Jehoshua
Catholic
- Joined
- Sep 25, 2009
- Messages
- 7,284
I'm rather astonished to see someone here actually advocating disenfranchising women, and even more surprised that no-one appears to have picked up on it. So here are some questions about it.
Firstly I would note that that my position on what an electorate should consist of, is entirely one which is contingent upon there being an electorate at all. I'm ambivalent about the merits of an electoral system to begin with (although currently think an electorate which votes representatives to a lower house is best, in order to better distinguish between legislative, executive and repository aspects of government, which respectively would be elected, appointed and hereditary [with some ecclesiastical input in the case of the latter]). In fact, it would seem I am more "democratic" than Kaiserguard about this subject in that I would reasonably consider an electoral system. Now to your actual questions.
First, it seems that your reason for wanting to stop women from voting is solely that they tend to vote for things that you don't approve of. This differs from the reason for not allowing children to vote, since one can actively point to characteristics of children (lack of experience and understanding) that explain why they're less able to make a useful contribution to the political process. When you complain that women vote for "increased government spending and legislative restrictions", you're assuming that that is something so bad that it's worth disenfranchising half the population to avoid it. But how can you be so certain of this? As a man, couldn't it be the case that women have a perspective on these matters that you've missed? Aren't you assuming that the typical male perspective is the correct, standard, default one, and that the typical female one is divergent and transgressive? And isn't that just irrational?
Firstly, I think your question is rooted in some key assumptions. Firstly that the decision making system we have (elections to parliament, close to universal franchise) is a neutral one, with the state being a neutral arbiter between competing views with this neutrality being an assumed good (which is why you object to my previous point, since I don't care for neutrality). This assumption is of course wrong, since neutrality is impossible in a given system of government, and indeed 'neutrality" in any given ethical position always tends to come down on the side of one particular system elevated to the public orthodoxy. That system at present is liberalism, and the moral presuppositions of utilitarianism. So you cannot really assert implicitly as you have or otherwise that the system we have is neutral morally (it exists within an ideological consensus) and thus in terms of the policy it proposes.
Which comes to my point. I don't wish to replace the liberals defective system for neutral decision making with a better one. Since I deny that there can be any such system. The so called virtue of tolerance is incoherent and ultimately contradictory in that regard. It is my conclusion that it is simply impossible to set aside a conception of the good, and then from an "original position" decide a fair arbitration between my beliefs and someone elses. Without ones full morality there is no way for me, or anyone to decide what a fair decision would be (our divergent moral beliefs being why we differ so much politically I would guess). For an ostensibly neutral liberal therefore to reach any conclusions at all, he then has to sneak some comprehensive moral suppositions into his original position John Rawls notes this when he says that men in the original position operate on a thin theory of the good, a theory which basically turns out unsurprisingly (Seeing as Rawls is liberal) to be utilitarianism.
This then leads to the nature of government. If neutrality is impossible then it is logically supposed that the state must take stands on matters of moral good and evil, the distinction between us then is that I think society might as well be honest about its moral groundings and take functional measures to ingrain a particular moral system in place. The form in which a government is chosen is properly I think a functional matter oriented towards this end and with regards to the common good, with participation in the choosing of government being a privilege and not a right (as you presume). Since as I have noted, womens votes are clearly associated with dis-civic outcomes, the expansion of state intrusion into spheres previously within the realms of civil society, ever more intrusive laws even to the point of tyranny (perhaps why the fascsist held as a key principle the female franchise, and why John Adams to refer to a US founding father in response to a letter from his wife on the subject of women spoke of the "despotism of the petticoat") and unsustainable expenditure particularly into welfare. These tendencies (which are have clearly been correlated to the female franchise) arising from the feminine perspective of things if you will, have on the whole been ruinous to the public good and have exceedingly damaged the social order (for example easy divorce, you would note massively favours the female partner, to the consequence of numerous broken homes, fatherless families and social disorder since the vast majority of initiations of divorce proceeding are done by women). If you take it as I do that the state cannot be neutral morally, and if you likewise take it as I do that the system of choosing a government is purely a functional consideration to that end, with participation in such a system being a privilege and not a right, than there is little to merit the womens franchise, and much to consider it a negative.
Second, you say that women's interests would be met by the votes of their male relatives. But what of women who don't have male relatives? In particular, what about whole classes of women who don't have male relatives, such as widows or the childless? More fundamentally, how can you guarantee that men will vote for what is actually in their families' interests, and not simply what they think is in their families' interests? Just to give one example, do you think that marital rape would ever have been made illegal if only men had ever voted on the matter? Indeed, would a "reactionary" prefer it if that change in the law had never happened?
You are making "male relative" synonymous with husband when it also includes sons, brothers and other relatives who would have the franchise in the hypothetical system where there is in fact an electorate I noted (suggesting a restricted franchise of male, age 21, owns land, needs to contribute more in taxes than they receive from the state to be eligible). As to them voting in whats their families interests, one can presume firstly that they engage with their relatives and vote for what they think best serves the collective family unit, this is ultimately a personal subjective judgement just as much as it is with regards to anyones voting decision under the current system (your objection to, well what if they only vote for what they think is in the families interests is nonsensical, since people voting for what they think is in the interests of them and theirs is what they do anyway, its not like people objectively are granted a "this is in the best interests of your family" perfect certainty of truth, card pointing to a given candidate for office). On your query regarding marital rape, I think the term is an oxymoron. Once you have given consent formally in public ceremony (which is what marriage is, seeing as its a legal form), it cannot be revoked within that contract; The form in which marital consent via that contract is revoked incidentally is well-established. It is called divorce (or annulment or legal separation in the Catholic context). Really I think its a simple matter of when consent is revocable (afterall, we can both agree an abusive spouse is acting immorally) and the specific form that revocation must take. If you believe that consent may always be granted and revoked at will, I would advise you to consent to join the army, then attempt to withdraw that consent, likewise for any other legal contract. This should clarify the matter for you I should think. The attempt by liberals to create a legal concept of "marital rape" is no less really than an attempt to destroy the basic concept of marriage as it has always traditionally been understood. This is also a testament of course to the fact that marriage should be carefully considered before being agreed too, a consideration which easy divorce and the morphing of marriage into formalised co-habitation which can be exited at ease (with the husband usually being fleeced of oodles of money in alimony) has somewhat degraded.
Third, and most fundamental of all, isn't it the case that when one group of people has less power than another, they get exploited and lose whatever power they had? Don't we see this today with the incredible aggregation of wealth into the hands of a very few super-wealthy people? Those with power inevitably exercise that power for their own interests, not for the interests of those without it. A world where men vote and women don't is a world that's run for the benefit of men, not women. Even if all the men are benign and attempt to look out for the interests of women - something that wouldn't happen - it would still marginalise women because they would have to put up with what men think is in their interests, not with what they they think is in their interests. Doesn't this infantilise women and patronise them, by making them out to be little more than children who have to be looked after because they're too stupid or irresponsible to understand what's in their own best interests? And isn't this not only a profoundly immoral outlook, but one that's irrational and lacking in evidence? If not, what evidence can you give to show that men know what's best for women better than women themselves do?
Your question starts with an example of power differential in the present system, and then expresses fundamentally the concern that a limited franchise which excludes women (or no franchise at all) would perpetuate the same kind of power differential, distinct only in that women are further marginalised. The first part of your question is a recognition that distinctions in power and the presence of inequality are inevitable (that's just human nature and the nature of society) and secondly and more implicitly I would suppose, it is a recognition that under the current system power subsides (as I have said) in an elite and fairly closed class, which renders the votes of the electorate male and female mostly a meaningless formality under the current "democratic" complex.
This (together with my previous statements regarding the relationship of morality to th state) leads I think to the subject of the conservative (the traditionally conservative) vision of authority, which also underpins what I have said on this thread pertaining to the principle of subsidiarity in particular. This vision of authority (to put it very basically) considers that since a man gains his since of identity by his association with multiple groups to which he belongs, but gains an ultimate sense of his self by reference to an ultimate loyalty, it is necessary for the unitary polity to point towards a moral order outside of itself and for the group to refer itself to a common affirmation of Justice and the good, with the authority this instantiates being then particularised to that community. Therefore, since man is loyal to multiple groups and intersecting authorities, understanding loyalty to them as being rooted in that single loyalty to a higher order resolves mans need for identifications, and enables the coexistence of multiple particular loyalties and group-associations. It likewies results in authorities being obligated to promote all the virtues and constrain the vices not only for the benefit of the group but for everyone, since there is something beyond themselves to which they are obliged (this distinction being what constitutes the difference between an authoritative ruler, and a mere agent of the popular will). Although this is rather simplifying it, Authority is the answer to the cosmopolitans claim that loyalty to particular groups bespeaks a limited moral vision, that it is merely a form of collective selfishness.
This directly pertains to your point (a point interspersed across your entire argument I will add) regarding men voting only in their own interests, a point which you make because the current liberal system functions precisely upon (as I have noted) a utilitarian presupposition in which self-interest is the entire ruling dynamic of government. Holding this moral conceptualisation you logically conclude a universal franchise is essential precisely lest one interest group in pursuing its utilitarian interests subjugate the equally valid (in the orthodox moral calculus you are referring too) interests of another group (in the context of this discussion women) violating the principle of the greatest "good" (which is defined as maximised satisfaction for all groups) for the greatest number. This concern is rendered meaningless within my consideration of things, precisely because self-interest is not the overruling concern of the polity, but rather fidelity to a higher order (God, and associated divine and moral law) and with the particular instantiation of that good in the particularised context of the given polity. Both this restriction, and the one pertaining to tax contribution incidentally render ones vote more substantial, and give the voter some greater degree of influence than is currently the case since candidates for office cannot so easily bribe the electorate in pursuit of office (which is what constitutes much of modern election campaigning), while in the local sphere the electorate is more strongly entrenched to a specific community and place.
Finally, to your assertion that saying that women should not vote (due to assertions that female participation in this sphere of society is essentially discivic) is immoral. I would respond that it isn't, mostly since I don't hold to the liberal idea that equality is a virtue (And concordantly, that denial of equality between any two groups is a sin, or as you say, immoral). If the means of choosing a government is a functional concern, to the purpose of maintaining and perpetuating the orientation of the polity to the higher order (ergo, the function exists to facilitate and maintain the guiding principle of the whole, which then applies collectively to all who dwell in that society. As compared to being a means of satisfying the self-interest of diverse groups within that whole, who then compete to institute policy towards that end) than there is no moral reason why womens franchise should be held as something that is morally mandated.
Fourth, and relatedly, black people (at least in Britain, and I think in the US too) are statistically much more likely than white people to vote for left-wing parties and causes. Does it follow, by your logic, that they should also not be allowed to vote? If not, how does their case differ from that of women?...
Having referred to the vision of how society (and the state) exists within a moral dimension, I think much of the assumptions inherent to this question are addressed in the response to the previous question you made, particularly with regard to the assumption you make that voting exists as an expression of utilitarian self-interest with the goal of maximising general contentment amongst diverse groups within society. However to specifically answer this question, I think its speaks not so much to the vote (since I think black people, and the various other groups you mentioned in the section I excised for special reasons vote as they do as an expression of self-interest within the system that they exist within, which is only natural and understandable. Black people and others are perfectly reasonable in voting for the good of their group, to which they hold primary loyalty, and for the policies of those parties which directly advantage them over other groups) but to an objection to mass immigration, and to the principle of state neutrality when it comes to matters religious (I have noted I think the state should preference the Catholic religion, but could equally apply to others)
Placing diverse groups, racial, religious and otherwise within the single polity as multi-culturalism has done, is a recipe for social discord and for hostile relations between the distinct groups. This is seen quite clearly I think in the long history of racial conflict in for example the United States between black and white, and is an ongoing (if politically incorrect) concern regarding the mass influx of muslims into Europe, and largely I think explains the ascent of nationalist and even neo-fascist parties on the continent. I think therefore that the best recipe is each to his own allotted dwelling place (as the good book says, myself paraphrasing), with such diverse groups of cultural and religious distinction being best in their own polities and communities distinct and separate, and free to maintain their own particularised instantiations of authority. Indeed I think the desire to exist in a distinct communities is a natural impulse, as is evident by the human tendency to self-segregate into ethnically, racially and religious uniform communities, something which is directly observable (London for example is divided very much into religious enclaves iirc, according to some article I recall reading some years ago. A starker division can be seen racially in such places as Detroit, where black and white are very starkly separated). The liberal experiment of multiculturalism (and in the case of the united states and much of the Americas the inhuman institution of slavery) has therefore created a very problematic situation where a number of such diverse groups are bunched uncomfortably together, which risks in the future very many social problems ,and perhaps even greater violence than that which is already ongoing between communities.
So in short answer, no I don't think blacks (or other minority groups) should be denied the (limited if at all) franchise. I think the existence of a multi-racial polity is a negative product of liberal social experimentation that is evidently problematic by simple observation. I also don't think one should be denied (a limited franchise) for disagreeing with a traditionalist position. The distinction in the case of the latter though is that in they would just have to accept living within a society that rejects their principles and does not run according to them (much as anyone who isn't liberal now must tolerate the orthodoxy). Afterall as I noted right at the beginning, no society is morally neutral.
Similar points apply to the suggestion of rolling back the clock so that only landowners can vote. That's again giving the wealthy more privilege than they already have. It makes the fundamental error of assuming that those with wealth and power are more "invested" in society than those without it. But of course this isn't true. They're just luckier. Indeed, isn't the reverse the case - they are less invested in the good of society? If I have no job and no wealth, it's very much in my interest that the economy should be in a good condition such that the state is able to support me while I look for work and that there are jobs out there for me to find. But if I'm as rich as Croesus' lawyer then I really don't care how things are going, because I've got enough to be assured of a comfortable life no matter what happens. It's the people who are losing out under the current system who know what's wrong with it, not those who are doing well. Aren't you just making the same mistake as the Prosperity Gospel, the assumption that moral value and material success are directly correlated? Would you really think that Francis of Assisi should have less right to a vote than Silvio Berlusconi? And do you really think that people were, overall, better off when voting systems like the ones you prefer actually existed, e.g. in Dickensian Britain, than they are today? Were the poor better off? Were women?
My consideration that (if there is an electoral system) a property qualification (owning land) and tax qualification (must contribute more in taxes than you take in government money) firstly, is hardly exorbitant, and not equivalent to requiring that (to be eligible to vote) one must be as rich as Croesus' lawyer, or owner of a vast landed estate (although I suppose in the case of Britain, as compared to Australia or America, the number of land-holders would be decidedly reduced due to the fact much land is still owned by the old aristocracy and as a consequence of the high population in such a restricted space). Rather it speaks very much to concerns noted previously at the risk pure self-interest has to the common good of the whole, in recognition in particular of the realities of the decidedly non tabula-rasa human nature.
The whole point behind my suggestion that perhaps (should such a system apply) one should contribute more in taxes then one receives to be eligible to vote is that when people gain more in from the state than they receive, then precisely because it is in their self-interest to do so they vote for politicians who promise them more cash from the government cash cow. This is clearly observable both here and elsewhere, and indeed people admit quite readily (and it is clear in the media cycle) that the primary concern is how government policy will affect their "hip pocket" as compared to the ultimate economic sustainability of the state. The attempt being made in a system where one must contribute more in taxes than one receives in order to vote, is precisely to dampen the affect of such greed, by ensuring that only those who are ultimately paying a positive cost for other peoples benefits (to their own detriment you could say) can vote. In this way we avoid what effectively amounts to state theft in a robbing peter to pay paul scenario, in which the state extorts more and more money from the people (or goes into debt to do so) to satisfy the interests of a dependant class (welfare dependency) to the eventual ruination of the economy and the state.
The principle behind requiring ownership of land, is distinct in that it would constitute a basic attempt to assess household stability and ones permanent association with a particular place and community. If one is transient, or spends ones time travelling hither and thither across the world, it is highly unlikely that ones loyalties and concerns are primarily invested in the community one nominally is voting in, or that you would have its interests and values at heart. This is why many polities already put in restrictions on non-residents or require one be resident for a certain length of time (yearly or over time) to be eligible to vote. Now considering the British context of land-ownership (as compared to my own country, Australia) some other principle could be considered to assess this concern for stability and the electorates investment if you will within the particular local context, but the principle it points too remain valid I would think.
Finally, are views such as the ones you've articulated here common among those who identify as "reactionaries"?
I as Kaiserguard graciously acknowledged somewhat, don't call myself a reactionary, but rather simply a traditionalist. I agreed to request to add me as a respondent here because my position is close enough in general scope to the ideological spectrum he places within "reactionary" (and to be fair some traditionalists do outright call themselves reactionaries, presumably in some bid to turn the negative impression the term has amongst liberals, into a positive). As to whether the views I articulated here are common amongst them, I would say to a lesser or greater degree they are. Obviously my positions are my own, but I know some people (bloggers, writers, and so forth) who share such positions that women shouldn't vote for example amongst others.