Newcomb's Problem

[Perfection]

Both options give the same payoff of zero boxes so it doesn't really matter what you do.

What about this situation

Spoiler :

In the future, people can be duplicated to a practically exact level of detail. Because you have very special skills your employer says that you are to be duplicated (and you agree with this) and you and your duplicate will be assigned (randomly) to two different positions (let's say one on Mars, and one on Venus).

Immediately after duplication (it's performed while you are unconscious), you and your duplicate awake to see your mischievous friend (who is the machine operator) on a video screen saying, "you and your double are in rooms that are practically exactly the same, listening to this message, both rooms have two buttons, if you push the red button I will give your double 2 boxes, if you push the blue button I will give you 1 box".

He adds, "if your double pushes the red button I will give you 2 boxes if your double pushes the blue button I will give him 1 box"

"I will give you both 15 minutes to make your decision, after which I will let you guys out and give you each the money from you and your double's button pushing"


What button would you push?

Wait perfy, I don't see a loss of money with that scenario.

I press red, my awesome more-than-a-broski presses red, we get 4 million?

Or if I press red he press blue, I get 0 mil and he gets 3 mil? Both mes presumably pick red and will contact the other to split the money. Or even if he doesn't, we split the 3 mil into 1.5 apiece.

We can make a slight modification to the rules that you aren't allowed to share the winnings. We could even say that you and your double will never even meet! Does your thoughts change under that circumstance?

Simple math solves that--according to the rules of the game you are GUARENTEED a payout. I.e. if someone picks red, someone gets paid. Might not be me, but money is determined based on the players choice

The difference is that those boxes has no guarentee what are in them--Omega put whatever he wanted in them. He could have put in bandaids in the "1 million" dollar box for all I know. So, I take both and get both contents. The money was determined by Omega, and the player's choice has 0 relevance.

Well what choice do have over your double's decision?

First Perfection your example is a bad one, in that there is a dominant strategy in blue and red button pressing. It is a boring game. Both players have a dominant strategy to pick blue. Game Theory 101.

But in a way, both players are the same player, and presumably you and your double will pick the same thing! And knowing that, is it not in your best interest to pick the red button, knowing that by the property of your double being a duplicate he will pick the same as you, and thus you will get more money?

 

[Mise]

To be fair, perf, it relies on a pretty big assumption about "me-ness". In other words, nobody really knows if this: "presumably you and your double will pick the same thing" is true. I might believe that the premise is correct, but nonetheless be sufficiently risk averse to pick the blue box anyway, just in case I'm wrong about it.

The same is true of the Omega problem, but in that case, the "risk averse" thing to do would be to pick the 1 box. So you can be a 1-boxer and a red-buttoner (you believe the premise), or a 1-boxer and a blue-buttoner (you believe the premise but are risk averse), or a 2-boxer and a blue-buttoner (you don't believe the premise), but I guess you can't be a 2-boxer and a red-buttoner without drawing on some other reasoning. I don't think Sauron has adequately elucidated what that reasoning might be, though.

 

[Souron]

I will be replying to others soon.

So there's two responses here, one from 2008 Perf, and one from 2010 Perf.

2008 Perf:
This is similar to my one-box argument of SimPerfs where desire to be Good to RealPerfs provides the motivation to one box it. So, if you believe in Red-buttoning, why not one-boxing?

2010 Perf:
Altruism has nothing to do with it! It all has to do with coordinated action. Let's contrast it with the scenario where only you have the blue and red buttons and your double has none (either you get 1M$ or your double gets 2M$). Suddenly this game becomes quite different! Would you still give your double $2M, if he could not return the favor?

I get it now. I misunderstood the scenario.

I agree that the parallels to Newcomb's Problem are there.

 

[Borachio]

Wait. There's a bee in the box?

I love bees. They're one of my favouritist insects. Bees!!!!

 

[Flying Pig]

At first I thought that was about the most inane way possible to necromance a five-year-old thread, but I can't think of a better way to do it. Raised a smile at least.

 

[Borachio]

Well, thank you. Especially for the inane quip. Inanity has always been my specialist subject.

Anyway.

Seriously, has anyone come across two boxes left by an alien called Omega in the last five years? (All this talk about it would be a bit of a waste if it hasn't actually happened.) And how did it turn out? Was there a million dollars in box bee? Or was it empty? Or did it contain a bee?

I haven't actually read this entire thread, I'll be honest. Just up to the point where somewhere said they wouldn't choose either box as they didn't want any handouts. Then I thought of bees and couldn't help myself.

 

[Mouthwash]

So, what do people make of this?

Omega appears and says that it has just tossed a fair coin, and given that the coin came up tails, it decided to ask you to give it $100. Whatever you do in this situation, nothing else will happen differently in reality as a result. Naturally you don't want to give up your $100. But Omega also tells you that had the coin come up heads instead of tails, it'd have given you $10000, but only if you'd have agreed to give it $100 if the coin came up tails.

 

[warpus]

In the case of a fair coin toss I would personally risk the $100 because the calculated expected payout value would be a lot higher than $0 and the odds are 50/50.

But since the guy throwing the dice is some sort of an uberpowerful entity and past data indicates a rigged game, I would keep my money, thanks.

 

[Mouthwash]

But since the guy throwing the dice is some sort of an uberpowerful entity and past data indicates a rigged game, I would keep my money, thanks.

The precondition for these scenarios is that Omega is telling the truth. That's why they call it a thought experiment.

 

[Lohrenswald]

well that last scenario is just omega being a prick

 

[AlpsStranger]

Only B.

Thousands of dollars would be nice.

Millions of dollars would change my life completely.

 

[Lohrenswald]

Only B.

Thousands of dollars would be nice.

Millions of dollars would change my life completely.

but what if the box is empty D:

 

[onejayhawk]

I am a one box.

This is something I have not heard of in years.

J

 

[AlpsStranger]

but what if the box is empty D:

Then it's no worse than a losing lottery ticket, really.

 

[civvver]

It's not a probability guys, it's a time travel paradox, ie a casual loop.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causal_loop

A loop problem is when a past event causes a current event, but the same current event is also responsible for causing the past event. You get like a chicken and the egg problem of which came first?

It's like in the movie interstellar when humans finally figure out how to bend time and travel through the galaxy and it turns out they got the answers from their future selves. But how did they get to the future selves without their future selves to guide them in the first place?

It's the same issue here. Assume omega really is omniscient and knows what you'll pick and has put the million dollars in box B. You have to now in the present be the cause of past events. Cus omega is only putting that money in box B IFF you are going to choose box B in the present. So omega's choice in the past influences your choice in the future. But you also have to validate his choice in the past.

Well I'm not one for breaking time loops, I'm choosing B.

 

[warpus]

The precondition for these scenarios is that Omega is telling the truth. That's why they call it a thought experiment.

If he's telling the truth and the game is fair, then I would play. However, when looking at past statistical data, I would come to the conclusion that the game is not fair and as a result would not play.

Hypothetical scenarios are fine, but everything has to add up.

 

[Mouthwash]

If he's telling the truth and the game is fair, then I would play. However, when looking at past statistical data, I would come to the conclusion that the game is not fair and as a result would not play.

Hypothetical scenarios are fine, but everything has to add up.

No, they don't. Because it's hypothetical.

 

[warpus]

For a hypothetical scenario to be useful it has to be internally consistent*

*unless it's a hypothetical scenario highlighting a paradox

 

[Mouthwash]

It kind of is.

 

[warpus]

You just disagreed with me when I said that hypothetical scenarios have to be internally consistent. If you actually agree then we have no disagreement here, unless you point out a different one.