[RD] Ask a Theologian V

[Agent327]

I'm saying that since the existence of objective morality is, by definition, more objectively moral than its nonexistence, some kind of moral standard must be true.

Is the existence of objective beauty by definition more beautiful than its non-existence?

Semantics. Fine, I should have said 'argument.' And this sentence is somewhat ironic in light of your views on morality.

Pointing out a logical flaw in an argument is, again, not semantics.

Nope, we're discussing the existence of an objective morality, independent of people's minds.

Which I would consider nonsensical. As I tried to explain with an absolutely good God.

But one that is either true or false. You haven't made any arguments for why objective morals don't exist; you've simply asserted that since different people believe different things, their perspectives are equally valid.

That's one possible conclusion. Another might be that without people there is no morality.

Saying something is immoral is a meaningless statement if morals are defined as opinions. You may as well say that you do not like murder, or that society frowns upon it. Why would we say that making lampshades out of the skin of Jews or Romani is wrong, if we believe that Hitler's opinion was equally valid?

You haven't made any argument that it isn't. I suggest that you simply assume that it is. But on what is that (implicit) assumption based?

I don't mean this in any condescending way, but the laws of formal logic are useful to understand my point:

2. The law of non-contradiction says that A cannot be both A and not A at the same time and in the same sense.
3. The law of excluded middle says that a statement is either true or false.

Apply these criteria to the statement "murder is wrong."

I think you missed the point. But I will illustrate: murder is generally considered wrong (as in Thou shalt not kill). But in war it is considered OK to kill the enemy. So, murder is wrong is both true and not true. It depends on the situation. If I defend myself from someone trying to kill me and kill that person in the process, I commit the very crime I am defending myself from. Yet one can easily argue that is not wrong, even though strictly speaking I have committed murder. (And I ignore the fact that we murder animals on a daily basis.)

So, 'murder is wrong' is not a statement about any absolute morality. In fact, I suggest no such statement can be made. (And I suggest no such statement can be made, simply because there is no absolute morality.)

But let's assume there is indeed an absolute morality (i.e. independent of people's minds). How then would people learn about this absolute morality? It seems to me this would still have to be processed by people's minds. I.e. 'people's minds' cannot be excluded from the definition. Therefore there is no absolute morality independent of people's minds.

Let's assume this absolute morality exists with God. Again the question is: how will people learn of it? To those of us who aren't blessed with heavenly visions (and, by the way, including those even) this will still have to be done through people's minds. How do we perceive anything, except through our minds?

 

[Mouthwash]

Is the existence of objective beauty by definition more beautiful than its non-existence?

Neat. So can this be used to basically prove the existence of all adjectives? The existence of awesomeness is more awesome than its nonexistence. The existence of yellow...

Not sure what it means, though.

Pointing out a logical flaw in an argument is, again, not semantics.

I was talking about what YOU said.

You haven't made any argument that it isn't. I suggest that you simply assume that it is. But on what is that (implicit) assumption based?

I don't assume that it is. I have no idea whether realism or non-realism is true. That's not the same as having an "opinion" as opinions can be argued for. Preference would have been a better word.

I think you missed the point. But I will illustrate: murder is generally considered wrong (as in Thou shalt not kill). But in war it is considered OK to kill the enemy.

Murder is a legal term. Killing a combatant in a war isn't murder by any definition that I know of.

So, murder is wrong is both true and not true. It depends on the situation.

No, it doesn't. Replace the word 'murder' with killing; the statement "killing is wrong" is either true or false. But it's obvious that there are circumstances in which killing is permissible. The statement is therefore false.

"Killing can be wrong" would be a true assertion, in your example.

But let's assume there is indeed an absolute morality (i.e. independent of people's minds). How then would people learn about this absolute morality? It seems to me this would still have to be processed by people's minds. I.e. 'people's minds' cannot be excluded from the definition. Therefore there is no absolute morality independent of people's minds.

Since you are apparently arguing that morality cannot exist without being perceived, can you also tell me why doesn't this apply to the physical world? Isn't there something out there that doesn't vanish when you go to sleep? We might not see the world as it really is, but we can have an approximation.

How do we perceive anything, except through our minds?

Why is perception a prerequisite for existence? I also find it interesting that you don't think God's mind counts- it's only YOUR mind which makes something real.

 

[Plotinus]

Every time I say "x is wrong" while discussing metaethics I think it should be assumed that it's about an objective moral fact.

But the question whether "x is wrong" is a statement about objective moral facts or not is precisely what metaethics is all about! If your argument is meant to be establishing one metaethical theory in favour of another, you can't start by assuming the truth of that theory. It's like St Anselm saying, "For the purposes of this discussion I'm going to assume that God exists. Now here's my ontological argument for the existence of God..."

Talking about morality as a 'social preference' is useful in colloquial language, but what purpose does it serve in philosophy? If you are talking about subjective preferences than you should say subjective preferences.

What purpose does it serve? It might be true! As I say, this is just the sort of thing that philosophers of metaethics are asking.

I'm saying that since the existence of objective morality is, by definition, more objectively moral than its nonexistence, some kind of moral standard must be true. Every time I use the word "morality", assume I'm referring to the realist definition of it.

But this again is assuming the truth of your conclusion.

I think you're slightly confused about what realism and non-realism in metaethics actually are. You can think of realism as the combination of two claims:

(1) An ethical statement such as "murder is wrong" is the assertion of a moral fact, just as any other statement of the form "X is Y" is the assertion of a fact. "Murder is wrong" is analogous to "the dog is brown" - it ascribes wrongness to murder just as brownness is ascribed to the dog.

(2) The facts asserted by ethical statements, or at least some of them, are correct. E.g. murder actually is wrong, or if you like, murder does have the property of wrongness.

Now you can see that there are two kinds of non-realists. The first kind accepts (1) but rejects (2). So a person of this kind will agree that "murder is wrong" ascribes wrongness to murder, but thinks that the assertion is false - murder is in fact not wrong. And so on for all other ethical statements. They make meaningful claims, but these are false claims. Such a person isn't really a non-realist at all, because she accepts the basic thesis of realism, but I suppose that this kind of moral nihilism is what people might think is entailed by the assertion that there are no moral facts.

The second kind, which is more interesting, rejects (1). So such a person does not accept that "murder is wrong" is making a claim of this kind at all, either true or false. It is either making a very different kind of claim or it's not making a claim at all - or a bit of both. Someone who takes this view denies that there are moral facts, at least of the kind that (1) envisages, but she does not at all think that moral claims are all false. She will happily endorse "murder is wrong" but deny that this involves ascribing wrongness to murder - in her view, this statement only looks like such an ascription through an accident of grammar.

So hopefully you can see the issue here - your argument for realism seems to presuppose that moral statements make truth claims about moral facts - which is precisely what "realism" is. A non-realist of the second kind above would simply reject the claim that a universe with moral facts is more morally significant than one without moral facts, because she doesn't think that moral facts are what ground moral statements in the first place.

 

[Agent327]

I'll just stick with this one and leave Plotinus to it:

Murder is a legal term. Killing a combatant in a war isn't murder by any definition that I know of.

Murder is wrong is not a legal phrase. And in both cases the effect is the same: people are being deliberately killed. Yet in the one case we consider it wrong, while in the other we can considered it justified.

Replace the word 'murder' with killing; the statement "killing is wrong" is either true or false. But it's obvious that there are circumstances in which killing is permissible. The statement is therefore false.

"Killing can be wrong" would be a true assertion, in your example.

Perfectly true. But are you noticing there's nothing moral about that statement? Even though it pertains to morality?

Since you are apparently arguing that morality cannot exist without being perceived, can you also tell me why doesn't this apply to the physical world? Isn't there something out there that doesn't vanish when you go to sleep? We might not see the world as it really is, but we can have an approximation.[/QUOTE]

Interesting comparison. To be true, everything vanishes when we go to sleep - only to return again when we wake. That doesn't imply that in the meantime (while we are sleeping) everything isn't there. We are just oblivious to it. I like the comparison as it includes dreaming: the most amoral thing a person can do.

Why is perception a prerequisite for existence? I also find it interesting that you don't think God's mind counts- it's only YOUR mind which makes something real.[/QUOTE]

Obviously. As I do not know God's mind. We know - at best - our own minds.

I do not think perception is a prerequiste for existence. The universe existed for billions of years before anyone perceived it. The crux is: an empty universe has no place for morality - because there's no one to apply it to.* Unless you have a quasiplatonic idea of Morality, without humans morality doesn't exist.

*Assuming God is perfectly good (i.e. has an absolute sense of morality), with an empty universe this has no meaning. He could be perfectly evil, it would still not matter to the universe. That's because categories such as good and evil only exist in relation to. You are good or bad to someone. A God in an otherwise empty universe would have no one to be good to. In other words, Gods' absolute morality doesn't relate to anything - unless there is some one besides God. (So, absolute morality can exist - with God. Paradoxical, isn't it.)

 

[Mouthwash]

(It might be time to split this into its own thread.)

But the question whether "x is wrong" is a statement about objective moral facts or not is precisely what metaethics is all about! If your argument is meant to be establishing one metaethical theory in favour of another, you can't start by assuming the truth of that theory. It's like St Anselm saying, "For the purposes of this discussion I'm going to assume that God exists. Now here's my ontological argument for the existence of God..."


What purpose does it serve? It might be true! As I say, this is just the sort of thing that philosophers of metaethics are asking.

I think we're both talking way, way past each other. Seriously, I just can't make heads or tails of this response.

I think you're slightly confused about what realism and non-realism in metaethics actually are. You can think of realism as the combination of two claims:

(1) An ethical statement such as "murder is wrong" is the assertion of a moral fact, just as any other statement of the form "X is Y" is the assertion of a fact. "Murder is wrong" is analogous to "the dog is brown" - it ascribes wrongness to murder just as brownness is ascribed to the dog.

(2) The facts asserted by ethical statements, or at least some of them, are correct. E.g. murder actually is wrong, or if you like, murder does have the property of wrongness.

Now you can see that there are two kinds of non-realists. The first kind accepts (1) but rejects (2). So a person of this kind will agree that "murder is wrong" ascribes wrongness to murder, but thinks that the assertion is false - murder is in fact not wrong. And so on for all other ethical statements. They make meaningful claims, but these are false claims. Such a person isn't really a non-realist at all, because she accepts the basic thesis of realism, but I suppose that this kind of moral nihilism is what people might think is entailed by the assertion that there are no moral facts.

The second kind, which is more interesting, rejects (1). So such a person does not accept that "murder is wrong" is making a claim of this kind at all, either true or false. It is either making a very different kind of claim or it's not making a claim at all - or a bit of both. Someone who takes this view denies that there are moral facts, at least of the kind that (1) envisages, but she does not at all think that moral claims are all false. She will happily endorse "murder is wrong" but deny that this involves ascribing wrongness to murder - in her view, this statement only looks like such an ascription through an accident of grammar.

Yes, let's use that to show what I'm talking about:

(1) Ethical sentences express propositions.
(2) Some such propositions are true.
(3) Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

I'm referring to (2) when I made my argument (whether moral statements are 'real'). Basically, the whole point of it is to bypass (3).

Murder is wrong is not a legal phrase. And in both cases the effect is the same: people are being deliberately killed. Yet in the one case we consider it wrong, while in the other we can considered it justified.

Sure...? I don't know what you're trying to say here.

Perfectly true. But are you noticing there's nothing moral about that statement? Even though it pertains to morality?

Huh?

I do not think perception is a prerequiste for existence. The universe existed for billions of years before anyone perceived it. The crux is: an empty universe has no place for morality - because there's no one to apply it to.* Unless you have a quasiplatonic idea of Morality, without humans morality doesn't exist.

I do have a 'quasiplatonic' idea of morality. That's what this whole discussion's been about.

Assuming God is perfectly good (i.e. has an absolute sense of morality), with an empty universe this has no meaning. He could be perfectly evil, it would still not matter to the universe. That's because categories such as good and evil only exist in relation to.

Why? All I'm saying is that some states of affairs are better than others. The aspects that make them better are what we call 'moral.' Why does there have to be a self-aware being examining it to make it so?

 

[Agent327]

Perhaps you should delve a bit into metaethics if it's not clear that that is what you're actually discussing.

Sure...? I don't know what you're trying to say here.

I usually don't mean anything else than I say.

Huh?

I'm afraid you have to be a bit more specific.

I do have a 'quasiplatonic' idea of morality. That's what this whole discussion's been about.

In which case the same conclusion still applies. An Absolute Morality is to all intents and purposes an absurdity. All morality applies to something - in particular humans. Without that link 'morality' loses all meaning. You may perceive Morality as something existing with no relation to humanity, but then you sever the one link that gives morality its meaning.

In addition, there has to be a perception of morality first in order to perceive something like absolute Morality. If we imagine an Absolute Morality in the sense of God (i.e. God is Absolute Morality) and man has no knowledge of God, then man also has no knowledge of morality. In practical terms: man has to have a sense of morality (absolute or otherwise) or the whole concept of morality has no meaning. If we have no sense of morality and there's this Absolute Morality out there (whether it's called God or something else), we can't relate to it. We simply can't understand morality if it's not already inside of us. It would be a totally alien concept. Like eating meat would be to a herbivore.

Why? All I'm saying is that some states of affairs are better than others. The aspects that make them better are what we call 'moral.' Why does there have to be a self-aware being examining it to make it so?

Circular argument: 'Some states of affairs are better than others'- you say. That means someone judges it to be so. That judgment is moral, yes. But the crux is someone has to make that judgment. Without this someone there is no morality. The self-aware being you mention is the very same that is passing the judgment 'some states are better than others.' And yet you insist this self-aware being is not necessary for morality to exist. (And once again, although all these statements apply to morality, they are not moral in themselves.)

 

[Mouthwash]

I usually don't mean anything else than I say.

I just have no idea what your point is.

I'm afraid you have to be a bit more specific.

Nope, I can't comprehend that whole argument. I don't know what any of it means.

In which case the same conclusion still applies. An Absolute Morality is to all intents and purposes an absurdity. All morality applies to something

That's not how Platonism works: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1

If we have no sense of morality and there's this Absolute Morality out there (whether it's called God or something else),

It's not called God. Plenty of philosophers believe in this 'absolute morality' while also being atheists.

we can't relate to it. We simply can't understand morality if it's not already inside of us. It would be a totally alien concept. Like eating meat would be to a herbivore.

That wouldn't make any difference to our morality because it is BY DEFINITION mind-independent!

Circular argument: 'Some states of affairs are better than others'- you say. That means someone judges it to be so.

No. No, it doesn't. Why do you keep assuming this?

 

[Agent327]

I just have no idea what your point is.

You argued: murder is a legal term, and by that logic 'killing an enemy' would be morally justified (morally right). It is equally possible to state that killing another person is never justified. In neither case (killing the enemy or murder) is it morally relevant that murder is a legal term.

Nope, I can't comprehend that whole argument. I don't know what any of it means.

Which is already more specific than 'Huh'. I wan't making an argument, merely pointing out that statements about morality don't necessarily have to be moral statements in themselves.

That's not how Platonism works: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/platonism/#1

Then maybe Platonism doesn't work. But how Platonism works isn't relevant to the argument.

It's not called God. Plenty of philosophers believe in this 'absolute morality' while also being atheists.

I was using God as an example. Whether one is an atheist or not is not relevant to that.

That wouldn't make any difference to our morality because it is BY DEFINITION mind-independent!

No, it is not. But you are free to believe it is. The fact that I feel stealing is wrong is not something 'existing outside my mind.' If to you it is, that doesn't make it so 'by definition.'

No. No, it doesn't. Why do you keep assuming this?

I pointed out that it was you passing that judgment. Are you not someone?

 

[Lohrenswald]

Early in the God: what do you believe thread, _Random mentioned some idea about "god doesn't exist, but also doesn't not exist", and linked to this article

Could you tell me more about it, explain it in a more understandable way or something?

 

[Berzerker]

murder is generally considered wrong (as in Thou shalt not kill).

when is murder considered right?

But in war it is considered OK to kill the enemy.

murder /= kill

So, murder is wrong is both true and not true. It depends on the situation.

when the situation changes it aint murder

If I defend myself from someone trying to kill me and kill that person in the process, I commit the very crime I am defending myself from.

killing a would be murderer in self defense is not the same as trying to murder someone

 

[Agent327]

when is murder considered right?

You're free to come up with an example, but:

murder /= kill

Here's one already. If your position is that it is wrong to kill another human being unconditionally than that would be murder. As I already mentioned.

when the situation changes it aint murder

Which is the short version of the argument, albeit less eloquently put.

killing a would be murderer in self defense is not the same as trying to murder someone

That depends on your point of view. Which in your case is clear. The situation in question might not be as clearcut as that though. Which is what morality is all about, and which is why laws aren't as simple as 'thou shalt not kill.' There are a lot of grey areas which need sorting out. Theologians know this, don't they, Plotinus?

 

[Berzerker]

You're free to come up with an example

I dont need an example, I'm not the one arguing murder is "generally wrong".

Here's one already. If your position is that it is wrong to kill another human being unconditionally than that would be murder. As I already mentioned.

My position? So far your examples of "murder" are killing someone in wartime and self defense. Those are not murder.

That depends on your point of view. Which in your case is clear. The situation in question might not be as clearcut as that though. Which is what morality is all about, and which is why laws aren't as simple as 'thou shalt not kill.' There are a lot of grey areas which need sorting out. Theologians know this, don't they, Plotinus?

Morality is all about unclear situations? You're claiming objective morality doesn't exist because killing in self defense is actually murder. It isn't.

 

[Plotinus]

Early in the God: what do you believe thread, _Random mentioned some idea about "god doesn't exist, but also doesn't not exist", and linked to this article

Could you tell me more about it, explain it in a more understandable way or something?

I'm not sure I can explain it more clearly than that article. Apophatic theology has its roots in Greek theology of late antiquity, particularly Gregory of Nyssa and, later, Pseudo-Dionysius. The basic idea is that God transcends all human concepts, such that we can't really say anything about him at all. Moreover, we can't really deny anything of him either. So God is not love, or not-love; he's not life, or not-life; he's not three, or not-three; he's not one, or not-one; he's not being, or not-being; and so on. This is what Pseudo-Dionysius says in the last chapter of his Mystical Theology, which is the central text of this tradition. This is really the basis of much of Orthodox theology and spirituality and also quite a lot of western theology too - part of Thomas Aquinas' genius was that he began with this basic viewpoint and yet managed to find quite a lot to say about God all the same. The author of that article makes the point that atheists such as Richard Dawkins don't understand this, and think that Christians believe only in a positivist God who is a sort of gigantic thing rather than as something that transcends existence itself, and therefore their arguments aren't any good. (I disagree with him about the value of Dawkins' argument from complexity, though, which he thinks would be good granted Dawkins' assumptions about what God is supposed to be. I think it's a pretty rubbish argument even if you grant those assumptions.)

 

[Lohrenswald]

This is really the basis of much of Orthodox theology and spirituality and also quite a lot of western theology too - part of Thomas Aquinas' genius was that he began with this basic viewpoint and yet managed to find quite a lot to say about God all the same.

What sort of things was he able to find out? I read a bit about Thomas Aquinas a few years ago, but don't remember a whole lot.

 

[Agent327]

I dont need an example, I'm not the one arguing murder is "generally wrong".

Actually, nobody is.

My position? So far your examples of "murder" are killing someone in wartime and self defense. Those are not murder.

That's your opinion. Other opinions are possible. You should consider the possibility that your personal view on what is right and wrong is not the only one possible.

Morality is all about unclear situations? You're claiming objective morality doesn't exist because killing in self defense is actually murder. It isn't.

Nobody is claiming what you state they are.

 

[Flying Pig]

I'm not sure I can explain it more clearly than that article. Apophatic theology has its roots in Greek theology of late antiquity, particularly Gregory of Nyssa and, later, Pseudo-Dionysius. The basic idea is that God transcends all human concepts, such that we can't really say anything about him at all. Moreover, we can't really deny anything of him either. So God is not love, or not-love; he's not life, or not-life; he's not three, or not-three; he's not one, or not-one; he's not being, or not-being; and so on. This is what Pseudo-Dionysius says in the last chapter of his Mystical Theology, which is the central text of this tradition. This is really the basis of much of Orthodox theology and spirituality and also quite a lot of western theology too - part of Thomas Aquinas' genius was that he began with this basic viewpoint and yet managed to find quite a lot to say about God all the same. The author of that article makes the point that atheists such as Richard Dawkins don't understand this, and think that Christians believe only in a positivist God who is a sort of gigantic thing rather than as something that transcends existence itself, and therefore their arguments aren't any good. (I disagree with him about the value of Dawkins' argument from complexity, though, which he thinks would be good granted Dawkins' assumptions about what God is supposed to be. I think it's a pretty rubbish argument even if you grant those assumptions.)

I found the Terry Eagleton article extremely interesting, but am forced into something of a hole by it. I understand the idea that our rational machinery would not be able to detect Eagleton's god, and the extremely valid point that Dawkins' atheism rests itself on a great deal of unspoken faith. However, I'm not sure - given that you define God as something that exists outside the universe, and could never be detected or disproven with rational equipment - where Eagleton is coming from when he argues that Christian belief is based on rational argument built up on faith. Rational argument tells me that such an entity could exist, but how does it incline me to believe that it does?

I'm also aware that I used the word 'exist' there, and of the problem that doing so created - but not how to fix it, unfortunately.

As far as I know, atheists are no more monolithically simple than Christians - just as there are many intelligent Christians who do not argue that God is literally comparable with a man in the sky who talks to people, there are many atheists who do not argue that God can be 'disproven', only that there is no good reason to believe in God.

 

[Agent327]

Most curious for Plotinus' response to those interesting issues.

I came upon another issue, which I wasn't sure where to post, until I raelized that by extension this also holds true for theology:

We each exist for but a short time, and in that time explore but a small part of the whole universe. But humans are a curious species. We wonder, we seek answers. Living in this vast world that is by turns kind and cruel, and gazing at the immense heavens above, people have always asked a multitude of questions. How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of the time.

Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead.

Shocker. But here's why:

Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particular physics.

How does one respond to that?

 

[_random_]

(I disagree with him about the value of Dawkins' argument from complexity, though, which he thinks would be good granted Dawkins' assumptions about what God is supposed to be. I think it's a pretty rubbish argument even if you grant those assumptions.)

I briefly thought you'd be speaking in defense of Dawkins. That last sentence was a relief.

 

[Agent327]

I briefly thought you'd be speaking in defense of Dawkins. That last sentence was a relief.

Actually, Dawkins doesn't really 'argue from complexity'. He need only point to the design flaws in animals to question the existence of an Intelligent Designer.* Arguing from complexity is often used by misguided creationists, who fail to realize that that argument basically undermines their own position.

*For example the nerve that controls speech, running from the brain directly to the larynx and back - in fish. Fish don't have a neck. In giraffes this nerve goes all the way down the neck, circles around the aorta, then circles back to the brain. (It does the same in humans, where the detour is obviously shorter, but the larynx is positioned at the top of the neck, not the bottom.)

 

[Mechanicalsalvation]

How does one respond to that?

Its the science which doesnt explore both our mental existence and the spiritual phenomena which is to blame since its almost exclusively focused on the material universe.