Korean peace in our time

What's next, Trump colluding with North South Korea?

Best Korea, Worst Korea same difference
Who new remembering the good asians from the bad asians would be so complicated ?

Phone call Trump said he had with North Korean regime was actually with South Korea's president

President Trump incorrectly described a phone call he had with South Korean President Moon Jae-in as being with someone from North Korea, a National Security Council official said Monday.

While discussing North Korea on Saturday, Trump said "they, by the way, called up a couple of days ago. 'We would like to talk.' And I said, 'So would we, but you have to de-nuke, you have to de-nuke.'" In reality, the call on March 1 was with Moon, the official told South Korea's Yonhap News Agency. "President Trump did not have a call with the North Koreans," the official confirmed. The leaders did talk about North Korea, and Moon told Trump about the envoy he was sending to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Jong Un

http://theweek.com/speedreads/75919...korean-regime-actually-south-koreas-president
 
Regardless, I'm willing to bet serious money that the big driver to the current Best Korea /South Korea talks is that both got spooked that His Trumpiness might actually do something in Korea. Solution? Have some talks about having talks and wait until he looks elsewhere. Best Korea might have been able to keep a high level of rhetoric under a normal president but with His Trumpiness? Not a risk they wanted to take

So what you are saying is that in some weird, roundabout way Trump's dementia-addled brain and the unpredictability that comes with it may actually be preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula?
 
So what you are saying is that in some weird, roundabout way Trump's dementia-addled brain and the unpredictability that comes with it may actually be preserving peace on the Korean Peninsula?

I wouldn't call it "preserving peace." Forcing them to work out their problems, maybe. But, if they accomplish that without the US it will effectively prove that the problem all along has been...the US. So what then happens to the US in Asia?
 
I wouldn't call it "preserving peace." Forcing them to work out their problems, maybe. But, if they accomplish that without the US it will effectively prove that the problem all along has been...the US. So what then happens to the US in Asia?

As long as they can keep cycling dictators in to rule Katagalugan they’ll have their foothold. Remember they started in the Philippines, even a full military withdrawal from South Korea leaves them with Japan.
 
As long as they can keep cycling dictators in to rule Katagalugan they’ll have their foothold. Remember they started in the Philippines, even a full military withdrawal from South Korea leaves them with Japan.

When the Philippines kicked the US out we said "eh, still have Japan, and of course Korea." I'm not sure if there is actually a legal recourse for Japan to kick us out, so maybe there's always that.
 
So what then happens to the US in Asia?

Well if we would get our collective heads out of our butts and realize China is more valuable to us as a friend rather than a rival, I think our future in Asia would look quite bright. Power in the world is shifting, and if we want to remain one of the most influential nations on the planet, we need to start recognizing that we just might have to reevaluate who we should be trying to get chummy with.
 
Well if we would get our collective heads out of our butts and realize China is more valuable to us as a friend rather than a rival, I think our future in Asia would look quite bright. Power in the world is shifting, and if we want to remain one of the most influential nations on the planet, we need to start recognizing that we just might have to reevaluate who we should be trying to get chummy with.

Problem is that on a planet shared with China our long term possibilities of being all that influential are pretty limited. They just have too large a domestic market to be influenced once some other things balance out...which is inevitable.

I agree that we should be hopping on those coat tails though, no doubt.
 
This I don't agree with. Quality of life rising in the DPRK will make people wonder about why they need the whole police state, much as it did in the USSR.
This effect should not be placed on "rising quality of life in the USSR", but rather "Soviet citizens realizing, that supermarkets in the West are actually real".
 
American economic influence in Asia is no longer really about manufacturing anyway— the fact that Asian manufacturing is overcoming/has overcome American manufacturing doesn’t matter so long as it’s Americans who own a lot of the manufacturing capital in Asia. Maybe not so much in China or Japan or RoK, but definitely in India, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand... the list goes on. Plus in personal experience, in the Philippines, a lot of the economic growth we imagine coming to Asia is run by American megacorporations. I mean, the very way we think about Asia’s economic growth is in the context of American corporations like McDonalds, Apple, and Microsoft.
 
When historians look back at the end of the Cold War, they no longer consider Reagan to be all that relevant. It was really a matter of what was happening within the USSR and Eastern bloc, no matter who was in charge of US foreign policy. There's probably a tendency to over-emphasise the impact of the US and Trump in relation to North Korea as well. I mean, North and South Korea decide to hold talks, and the immediate question is about foreign policy of Trump, the leader of neither country? That seems off.
 
I mean, North and South Korea decide to hold talks, and the immediate question is about foreign policy of Trump, the leader of neither country? That seems off.

Not when you consider that it is likely one of the big reasons they decided to hold those talks is because both nations are worried about a US preemptive strike against North Korea, something Trump has alluded to being willing to do.
 
When historians look back at the end of the Cold War, they no longer consider Reagan to be all that relevant. It was really a matter of what was happening within the USSR and Eastern bloc, no matter who was in charge of US foreign policy. There's probably a tendency to over-emphasise the impact of the US and Trump in relation to North Korea as well. I mean, North and South Korea decide to hold talks, and the immediate question is about foreign policy of Trump, the leader of neither country? That seems off.

First off, what was happening in the Eastern Bloc was largely a result of the USSR trying to maintain an estimated 26% of GDP in defense spending. Whether Reagan was any more or less threatening than the next guy might have been to the people who decided that trying to do that was a good idea is an open question, but for whatever reason when the US went off the deep end and decided that the foundation of economic growth was a massive military buildup the USSR tried to follow. Pretending that the USSR collapsed in a vacuum is absurd.

Much like it is absurd to pretend that Trump has had no effect on RoK/DPRK relations. He has given them common ground. The DPRK has always operated from the notion that the US cares nothing about them and could launch an attack at any time intending to slaughter them out of hand. Until Trump the RoK has operated from the notion that the US would not do such a thing since it would also lead to millions dead in South Korea and a huge hit to GWP that would hurt the US economy. Trump has made perfectly clear that the US could, at any time, elect a president that couldn't care less about South Korean casualties who is also so economically illiterate as to not understand the consequences to the US economy.

So now the RoK and DPRK have a mutual problem of survival proportions and they have to find a way out. That's why they are talking, and what they are talking about.
 
It wasn't defense spending which made USSR collapse. As North Korea example shows, the country can exist indefinitely having far worse living standards and higher relative defense spending.
 
Well if we would get our collective heads out of our butts and realize China is more valuable to us as a friend rather than a rival, I think our future in Asia would look quite bright. Power in the world is shifting, and if we want to remain one of the most influential nations on the planet, we need to start recognizing that we just might have to reevaluate who we should be trying to get chummy with.

this is one of the best, most sane posts you've ever made. agreed 100%. especially wrt power projection the US will have to accept that everything in north/south china sea is just not something they can fight over, even if the US military is still vastly superior (aircraft carriers etc.).

it would also be a smart move to have china as a economic ally since it seems they are trying to monopolize rare earths and have taken a very strong, almost colonial-esque foothold in africa.

When historians look back at the end of the Cold War, they no longer consider Reagan to be all that relevant. It was really a matter of what was happening within the USSR and Eastern bloc, no matter who was in charge of US foreign policy. There's probably a tendency to over-emphasise the impact of the US and Trump in relation to North Korea as well. I mean, North and South Korea decide to hold talks, and the immediate question is about foreign policy of Trump, the leader of neither country? That seems off.

I actually agree wrt Ronald Reagan, but this argument doesn't hold true for the other American presidents after him. infact there is a very clear correlation of NK/SK relationships worsening every single time a republican president entered office. not necessarily just because of US foreign policy, but because NKs and SKs politics are heavily dependant upon external perceived "threats" and upon a mediator.

consider this: it is much harder to have the NK propaganda machinery running when Al Gore is calling for world peace, otoh it is very easy to rail up your own citiziens when the "most powerful" man in western politics quite literally declares you as part of "the axis of evil".

the fact that Moon Jae-In is now SKs president is a blessing. I was there when Park was impeached and you could almost feel in the air that the koreans were hungry for blood. the Saenuri (conservative old money) party of SK had been one of the foremost reasons why NK/SK relationships were steadily declining after having improved for almost a decade.

the day Trump was elected into office university campus in Seoul was completely silent. people seemed legitimately scared, nervous. honestly, this world right now is just bizarre. this man being president of anything is bizarre. maybe Bush Junior was incompetent, but he wasn't braindead enough to confuse SK with NK.
 
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it would also be a smart move to have china as a economic ally since it seems they are trying to monopolize rare earths and have taken a very strong, almost colonial-esque foothold in africa.

Rare earths are not rare, just messy to mine. And China's influence in Africa is still extremely weak and will remain so for decades to come.

First off, what was happening in the Eastern Bloc was largely a result of the USSR trying to maintain an estimated 26% of GDP in defense spending. Whether Reagan was any more or less threatening than the next guy might have been to the people who decided that trying to do that was a good idea is an open question, but for whatever reason when the US went off the deep end and decided that the foundation of economic growth was a massive military buildup the USSR tried to follow. Pretending that the USSR collapsed in a vacuum is absurd.

But pretending that there was a political vaccum inside the USSR and the collapse must have come from external causes is equally absurd. If the chinese leadership had lost their nerve and allowed the government to be toppled in 1989, would you likewise claim that they had fallen due to military pressure from outside? The USSR dissolved mainly due to internal political legitimacy problems had been accumulating during the 1980s. And it might very well have reformed and survived if not for the actions of a handful of people in late 1991. The influence of external ideas after the glasnost was probably far more important that economic situation. People always go through a period of great naiveté when their countries move from an environment of censorship to one of open communications.

the US would not do such a thing since it would also lead to millions dead in South Korea and a huge hit to GWP that would hurt the US economy. Trump has made perfectly clear that the US could, at any time, elect a president that couldn't care less about South Korean casualties who is also so economically illiterate as to not understand the consequences to the US economy.

I don't really see how taking out (through indirect casualties) the US's main competitor in a series of top technological industries, and likely seriously harming another two (Japan also indirectly, and perhaps China through destabilization. Perhaps even Taiwan too) would be a bad consequence.
A risk, certainly. But one that I've been fearing that some people will be willing to take. The one big risk weighting against this in the minds of those making the war calculus is that China might remain uninvolved and lead an asian alliance to completely exclude the US from the region after the fallout settles. Kind of like the US destroying Iraq and finding out that Iran has its strategic situation improved. And this just makes me more scared that if there is a war in Korea, a deliberate effort will be made to extend it to China.
 
I don't really see how taking out (through indirect casualties) the US's main competitor in a series of top technological industries, and likely seriously harming another two (Japan also indirectly, and perhaps China through destabilization. Perhaps even Taiwan too) would be a bad consequence.
A risk, certainly. But one that I've been fearing that some people will be willing to take. The one big risk weighting against this in the minds of those making the war calculus is that China might remain uninvolved and lead an asian alliance to completely exclude the US from the region after the fallout settles. Kind of like the US destroying Iraq and finding out that Iran has its strategic situation improved. And this just makes me more scared that if there is a war in Korea, a deliberate effort will be made to extend it to China.

Trump doesn't see it either, which is why the term "economically illiterate" is so apt.
 
Much like it is absurd to pretend that Trump has had no effect on RoK/DPRK relations. He has given them common ground. The DPRK has always operated from the notion that the US cares nothing about them and could launch an attack at any time intending to slaughter them out of hand. Until Trump the RoK has operated from the notion that the US would not do such a thing since it would also lead to millions dead in South Korea and a huge hit to GWP that would hurt the US economy. Trump has made perfectly clear that the US could, at any time, elect a president that couldn't care less about South Korean casualties who is also so economically illiterate as to not understand the consequences to the US economy.

So now the RoK and DPRK have a mutual problem of survival proportions and they have to find a way out. That's why they are talking, and what they are talking about.

I'm certainly not saying that Trump is irrelevant, but rather than it's odd how much the Korean problem is viewed through an American lens. As in, even in Australia, it's viewed through an American lens, as if the problem is that now North Korean missiles can deliver a nuclear warhead to one particular foreign country instead of the other foreign countries to which it could already do the same. Again, that's not to deny the importance of the US in this dispute, it's to say that the frame of reference seems off. I think it's probably the spectacle of Trump that drives this, more than his actual direct impact, which I think is relatively minimal in a marginal sense (i.e. compared to any other US leader faced with the prospect of a nuclear-capable North Korea). After all, when Trump tweets that he has nuclear weapons and is not afraid to use them, that's actually one of his more conventional policy positions, because to my understanding it's entirely in line with US foreign policy since the end of the Korean War. It's the mode of communication that's unique.

So I'm sceptical of the notion that the big agent of change in the Korean dispute is Trump, and suspect the tendency to focus on him obscures potentially more convincing reasons for change (if indeed there has actually been any actual change, as opposed to a return to a different spot along a familiar cycle).

I suppose there's an element of laziness in that complaint; if I looked hard I could probably find those more convincing reasons, without asking the media I typically consume to feed them to me, but it would be nice if they could at least entertain some non-Trump-centric explanations for the current situation.

consider this: it is much harder to have the NK propaganda machinery running when Al Gore is calling for world peace, otoh it is very easy to rail up your own citiziens when the "most powerful" man in western politics quite literally declares you as part of "the axis of evil".

Is it though? How much does reality really limit North Korean propaganda? Has it really changed that much since Obama was in office? Didn't North Korea essentially treat the US the same way back then, albeit with a bit less theatre?

I don't think perception is unimportant, and to a large extent I suppose it doesn't matter whether there has been an actual departure from longstanding US policy, if there is a perceived departure.
 
I predict that Kim will have talks with Trump for a few days, then announce the talks were a farce and set off another nuclear test to embarrass Trump. That or Trump will walk away after his laughably stupid demands are not met.
 
I'm certainly not saying that Trump is irrelevant, but rather than it's odd how much the Korean problem is viewed through an American lens. As in, even in Australia, it's viewed through an American lens, as if the problem is that now North Korean missiles can deliver a nuclear warhead to one particular foreign country instead of the other foreign countries to which it could already do the same. Again, that's not to deny the importance of the US in this dispute, it's to say that the frame of reference seems off. I think it's probably the spectacle of Trump that drives this, more than his actual direct impact, which I think is relatively minimal in a marginal sense (i.e. compared to any other US leader faced with the prospect of a nuclear-capable North Korea). After all, when Trump tweets that he has nuclear weapons and is not afraid to use them, that's actually one of his more conventional policy positions, because to my understanding it's entirely in line with US foreign policy since the end of the Korean War. It's the mode of communication that's unique.

So I'm sceptical of the notion that the big agent of change in the Korean dispute is Trump, and suspect the tendency to focus on him obscures potentially more convincing reasons for change (if indeed there has actually been any actual change, as opposed to a return to a different spot along a familiar cycle).

I suppose there's an element of laziness in that complaint; if I looked hard I could probably find those more convincing reasons, without asking the media I typically consume to feed them to me, but it would be nice if they could at least entertain some non-Trump-centric explanations for the current situation.

Have the North Koreans been complaining about Australian bases in South Korea that I'm unaware of? Rhetorical question, obviously.

The Korean dispute is viewed through a US lens because it is basically DPRK's dispute with the US. Australia isn't anyone's enemy. Even South Korea isn't anyone's enemy, they are just too close an ally of the enemy. The US is the enemy, so the US is always going to be a focal point.

As you said, Trump pushing sanctions isn't new. Trump rattling the sword isn't new. There really isn't anything new in the adversarial relationship between DPRK and the US. But the current situation is entirely Trump-centric because what is new is that South Korea, for the first time in decades, is being forced to consider whether being a US ally is really a good thing. It isn't US adversaries who are seeing the Trump administration as a new and different US, it is US allies. There is a very real possibility of reunification, or at least peaceful and cooperative coexistence, on the peninsula, because for the first time South Korea is confronting the fact that they are hosting the actual obstacle to peace.
 
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