The planters themselves had no standing army, not even a reliable militia or police force, nor the institutional means to organise such things. They had no effective way of challenging a large-scale slave revolt, only of dealing with individual slaves. All that came from the state. Do you think it plausible that the planters could have developed such institutions, and simply chose not to? And, if is plausible, in what sense does that negate the very real involvement of state and federal governments in upholding slavery in our history?
Mmmmmh.
During the War of 1812, the United States' military was chiefly comprised of local and state militia organizations. For the assault on Canada, several of these militias - chiefly the New England militias, which were well-equipped but which did not want to fight the war in the first place, and the Indiana militias, which were experienced and
did want to fight the indigenous tribes aligned with the British more than they wanted to fight the British themselves - were massed, along with the greater portion of the American federal army.
This left state militias responsible for the defense of the southern states. In the belief that a threat to the nation's capital and the heart of the Democratic-Republican caucus (the southern planters) would induce the Madison administration to pull federal forces away from the invasion of Canada, the British launched a Chesapeake Bay campaign in 1813. They seized control of several islands in the bay and began attacking coastal towns. Sometimes British raids even developed into what would at the time have been called atrocities, such as at Havre de Grace (Maryland) and Newport (Virginia). And, of course, in 1814, the British launched their attack on Washington and Baltimore, with the famous result of a partial victory.
Yet these attacks faced hardly any opposition at all. It wasn't just that the federal government didn't send troops to fight the British. That was a problem, partially because the federal government lacked the logistical capability to transfer troops from the Canadian front, and partially because the Madison administration's priorities were hilariously out of whack. (One might liken the British diplomacy before the war as "talking to a Whoopee cushion"; in that vein, I suppose their military efforts
during the war would be like punching a beanbag. Or SpongeBob SquarePants.)
But the real problem was that even the local militia organizations weren't putting up a fight at all. Now, the Maryland and Virginia militias were pretty terrible at that point in time, with virtually zero training and bad equipment. One would still have expected them to contest the British attacks on the Chesapeake area more than they actually did.
So why not? Because these militias were primarily disposed in preventing slaves from leaving local plantations. When the British first arrived in the Chesapeake they were, somewhat to their surprise, suddenly inundated with thousands of escaped slaves. While most officers were unwilling to arm these slaves to augment British military power in the area, they
were willing to house, clothe, and feed them, and the British would eventually ship most of them to new homes in Canada and the Isles. The local planters, of course, saw the specter of loss of control, economic collapse, and social revolution rearing its head, so they deployed the militias in places that they thought were
truly important.
All of this is aimed at arguing that yes, the planters had a militia system - albeit not an
incredibly effective one - and yes, they did attempt to use it to sustain their slave system in certain extremities when federal power was not so readily available.