to now be Too Big to Fail? I see two options: one is to break them up, aka Trust Busting, and the other is to integrate it into the civil service, aka Nationalization. Personally, I favor the latter, because it acknowledges and codifies what is, by that point, essentially already the case. In some industries it may be necessary, such as electricity, transit, or health care, where having competing companies may not be in the best interest of society anyway, or may not be feasible in an efficient way. It is the ultimate reward for any company, to be deemed so successful as to be indispensable to society; but it also best protects society from being held hostage by or otherwise extorted into paying high prices and accepting low wages from such a powerful private firm. I don't think trust-busting is nearly as effective, it just kicks the can down the road, and there's no way to guarantee that the newly-formed sister companies won't behave like a cartel anyway. And if the government enforces perfect competition, isn't that really like combating capitalism to enforce capitalism?
 
To start with, this:

However, there may certainly be internal competition between products, such as a Mustang competing with a GT or Shelby

doesn't follow. Why would the company offer both? It's profit maximizing to only off the most expensive version. Make people either come up with the money, or go without. Remember that the monopolist is trying to maximize the rate of profit, not the quantity of it. It is only when the rate of profit is regulated, such as power utilities and defense contractors that the quantity of profit becomes the focus of management action.

The second point I'd like the address is the problem of bureaucracy. Now you can make the argument, as you have, that bureaucracy is not in and of itself poor at management and decisions as it gets larger and more complex. But in practice I don't think that often holds true. The problem is that if you have a huge organization where everyone is making the decisions at the lowest level then you can still get good decisions. There is a concept called Information Costs. The closer the decision maker is to the information, the greater the likelihood of good information. But that doesn't always hold true. And the further the decision maker is from the information, the less likely they will be fully knowledgeable on the subject to make a good decision. However they may well have some information that the lower level manager lacks.

Then you get to the incentives. Every level of management has the incentive to control as many of the decisions as it can. However, the levels above that have the incentive to centralize the decisions. It's very hard to run an organization in a way that leaves the decision making at the proper level for best available decisions. What ends up happening is that layer after layer of bureaucracy ends up being grafted on to the system as means of control of the various layers. Bureaucracy tends to make itself inefficient, because that is the price of maintaining control. Which is often why you see the best results where you see the least bureaucracy. That's not to say that it is impossible for bureaucracy to do something well, but that the incentives are against it.

Look no further than the difference between Social Security, which has very low administrative costs, and other welfare programs that have federal, state, and local, levels of bureaucracy and controls. Much higher administrative costs, much worse performance.

The next point is that creation of wealth requires the creative destruction within the economy aka Schumpeter. You need the competition for that. Any organization that can't grow by innovation, or that can keep profits without investment, is not going to innovate much. If a market is controlled, then there's more profit to be made by not investing any further. And that includes no innovation.

We must have the innovation. We must have the creative destruction. And so we must have the competition.

And so I disagree with your final point. I say it is better to break the companies up than it is to nationalize them. We will get better decisions, lower prices, and more innovation. And so the net good to society is maximized.
 
As a small posterperson, the mere size of the OP is indimidating enough to make me want to just get bought out rather than having to respond in a competing manner. Perhaps we can get some moderator action to break the OP into several threads that aren't too big to fail.
 
By the consolidation of industry, I mean that agglomeration of markets by companies which occurs by both choice, as in mergers or buy-outs, and also without, as by consumers' choice.

This definition is flawed - you have substituted "consolidation of industry" with "agglomeration of markets" but these are not the same thing. For example, brand-domination of a market does not necessarily lead to the consolidation of industry, as industrial producers may remain diverse and competitive in supplying the brand leader.


First and foremost is the question of efficiency. By definition, if one company does more business than another, and earns a larger share of the market than another, then it is more efficient.

"Increasing market share" is not the definition of efficiency, nor is "doing more business" the definition of efficiency.

Wikipedia said:
Economic Efficiency

In economics, the term economic efficiency refer to the use of resources so as to maximize the production of goods and services.[1] An economic system is said to be more efficient than another (in relative terms) if it can provide more goods and services for society without using more resources.

Efficiency is tied to the way that resources are used to maximise outputs in relation to inputs. It is one but not the only way in which business competes for market share, so that market share and efficiency are not interchangeable.


This is why consumers chose them

Really? Consumer choice is a very complex process - if it were simply down to efficiency and price then we would see that reflected in our economy [which is wasteful and produces many luxury goods, price-enhancing brands etc].


The logic of the market also assumes that this will be the best product available, because it most balances the efficiency of cost of production with the quality that satisfies consumers, as compared to the competition.

This is much more to the point, but you should be careful about a priori defining what is "best" [where "best" means efficiency, for example] because then you will have great difficulty explaining the diverse range and qualities of market-leaders.


I read the rest of your argument with interest, but you should make explicit that you are specifically considering the concept of efficiency rather than other factors of economics or consumer choice. You should try to ground your argument with a correct definition of efficiency and then place the discussion in the context of the wide range of other values that govern consumer preference, even if you don't plan to consider these other aspects of the economy.

Finally, I simply don't agree with your general approach to the subject. Your general approach seems to be that a clear and simple interpretation can be reached on the efficiency issue and applied universally, but it's rarely that simple.
 
tl;dr

Skimmed through it a bit, only saw the parts with "mao and stalin are my idols" and stuff like that.
 
@Cheezy, You sure you don't want this is in 'The Chamber'


OT: every time I type 'The Chamber' I imagine that 'Dun Dun Dunnnn' sound sounding in the background :p
 
As a small posterperson, the mere size of the OP is indimidating enough to make me want to just get bought out rather than having to respond in a competing manner. Perhaps we can get some moderator action to break the OP into several threads that aren't too big to fail.

Intimidating? I say that Cheezy's done an amazing job of summing up a lot of arguments about monopolies (and what to do about them) in a relatively short post. Leaving lots of room for discussion.

I won't want to add any other long text just now, but I do want to comment some points from one of the replies:

doesn't follow. Why would the company offer both? It's profit maximizing to only off the most expensive version. Make people either come up with the money, or go without. Remember that the monopolist is trying to maximize the rate of profit, not the quantity of it. It is only when the rate of profit is regulated, such as power utilities and defense contractors that the quantity of profit becomes the focus of management action.

Or when profit is not the driving force...

The next point is that creation of wealth requires the creative destruction within the economy aka Schumpeter. You need the competition for that. Any organization that can't grow by innovation, or that can keep profits without investment, is not going to innovate much. If a market is controlled, then there's more profit to be made by not investing any further. And that includes no innovation.

We must have the innovation. We must have the creative destruction. And so we must have the competition.

Again, your objection depends on assuming that profit must be the sole goal...

And so I disagree with your final point. I say it is better to break the companies up than it is to nationalize them. We will get better decisions, lower prices, and more innovation. And so the net good to society is maximized.

...and that is why your conclusion makes no sense - it would make sense only if profit remained the sole goal of the nationalized companies!
 
Or when profit is not the driving force...


If it's privately owned, it is profit. If it's government owned and there are other considerations dominating, then the organization isn't very likely to be viable in the long run.



Again, your objection depends on assuming that profit must be the sole goal...



The business of business is business.



...and that is why your conclusion makes no sense - it would make sense only if profit remained the sole goal of the nationalized companies!


Most nationalized companies don't have profit as a motive at all. And that is why they fail.
 
Why would the company offer both? It's profit maximizing to only off the most expensive version. Make people either come up with the money, or go without. Remember that the monopolist is trying to maximize the rate of profit, not the quantity of it.

It's profit maximizing to offer a number of choices at different price points. The auto industry has been mentioned in this thread so I'll use it as an example.

If all you offer is the Cadillac, you get $0 from the segment of the population unable or unwilling to pay for a Cadillac. If all you offer is the Chevy, you leave money on the table from the segment of the population that is able and willing to buy a Cadillac. It's in your best interests to offer both because the demand exists for both products. If that weren't the case, car companies wouldn't have so many different models.

Whether you have a monopoly, an oligopoly, or a free market, the same principle would apply. The problem with a monopoly would be that both the Cadillac and Chevy would be more expensive and lower quality than you would have with competition.
 
But if you have a monopoly, the profit maximizing thing to do is to offer as few as possible choices that are within spitting differences with one another. A luxury car and a sports car are in two different market segments. a low end to a mid level sports car are not that different.
 
To start with, this:



doesn't follow. Why would the company offer both? It's profit maximizing to only off the most expensive version. Make people either come up with the money, or go without. Remember that the monopolist is trying to maximize the rate of profit, not the quantity of it. It is only when the rate of profit is regulated, such as power utilities and defense contractors that the quantity of profit becomes the focus of management action.

Meh, different companies and different managers behave in different ways. The goal of corporations nowadays is certainly not profit maximization in the most absolute sense as it once was (i.e., playing chicken with the markets), but rather the maximization of profit within a program of internal stability and predictability. A modern corporation does not behave in a way that will destroy its potential for future profits in favor of present ones. Banking and investment institutions aside, quite obviously. But those people are largely playing with other peoples' money, so the point is beside itself.

Anyway, to address the point directly: if the only car they offer is a Shelby, and no one can afford a Shelby, then no one will buy the Shelby, and the company makes $0. By offering multiple products, they still give people the illusion of choice, and it allows them to cater to multiple markets, including reeling in the less affluent buyers.

The second point I'd like the address is the problem of bureaucracy. Now you can make the argument, as you have, that bureaucracy is not in and of itself poor at management and decisions as it gets larger and more complex. But in practice I don't think that often holds true. The problem is that if you have a huge organization where everyone is making the decisions at the lowest level then you can still get good decisions. There is a concept called Information Costs. The closer the decision maker is to the information, the greater the likelihood of good information. But that doesn't always hold true. And the further the decision maker is from the information, the less likely they will be fully knowledgeable on the subject to make a good decision. However they may well have some information that the lower level manager lacks.

I do believe I dedicated a rather large paragraph to supporting this point.

Then you get to the incentives. Every level of management has the incentive to control as many of the decisions as it can.

Not really. There is only incentive to control as much of the decision-making over its own affairs as it can get. One district doesn't care about managing another's district, and just the same, marketing doesn't care about controlling decisions about IT Support or Payroll.

However, the levels above that have the incentive to centralize the decisions. It's very hard to run an organization in a way that leaves the decision making at the proper level for best available decisions. What ends up happening is that layer after layer of bureaucracy ends up being grafted on to the system as means of control of the various layers. Bureaucracy tends to make itself inefficient, because that is the price of maintaining control. Which is often why you see the best results where you see the least bureaucracy. That's not to say that it is impossible for bureaucracy to do something well, but that the incentives are against it.

I don't see how there's incentive to centralize decisions, when the whole point of bureaucracy is to decentralize them out of necessity. Have you ever read Galbraith or Weber? Both of them vindicate the concept far better than I could, and I'm just going to be throwing quotes by them at you.

T
he next point is that creation of wealth requires the creative destruction within the economy aka Schumpeter. You need the competition for that. Any organization that can't grow by innovation, or that can keep profits without investment, is not going to innovate much. If a market is controlled, then there's more profit to be made by not investing any further. And that includes no innovation.

We must have the innovation. We must have the creative destruction. And so we must have the competition.

So then why was 1989 Soviet Union not technologically identical to 1917 Sovnarkom, if such an entity is by nature incapable of technological innovation and advancement?

Unless there's another way outside of the present paradigm to innovate...

As a small posterperson, the mere size of the OP is indimidating enough to make me want to just get bought out rather than having to respond in a competing manner. Perhaps we can get some moderator action to break the OP into several threads that aren't too big to fail.

I would buy you out, but I fear the stocks are poisoned. Best to let the government subsidize your bailout with bonds.

This definition is flawed - you have substituted "consolidation of industry" with "agglomeration of markets" but these are not the same thing. For example, brand-domination of a market does not necessarily lead to the consolidation of industry, as industrial producers may remain diverse and competitive in supplying the brand leader.

I thought it was fairly clear that I was talking about the general trend of gaining an increasing share of "the" market, by either of those methods. I never spoke of suppliers, except very briefly with regards to vertical consolidation.

"Increasing market share" is not the definition of efficiency, nor is "doing more business" the definition of efficiency.

No, but it is the mark of efficiency, by the capitalist definition. If a company is more successful than another in the market, that is because it presents a better product at a lower price, and thus is, by necessity, more efficient.

Efficiency is tied to the way that resources are used to maximise outputs in relation to inputs. It is one but not the only way in which business competes for market share, so that market share and efficiency are not interchangeable.

The word "efficiency" can have many meanings, this I will not debate. The narrow sense in which I intended it to be used, as it applies to the topic, is prevalent.

Really? Consumer choice is a very complex process - if it were simply down to efficiency and price then we would see that reflected in our economy [which is wasteful and produces many luxury goods, price-enhancing brands etc].

Certainly advertising does a great deal to convince people to buy more expensive versions of products than they require. But to the rational buyer, which I thought we assumed consumers to be, the below definition (in your quote) is the most apt to describe their buying tendencies.

This is much more to the point, but you should be careful about a priori defining what is "best" [where "best" means efficiency, for example] because then you will have great difficulty explaining the diverse range and qualities of market-leaders.

I thought it was obvious I didn't intend to make any sort of qualitative judgment, merely an observation about how things appear to the rationally-behaving consumer as caricatured by economists.

I read the rest of your argument with interest, but you should make explicit that you are specifically considering the concept of efficiency rather than other factors of economics or consumer choice. You should try to ground your argument with a correct definition of efficiency and then place the discussion in the context of the wide range of other values that govern consumer preference, even if you don't plan to consider these other aspects of the economy.

Finally, I simply don't agree with your general approach to the subject. Your general approach seems to be that a clear and simple interpretation can be reached on the efficiency issue and applied universally, but it's rarely that simple.

Again, I thought that my intent to take this within a somewhat narrow window was apparent. But even with that intention, I believe I covered a variety of approaches. It's certainly not exhaustive, after all I haven't signed a book deal on this or anything. It we want to expand this topic, then, well, that's what the threat is for.

tl;dr

Skimmed through it a bit, only saw the parts with "mao and stalin are my idols" and stuff like that.

/me takes HC in the back of #fiftychat and beats him with a trout

@Cheezy, You sure you don't want this is in 'The Chamber'

Yes, I have no intention of endorsing The Chamber Pot outside of Ask a Red's Red Diamond protection, which I had secured long before the concept of RD even appeared on this forum.

Intimidating? I say that Cheezy's done an amazing job of summing up a lot of arguments about monopolies (and what to do about them) in a relatively short post. Leaving lots of room for discussion.

Thanks. I hope it generates it. We seem to be on a good track so far.

...and that is why your conclusion makes no sense - it would make sense only if profit remained the sole goal of the nationalized companies!

Which, if they are done in the proper sense, which is to make them essentially government agencies, would be irrelevant. It becomes a public service, not a business. A company that has achieved that level of penetration and prevalence in our society is, by the time it becomes Too Big to Fail, providing what is essentially a public service in an exclusionary way. Nationalization simply denies them this ability and protects society from such hostage-taking.
 
If it's privately owned, it is profit. If it's government owned and there are other considerations dominating, then the organization isn't very likely to be viable in the long run.

I'm going to ask to: can you list, say, the 10 oldest human organizations in existence?
Can you at least make a guess at whether they are businesses or something else?

The business of business is business.

And what is business? An organization with goal as a profit? That's far, far too simplistic. That can describe the goal of a single trade transaction, but never the goal of any complex organization. Even the single trader or craftsman himself, the smallest instance of a "business", will have other goals than simply making money. Like... having a life.

And you never find a modern industry that doesn't involve a complex organization. With many people and many different goals. It's never just about turning a profit. And even if it were just about that you'd still have to deal with complex stuff like when to turn a profit (the timescale of the investment), how it was organically divided and which groups inside it were to be "profit centers" and which were "costs" to be borne, what to do with net income (profits/dividends, reinvestment, or some other end?), etc.

Most nationalized companies don't have profit as a motive at all. And that is why they fail.

By now it should be clear that I strongly disagree that profit is a necessary (or even desirable) focus as the goal of an industrial operation (incidentally, I've just read a blog post arguing the opposite, giving examples of experiments showing that financial incentives make for worse decision-making). But I'll pretend to accept that just for the sake of not changing the subject of the discussion.

So, dropping the above discussion altogether and assuming that companies must be run for profit, I'd like to ask you why must we assume that under the same economic liberal reasoning that enshrines profit as the goal a government will be fundamentally different, as an owner, from any other stockholder?

I know that you've asserted that in real life most nationalized companies don't have profit as a motive, but let's keep this discussion in the theoretical realm where all those assumptions hold.
 
And so I disagree with your final point. I say it is better to break the companies up than it is to nationalize them. We will get better decisions, lower prices, and more innovation. And so the net good to society is maximized.

If trust-busting actually functioned to break up trusts, then this argument might be more on-point. However, as things stand, and indeed have stood since shortly after anti-trust legislation hit the books, it serves as a cover for the continued existence of monopolies (though not often complete monopolies), and actually encourages their existence. By the existence of anti-trust laws, society goes through the ritual of condemning them and punishing them, but because society had defined corporations - organizations - as people, long before Citizens United did, because it had to understand the accumulation of wealth through the myth of the rugged individual, the punishments dealt out to corporations deemed to be trusts were done as if pertaining to individuals. And thus when the trusts were assumed to be "busted," they were in fact slapped on the wrist and their fate left to be decided by preachers who can do nothing but throw words around. It was rather like prostitution laws: they existed to make Americans feel righteous, rather than to actually solve a problem.

If I may post an extended quote from Thurman Arnold's 1937 book The Folklore of Capitalism:

The antitrust laws remained as a most important symbol. Whenever anyone demanded practical regulation, they formed an effective moral obstacle, since all the liberals would answer with a demand that the antitrust laws be enforced. Men like Senator Borah founded political careers on the continuance of such crusades, which were entirely futile but enormously picturesque, and which paid big dividends in terms of personal prestige. And, of course, people like Borah were sincere in thinking that the moral answer was also the practical answer. Thus, by virtue of the very crusade against them, the great corporations grew bigger and bigger, and more and more respectable. This is not an attack on the process. It was an inevitable one in such an intellectual and moral atmosphere. It allowed the organizing ability of the American people to develop. Whether it would have developed faster or slower under other conditions is a question which it is not the province of a descriptive analysis to answer.

In any event, the Federal antitrust laws, since the nineties, have stood as a great moral gesture which proves that in a nation of organizations individuals really are supreme; or, if not, they asre going to become so very soon through the intervention of the Federal Government. Plenty of individual economists have written and talked about the trust problem as one of organization and control. Yet the general tenor of public debate about great industrial organizations, both conservative and radical, has been based on the conception that the only proper type of society is composed of unorganized competitive individuals. In each great depression, the attack on industrial organizations is renewed, coupled with the demand that they be dissolved - a demand which is always defeated because of the forces which make such organization essential...

...This was the procedure of attempts to control the great industrial organizations of this country in the interests of democratic and humanitarian service to those dependent on them. Attempts to reform usually ended with an appeal to the old creed under whose protecting mantle these institutions had grown, the creed of rugged individualism, with the organizations personified as individuals.

The reason why these attacks always ended with a ceremony of atonement, but with few practical results, lay in the fact that there were no new organizations growing up to take over the functions of those under attack. The opposition was never able to build up its own commissary and its service of supply. It was well supplied with orators and economists, but it lacked practical organizers. A great cooperative movement in America might have changed the power of the industrial empire. Preaching against it, however, simply resulted in counterpreaching.

And the reason for this was that the reformers themselves were caught in the same creeds which supported the institutions they were trying to reform. Obsessed with a moral attitude toward society, they thought in Utopias. They were interested in systems of government. Philosophy was for them more important than opportunism and so they achieved in the end philosophy rather than opportunity.

Edward Bellamy saw in the corporation itself a step toward Socialism. He thought of a future world of nationalized industry. He was the forerunner of the N.R.A. and the attacks on his preaching resembled very much the attacks on the recent National Recovery Administration. His failure in diagnosis was much the same as that of the N.R.A. He believed that change in social institutions occurs when right-thinking, intelligent men get together and plan to change them. He saw in political argument over principle, not a symptom of spiritual conflict, but a positive directing force.

When the spiritual conflict died down after the panic of the nineties, the old religion reasserted itself. The antitrust laws became the great myth to prove by an occasional legal ceremony that great industrial organizations should be treated like individuals, and guided by the principle and precept back to the old ways of competition and fair practices, as individuals were. This was then, and is today, the principal utility of that massive moral philosophy known as antitrust legislation.

One great change, however, did come over corporate activity because of the philosophy which produced the antitrust laws. Since everyone thought of these great enterprises as individuals which should be moral and gentlemanly in their dealings, they came gradually to conform to those standards. This is in accordance with the principle of political dynamics which makes it inevitable that an institution will, in the long run, conform to the character which men give it. The antitrust laws were based on a popular conception that great corporations could be made respectable. Following that ideal, great corporations did become respectable.
 
Meh, different companies and different managers behave in different ways. The goal of corporations nowadays is certainly not profit maximization in the most absolute sense as it once was (i.e., playing chicken with the markets), but rather the maximization of profit within a program of internal stability and predictability. A modern corporation does not behave in a way that will destroy its potential for future profits in favor of present ones. Banking and investment institutions aside, quite obviously. But those people are largely playing with other peoples' money, so the point is beside itself.

Anyway, to address the point directly: if the only car they offer is a Shelby, and no one can afford a Shelby, then no one will buy the Shelby, and the company makes $0. By offering multiple products, they still give people the illusion of choice, and it allows them to cater to multiple markets, including reeling in the less affluent buyers.


This is wrong. Corporations maximize profit regardless of sustainability. Sustainability is frequently not even on the radar. Take General Motors. Their business model was absolutely not sustainable between the 1970s and the bankruptcy in 2009. They were just too big for that to matter to them much. So year after year they lost market share, and lost their ability to pay their fixed obligations to their labor. US Steel absolutely put profits now ahead of sustainability. The US lost its steel industry not to low wages, but to higher quality and productivity. Why? Because while US Steel was using steel mills built during WWII and even half a century earlier, Japan had more modern technology that was all post WWII. They weren't cheaper because their labor was cheaper, they were cheaper because they were better at the job. Take any modern company that has outsourced much of their work to cheap labor countries. They are not managing for sustainability, they are managing for the quick buck. Take Walmart, in an industry that has a really hard time keeping good workers, they treat their labor like crap. Good for profits now, bad when the labor markets get tight.

As for the Mustang, you don't build one model no one can afford. Let's say they could make 5000 GTs, and 10,000 stock models, or just 10,000 GTs. They are obviously going to make just the 10,000 GTs. Half the people buying the standard model could, with trouble, but they could, come up with the higher price. They just don't want to. Taking away that choice is profit maximizing.



I do believe I dedicated a rather large paragraph to supporting this point.


Maybe I misunderstood, but I thought you made a number of points that large bureaucracy had problems, but the problems were less than the alternative. That's wrong. The problems are greater than the alternative.




Not really. There is only incentive to control as much of the decision-making over its own affairs as it can get. One district doesn't care about managing another's district, and just the same, marketing doesn't care about controlling decisions about IT Support or Payroll.


Of course it does. That's logic of bureaucracy. Each of the middle managers maximizes his own best interest, future career prospects, and salary, by controlling as much as possible.

And some do it just because they're control freaks. And control freaks have a nasty habit of coming to power in bureaucracies.



I don't see how there's incentive to centralize decisions, when the whole point of bureaucracy is to decentralize them out of necessity. Have you ever read Galbraith or Weber? Both of them vindicate the concept far better than I could, and I'm just going to be throwing quotes by them at you.


The core point of Bureaucracy is to centralize power and decision making. That's the reason that it exists. I challenge you to come up with examples of it not happening. It is in the interests of everyone in the bureaucracy to gain as much power as possible. Bureaucracy is a tool for control. If it was a tool for decentralization, then it would not exist at all.



So then why was 1989 Soviet Union not technologically identical to 1917 Sovnarkom, if such an entity is by nature incapable of technological innovation and advancement?

Unless there's another way outside of the present paradigm to innovate...


The USSR was moderately innovative in aerospace. But they also acquired much of that basic technology from the Germans at the end of WWII. They were somewhat innovative with weapons systems. But they they threw a vast portion of their economy at those sectors. As a percentage of their resources they threw something like 4 times as much at those sectors as the US did. And the result is that they did some things impressively well. And they did a couple of things first. But overall we got far higher quality for a fraction of the costs.

Outside of those sectors, where did the USSR innovate? They really didn't. They used technology invented elsewhere that they were either able to buy or copy. It is precisely that lack of innovation that lead to their stagnation and eventual dissolution.



If trust-busting actually functioned to break up trusts, then this argument might be more on-point. However, as things stand, and indeed have stood since shortly after anti-trust legislation hit the books, it serves as a cover for the continued existence of monopolies (though not often complete monopolies), and actually encourages their existence. By the existence of anti-trust laws, society goes through the ritual of condemning them and punishing them, but because society had defined corporations - organizations - as people, long before Citizens United did, because it had to understand the accumulation of wealth through the myth of the rugged individual, the punishments dealt out to corporations deemed to be trusts were done as if pertaining to individuals. And thus when the trusts were assumed to be "busted," they were in fact slapped on the wrist and their fate left to be decided by preachers who can do nothing but throw words around. It was rather like prostitution laws: they existed to make Americans feel righteous, rather than to actually solve a problem.


If I may post an extended quote from Thurman Arnold's 1937 book The Folklore of Capitalism:



The fact that people don't choose to use anti-trust does not change the fact that it is the best of all available options. Now I grant you that lobbying is very effective. But surrendering to your way isn't any better than surrendering to their way. At least with their way the unsustainablity of their model will eventually make way for the new to replace the old. And the partial monopoly system that we managed did turn out to be vastly innovative. And may be so in the future if conservatives don't succeed in their goal of exterminating it.
 
I'm going to ask to: can you list, say, the 10 oldest human organizations in existence?
Can you at least make a guess at whether they are businesses or something else?


Religions.



And what is business? An organization with goal as a profit? That's far, far too simplistic. That can describe the goal of a single trade transaction, but never the goal of any complex organization. Even the single trader or craftsman himself, the smallest instance of a "business", will have other goals than simply making money. Like... having a life.

And you never find a modern industry that doesn't involve a complex organization. With many people and many different goals. It's never just about turning a profit. And even if it were just about that you'd still have to deal with complex stuff like when to turn a profit (the timescale of the investment), how it was organically divided and which groups inside it were to be "profit centers" and which were "costs" to be borne, what to do with net income (profits/dividends, reinvestment, or some other end?), etc.



How many people do what they do just because they can, and not just to earn money so that they can live? Many people try to combine what they want to do with what they have to do. But that really isn't relevant to anything. Most people work because they need the income from that work to live. So it's all about the paycheck. Why would organizations be any different?



By now it should be clear that I strongly disagree that profit is a necessary (or even desirable) focus as the goal of an industrial operation (incidentally, I've just read a blog post arguing the opposite, giving examples of experiments showing that financial incentives make for worse decision-making). But I'll pretend to accept that just for the sake of not changing the subject of the discussion.

So, dropping the above discussion altogether and assuming that companies must be run for profit, I'd like to ask you why must we assume that under the same economic liberal reasoning that enshrines profit as the goal a government will be fundamentally different, as an owner, from any other stockholder?

I know that you've asserted that in real life most nationalized companies don't have profit as a motive, but let's keep this discussion in the theoretical realm where all those assumptions hold.


Let's consider Pemex, the national oil company of the nation of Mexico. The purpose of Pemex is to use a national resource to benefit all of the people of Mexico instead of just the oil companies. Yet Pemex has so much of its revenue drawn off for the use of the Mexican state that it badly under-invests in new oil recovery technology, new exploration, and new production. As production falls, they refuse to make the changes necessary to manage for a sustainable future. Taking the money elsewhere is just too valuable in the short run to think about the long run.
 
How many people do what they do just because they can, and not just to earn money so that they can live? Many people try to combine what they want to do with what they have to do. But that really isn't relevant to anything. Most people work because they need the income from that work to live. So it's all about the paycheck. Why would organizations be any different?

That's very true.

It doesn't even matter whether the organization is a business or a nonprofit entity. They have bills to pay, and they'll only get so much slack from their vendors before necessary goods or services are cut off and they have to shut down.
 
No, but it is the mark of efficiency, by the capitalist definition.

I don't know why you're using the term efficiency, but meh.


If a company is more successful than another in the market, that is because it presents a better product at a lower price, and thus is, by necessity, more efficient.

So there is only one way to increase market share? And how did you get to necessity?


Also, I still don't think you are clear about the complexities of consumer choice or the mechanisms of market competition. But as you consider your definitions to be correct we're not going to go any further than this.
 
Religions.

Not businesses, then? And what about governments themselves? You know, there are people who suggest that one of the advantages held by the UK and France at the start of the industrial era was its military institutions, in that they had personnel experienced in organizing large numbers of people and in procuring, transforming and distributing large amounts of materials. The beginnings of economic management on a large scale happened not in private industry but in the bureaucracies of state institutions, namely the military.

Similar things have been said, in slightly different wording, abut the US military in the post WW2 era.

So, to claim that organizations run by a state are not viable in thee long run, I dare say, a teeny bit of an exaggeration on your part. Seeing as they seem to have been successful enough to even provide management expertise for private organizations!

How many people do what they do just because they can, and not just to earn money so that they can live? Many people try to combine what they want to do with what they have to do. But that really isn't relevant to anything. Most people work because they need the income from that work to live. So it's all about the paycheck. Why would organizations be any different?

Organizations should not be any different, that's my point! They can be (arguably are in our current world), but they need not be. And I'll also point out that if we are to accept your comparison above (bold by me) then companies would only "operate to live" meaning they'd need only to break even, not to "maximize profits" as we keep hearing about.

But people don't just work for the paycheck, do they? The paycheck is a means to their other ends: having money that they can spend on what they like beyond the bare essentials to live on. That may be taken to mean that people try to maximize their income. But (again I must add a "but"!) if we again assume that an organization would "behave" in the same way as a person this only means that an organization would try to maximize income, not profits. It would also mean that the organization would then spend all that income in order to achieve other ends. What ends? Since an organization is not a sentient being, the ends decided by the people who are a position to direct it...

Let's consider Pemex, the national oil company of the nation of Mexico. The purpose of Pemex is to use a national resource to benefit all of the people of Mexico instead of just the oil companies. Yet Pemex has so much of its revenue drawn off for the use of the Mexican state that it badly under-invests in new oil recovery technology, new exploration, and new production. As production falls, they refuse to make the changes necessary to manage for a sustainable future. Taking the money elsewhere is just too valuable in the short run to think about the long run.

And? Would it be any different if Pemex was a private company and a cash-strapped mexican government set its payments for exploration rights so that the government would receive the same amount of money? In that situation what would happen is... exactly what is happening! A private company would continue to operate so long as cheap enough technology allowed recovery of oil at a cost low enough to be able to pay whatever the government demands per barrel, and then it would either negotiate a different deal or close shop.

In fact a private company, all else being equal, would have to close shop before a public company must do so. Because a private company (at least if it obeys the market dogmas) must close shop as soon as its profit margin goes below the prevailing interest rates on capital, while a public company may as well keep operating so long as it breaks even!
 
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