Summary
A Brexit will hit the economy of the Netherlands relatively hard because the Dutch economy, compared to the EU, more with the United economy Kingdom (UK) is intertwined through trade.
In 2030 the costs for the Netherlands may rise to 1.2% of GDP, which amounts to some 10 billion euros. If we comply with recent conditions images from literature also assume that growth depends on trade-driven innovation,
then the costs for the Netherlands of 10 billion euros can even be 65% higher.
The majority of British voters can choose to leave the EU. We take that in that case the actual exit of the UK from the EU will take two years. In addition, there will be a process of (re) negotiating possible for the UK trade agreements. This process will take a number of years, with the result that there is over the next few years there is uncertainty about the end point of the relationship between the EU and the UK. This will affect business. The economic damage due to this uncertainty is the largest in the short term and is already visible in the run-up to the referendum.
After a possible Brexit, the UK will become less attractive as a gateway to the EU foreign investments. The EU can benefit from this because foreign investments move from the UK to other countries within the EU. Larger losses in the UK and the EU only occur in the long term due to adjustments the economy, caused by the rise in trade costs and non-tariff trade barriers between the UK and the EU. Non-tariff trade barriers arise from differences in technical specifications or environmental requirements to which traded products must meet before they can be sold within the EU.
The Dutch costs of the Brexit are sector-specific. The 'other transport' sectors and 'Transport vehicles' are not very sensitive to a Brexit, because they are more with the EU than be connected to the UK. But this does not apply to the chemical, plastic and chemical sectors rubber ',' electronic equipment ',' motor vehicles and parts', 'food processing' industry 'and' metal and minerals' (together 12% of Dutch GDP). There will be production losses there of about 5%. This production loss can be reduced by 40% brought by a new free trade agreement with the UK.
After a possible Brexit there are several options regarding trade agreements between the UK and the EU. On the one hand, there is the fall-back option, namely the standard WTO regulation. This is a scheme whereby the UK has to comply with the higher external EU rates. If the UK also decides to use its own standards and regulations that deviate of those in the EU, non-tariff barriers to trade arise. On the other hand, there is the possibility to come to a new free trade agreement that substantially lowers trade costs. Such a treaty bypasses trade tariffs and states standards and regulation are firmly established where the UK and the EU must comply. The treaty howevert will not be able to restore full access to the internal market.
If the EU and the UK can come to a free trade agreement, the economic consequences of Brexit for the Netherlands will be about 20% lower. An important element of such a FTA is that non-tariff barriers to trade increase by only 6% instead of the 13% increase in the WTO scheme, the second element of the Free trade agreement is that the trade tariffs on goods between EU and UK remain absent.
A new free trade agreement poses a dilemma for the EU. On the one hand, the EU wants prevent a precedent action from the Brexit or that there is free shopping becomes the advantages and disadvantages of EU membership. It will therefore cost the to make the exit as large as possible. On the other hand, the EU itself is also confronted with higher costs and a new trade treaty makes these costs for the EU - but thus also for the outgoing country - smaller. Moreover, the costs of Brexit are relatively low for countries from Eastern and Southern Europe, because they are less connected to the UK. These countries therefore benefit less from a new free trade agreement than the Netherlands, Ireland or Belgium.
It could also be that those countries that have a major economic interest in a new free trade agreement with the UK, do not get the support of all EU countries.
2. After the Brexit: WTO or FTA
With a Brexit, the UK will lose free access to the internal EU market after two years goods, services and people. The UK will also fall outside the trade agreements that the EU with third countries. Trade to and from the UK will only be on the conditions of the World Trade Organization (WTO). But the UK and the EU can choose to make certain agreements about access to the internal EU market. In addition, the UK can conclude new trade agreements with non-EU countries. A number of scenarios are conceivable that allow different access to the internal EU market. The options that give the most access (EEA and customs union) are probably not acceptable for the 'leave' camp, because interference by the EU in the UK keeps existing. This leaves two possible scenarios: a free trade agreement (Free Trade Agreement or FTA for short) or the standard fallback option whereby the UK is a member remains of the WTO, but otherwise does not regulate.
European Economic Area (EEA): A number of European non-EU countries have signed a treaty with the EU that in more or less degree of access to the internal market. Countries like Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein are members of the European Economic Area (EEA) and are free to do so movement of goods, capital, services and persons within the EU. In exchange for this these countries make a substantial contribution to the EU budget and have to comply with the European budget standards and regulations, without being able to influence future amendments.
Joining the EEA is probably not negotiable for the proponents of one Brexit. The proponents do not want to make any more payments to the EU budget. They do not want it EU interference in UK regulations. And they want the UK to own migration does not and does not accept a treaty that allows free movement of persons between the UK and the EU arranges.
Customs union or bilateral trade agreements Switzerland and Turkey have a more limited treaty with the EU. Turkey has a customs Union with free movement of goods and a uniform trade policy compared to third countries.
Switzerland has signed a dozen agreements with the EU (including Schengen) that it access to the internal EU market in certain sectors. In addition, it has more then two hundred trade agreements are concluded. Because of these agreements, Switzerland is close linked to EU law, but can not cooperate with European decision. Switzerland also contributes to the EU budget. For similar reasons as in the case of the EEA this option does not therefore fit the wishes of the 'leave camp'.
The Turkish option is not advantageous for the UK. Agricultural products and services are excluded the internal market and Turkey must comply with EU law, without any control over the rules. Turkey also needs to join with EU policies on trade agreements; it can not conclude its own trade agreements with third countries. The proponents of a Brexit wants the UK to no longer be bound by EU standards and regulations, and want the UK to be able to determine its own trade policy. This therefore also excludes the Turkish model.
So two scenarios remain:
1. World Trade Organization (WTO)
If the UK does not regulate anything, then the UK will fall under the rules of the WTO. Because there is no precedent for this scenario, it is unclear whether the UK automatically remains a member of the WTO. It remains to be seen whether the agreements with third countries, which the UK has as a member of the EU closed, stay upright. If the latter is not the case, then it will be for the UK a lot harder, because it has to start long and complex negotiations with the WTO and new agreements must conclude with 58 non-EU countries.
We assume that the UK will remain a WTO member and that trade agreements with third parties countries remain. The UK will have to comply with the external EU rates. We assume that these will be approximately 3% across the board, comparable to the rates that the EU uses with the other countries. These trade tariffs lower trade See the conversation that the Director-General Azevêdo of the WTO had with the Financial Times on May 26, 2016. link between the UK and the EU. The UK does not have to adhere to the standards and regulations from the EU. But there will also be non-tariff barriers to trade arise, which increases the trade costs for goods by 13%. Also the costs of trade in services will increase by about 13% .
2. Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
The UK can conclude a free trade agreement with the EU, making tariff barriers bypasses. The treaty regulates the standards and regulations to which the UK and the EU apply must keep. An agreement does not ecessarily mean full access for services (including financial services). In our calculations, we assume that the UK and the EU do not have any trading tariffs impose. An FTA treaty will only be part of all standards and regulations
the UK is free to deviate from EU rules. That's why we assume that there will arise so-called not immediately visible trade barriers. It goes with this to differences in technical specifications or environmental requirements for traded products must meet. We assume that these trade costs for goods increase by 6%. The costs of trade in services (such as tourism, financial services) also start our calculations with an average of 6% up.