Question about Operation Barbarossa et al

Angst

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Germany would have invaded the Soviet Union and inevitably been defeated.
I've been told that the German loss against the Sovjets was actually caused by general mismanagement rather than raw power. They should expect the Russian winter to be harsh and had attempted preparations for this. Was the invasion really prematurely a failure?

WW2 is a really throughoutly explained historical case, so I know you guys have an answer to this.
 
Generally speaking, I'm not a big fan of singular causation as an explanation for why or how historical events took place the way they did.

Purposefully opening up a two front war is probably not the best strategy most of the time, so yes, mismanagement is definitely a reason. Yet at the same time, if Stalin hadn't killed all his officers the Soviet army would have likely had better management and the Germans might not have gotten as far along as they did.

So with that said I wouldn't be too much in a hurry to blame the loss on German mismanagement as I would be eager to accredit the Soviets with a victory. I suppose what I mean to say is that battles are won more often than they are lost and here I believe that the Soviet will to victory over a foreign enemy invading their homeland was the main cause of the German loss.
 
That would suggest the Germans lost because of lack of will to win. In reality however, Operation Barbarossa was started on the false premise the USSR would fall within 6 months. Preparations for a prolonged war were completely absent, and late in 1941 it should have been clear to anyone that the three-pronged goal of Ukraine, Leningrad and Moscow were impossible to attain simultaneously. Anyone except Hitler who, having no experience with military command at all, decided to take supreme command. (He also believed it when told winter preparations were in order when they were not.) so a combination of underestimation of Russian resolve and reserves, as well of insufficient preparations might be a more probable explanation.
 
Some of the literature suggests Hitler's mind was divided between economic and political objectives, and that his switching of Panzer armies from the center to the south and back again (along with rescuing el Duce's Balkan campaign) delayed the attack on Moscow until winter set in. This giving of course, the Soviets time to reinforce and defend the capitol. Remembering Napoleon's experience however, I'm not convinced taking Moscow would have made a difference. It's not clear the Germans could conquore Russia, especially with allied Lendlease aid.
 
That would suggest the Germans lost because of lack of will to win.

That is exactly what I am suggesting! Now, I wouldn't go so far as to say that the lack of will wasn't itself a result of poor planning. But neither would I discount the fact that fighting in Russia in the winter with a divided force would sap the will of an army.
 
WW2 is a really throughoutly explained historical case

only to remark a bit on this . In that ı once saw a 260 page thread in a forum about -erm- nude women . Much effort but lots of stuff still remains undecided .
 
Hitler was not prepared for war on attrition since the beginning, he counted on Poland/France scenario - quick destruction of country's army and its political collapse. Harsh winter by itself had little effect, because it affected both sides, but long campaign was less favourable for the Germans. Hitler's major mistake and decisive factor to the outcome of WW2, was great underestimation of Soviet potential and willing to fight.
 
IIRC Hitler less wanted to conquer Russia with Barbarossa and more decapitate USSR's leadership and political capital so that it's top-heavy government will flail helplessly and anti-communist or nationalist groups can emerge. Conquest is probably in there too, but the assault-heavy garrison-light method of overextended blitzkrieg speaks otherwise.

I would assume that a more thorough, to the Urals campaign after surrounding and taking Moscow and killing Stalin/Party Leaders, focusing on cleansing land for Lebanstraum, gathering resources for the western front, and squashing commie resistance with aid of anti-commie groups, if any. But I don't know about any documentation for the plans AFTER the supposed success of Barbarossa.

EDIT: Back to the OP. If the assumption that USSR will collapse if Moscow and Leningrad, and later Stalingrad falls, Stalin is captured and/or killed, the party leadership mauled and disunited, then the claim that mismanagement doomed the German war effort in Barbarossa is true- a stronger push and Moscow, Stalin, Party Leadership is in the bag. As the collapse begins they could push the flanks into Leningrad, Ukraine and Stalingrad, taking these symbolic victories to the USSR's psyche. The ability of the Russians to hold Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad probably was a great morale booster after their own disastrous first months.
 
This questions has been discussed here a lot, and the geeks usually give an answer along these lines, if I recall correctly (it would help if one of them would help here):

The German success was largely dependent on contingency and luck. The "expected" result of the campaign (say it is a civ game and you reload a lot of times from your january 1941 save game, and see what happens on average) would have the Germans not reaching as far as they did. The fall of, say, Moscow, was incredibly unlikely in any scenario.

The Russian winter is overrated in pop history. The quality of German vs. Russian materiel is also often judged poorly in pop history. The Russians had mostly equal or maybe even superior tanks most of the time.

The German economy was largely based on stripping occupied countries of resources and people (who were put to forced labour in Germany) to build a larger war machine to conquer more land. Rinse and repeat. This was an unstable system that was bound to collapse at some point.
 
1) Which is where the question of mismanagement comes in. Especially Hitler's direct involvement in switching around units between fronts during crucial months of the offensive.

2) I agree. The Russian Spring stops the tanks much more effectively, but in the end weather is still just weather. Also: France also had better tanks. Britain had better tanks. Poland actually had equal tanks (their tanks are lighter but had heavier firepower). Germany has better led tank units.
 
From the linked article:

The answer is remarkably simple: Hitler's failure to observe the sound strategic principle of "maintenance of the objective." The Germans had to defeat the Russians before winter arrived. As explained above, the only way to decisively beat them would be the seizure of Moscow. In the summer of 1941, wherever the German army advanced, it destroyed everything in its path. What stopped the Germans from taking Moscow was the arrival of winter. Had Hitler let his Generals advance on Moscow after the "Battle of Smolensk" it is probable that Moscow would have been captured and the Soviet Regime destroyed. It was Hitler's decision to switch the "Axis of Advance" to the Ukraine during the middle of the campaign that ultimately saved Moscow. Considering how close the Germans came to taking it in October and November, it is more than likely they could have taken Moscow in September if they would have advanced on it instead of Kiev.

According to one historian the Germans came remarkably close to defeating the USSR in 1941, but never again. As per Hitler taking charge of the campaign (and indeed overall military command): that was a crucial mistake, as he had no strategic insight whatsoever. So indeed, one of history's big What ifs.
 
What stopped the Germans from taking Moscow was the arrival of winter.
This is what the History Channel would like you to believe, yes.

it is probable that Moscow would have been captured and the Soviet Regime destroyed
It was still improbable to capture Moscow, and capturing Moscow wouldn't necessarily mean the end of the Soviet Regime. They could have taken the train east.
 
Stalin vowed to stay in to the very end. Leaving would destroy his personality cult. Not leaving would destroy his personality, as in, he's dead.
 
That historian should turn in his diploma if he's making an argument that Moscow would have been easily captured. The events contemporary at Leningrad and Stalingrad are more than enough to show that major cities that are actually fought for don't just fall because an army arrived at the city limits.
And pushing for Moscow and not for the Caucaus would not just move german troops to that front, it would also move russian defenders there!

And he should furthermore turn in his political science diploma if he's assuming that (in the very unlikely event of Moscow falling) just because a capital falls a country will necessarily collapse or sue for any peace. Russia wasn't France, it wasn't divided as France (that much Stalin had achieved) and it had no shortage of land and cities to retreat to.

Stalin vowed to stay in to the very end. Leaving would destroy his personality cult. Not leaving would destroy his personality, as in, he's dead.

Even assuming he did stay, that the city did fell, and that he was killed, so what? No shortage of people in the USSR either. The USSR was not Stalin - it did manage to survive him for over 30 years...
 
The Hitler's decision to turn advance to the South had good reasoning, since the Soviets still had large forces there, and attacking Moscow without destroying them was too dangerous. It delayed advance of army group center to Moscow, but unlikely changed the outcome of entire operation.

Stalin vowed to stay in to the very end. Leaving would destroy his personality cult. Not leaving would destroy his personality, as in, he's dead.
Evacuation of Soviet government and Stalin to Kuibyshev was planned and prepared. It was Stalin's decision to risk and stay in Moscow during Moscow battle, and obviously, making 7 November parade and his speech on Red Square was very good idea which boosted morale of Moscow inhabitants and defenders.
 
Going with the OP, we're just questioning the "general mismanagement" part. I guess the hypothesis that they are doomed from the beginning would also work. Of course, then you can debate the decision to start the war, and then make it a two front war, is mismanagement as well. The loss of opportunities to use anti-communist and nationalists as allies can also be placed under general mismanagement.

Anyway.

I am not making an argument that Moscow WOULD have been easily captured. Whether or not we do not know, although we can conjecture with the Nazi successes earlier in capturing cities, compared to their failures later when resistance stiffened. IF the Germans moved just slightly faster, then it is clear they would have A) Penetrated at least somewhat deeper into the city or B) was able to enforce a flanking movement around the city. More force means more results, although the end of said results must be seen as well.

Finally, what I said earlier was conjecture of what their goals would have been had they been successful and if they followed their earlier strategies and goals. They would have wanted to decapitate the Soviets. They hope that anti-soviet forces can cripple their foe. They know that at the time they started, most of the soviet industry were within range of a year's hard fighting.

Also, those said russian defenders and large soviet forces in the Ukraine area were trapped, enveloped, encircled and mauled. They had no chance of breaking out whatsoever, having already lost most of their armor when the Germans outflanked them, but with harvest coming and holding a decent area, they can survive the winter and serve to menace the German supply line, that is true. But in the end, their strategetic value is moot. Hitler's decision to destroy them might have been A sensisible decision, but is it the best? Again, I don't know all the details, but I do know that this eradication was touted as a major victory as soviet resistance stiffened and that there ARE german units freed from the elimination of these soviet holdouts in the Ukraine.

Finally, if the Germans did everything "Right" with "No Mismanagement" what would it look like? The Germans push along 3 fronts: Leningrad, Moscow, Ukraine. They did not divert attention to the Jewish problem yet. They have winter gear and anti-freeze ready when winter came. They recognize that the encircled russian troops are strategetically impotent and push closer to Moscow. The winter russian counter attack is blunted by the Nazis, having brought in more and proper supplies instead of more reinforcements to freeze without winter gear. Moscow becomes a new Stalingrad. Even if Moscow is not captured, the rails distributing troops and supplies to Leningrad and Stalingrad are disrupted more severely, and so must be diverted to less effective rails, which lengthens time until Germany's defeat. In addition, if Germany didn't mismanage they could have rolled the Soviet's counter offensives easily at this stage, instead of relying on allies for their flank-guards. Say Moscow is captured and the leadership escapes. Leningrad's siege is more complete and little of the Ural's restarting factories and tanks reach the Ukraine front. The desperate counter attacks outside of Stalingrad were less effective as a result, therefore they reach Stalingrad earlier and attack sooner, leaving Stalingrad with fewer stockpiled weapons for door-to-door defense. Now, if neither Stalingrad nor Leningrad falls, it doesn't matter if Moscow fell or not, but the "Fail via Mismanagement" argument has no given.

If we return to reality, this is what we find- at the center, a mismanaged campaign, a misunderstanding of the Soviet's resolve and power, and many other issues as well. However, it is clear that a mismanaged campaign is NOT the heart of Germany's defeat. Even if they do everything right and Stalingrad/Leningrad/Moscow falls, they get lucky and caught Stalin by surprise, they raise legions of anti-Soviet natives. They will still lose.

tl;dr. Looking at Alt-His, Germany still doesn't have a chance with perfect management. Doomed from the start via reality-perception disparity.
 
On the topic of old General Winter, it's often said how rough the Germans had it, since little preparation had been made for winter campaigning. Did the average Soviet trooper really have it any better?
 
I think the common belief is that, since they lived there, they were used to it. But it's pretty clear that the Soviets suffered in the winter as well. However, they're the ones who benefited from an end to campaigning, not the Germans.

The emphasis in these discussions is usually on Moscow. I'm not convinced that simply taking Moscow would really have done much to end the war (what with industry being east of the Urals). However, it's been pointed out that they would have had access to the rail lines, so I don't know.
 
The true effect of the 1941-42 winter weather has been greatly exaggerated both by the Germans and by their opponents. The total of German casualties during the THREE months July/August/September 1941 was greater than the total of German casualties during the FOUR months November(41)/December(41)/January(42)/February(42). That hardly substantiates the common myth that the Russian Winter was the key factor in stopping the Germans. The German high command simply underestimated the Russians, and overestimated their own capabilities.
 
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