Firstly, the argument with regards to consistency with other privileges. Framing the object of removing confessional privilege as being simply to 'catch more child abusers' simplifies in such a way as to miss the main point that is being sought - justice. Achieving or obtaining justice is the central aim, with protecting children being a particular instance of that aim. It is absurd to suggest that you achieve the aim of justice by undermining it! That's why the legal client relationship is a completely different creature. In the justice system, the 'one thing' of justice
does trump everything else.
In comparison, the sanctity of the seal of Confession is not on the justice system's priority list. It's quite odd to suggest that the justice system should be concerned with maintaining the sanctity of the seal as equally as it should be concerned with maintaining justice. The justice system is far more concerned with protecting justice than with protecting Catholic canons of conduct, and to suggest that the legal client privilege is equivalent to the confessional privilege because they both protect something ignores the point that the justice system is not equally concerned with what they protect. Taking away one is not the same as taking the other, as is suggested, because the justice system should clearly not give nearly as much of a damn about the seal of Confession as they should about, you know, justice. Justice is kinda the justice system's thing.
It's inaccurate to describe the purpose of mandatory reporting as solely to prevent other crimes. Concealing knowledge of a serious indictable offence, or failing to report, is reprehensible behaviour in itself. If a priest heard about child abuse
outside of the confessional, then we'd all agree that a failure to report is morally repugnant. Failing to report is deserving of punishment, and mandatory reporting laws apply criminal sanctions not simply as a means to coerce reporting in the hope of lessening crime, but to punish morally repugnant behaviour.
The most important point I want to make with regards to consistency however, is that even if legal client privilege is also an anomaly, or even if it is of the same character as confessional privilege, it is still more consistent to remove confessional privilege than to leave both intact. If you leave both intact, you have two exceptions to the rule (maybe there's a third, but the point is that you have a finite number of exceptions to the rule). If you take away confessional privilege and leave legal client privilege, you have one exception to the rule. The law is applied more consistently if there is one exception to it rather than two. So the argument against confessional privilege is the more consistent argument, whether it be aiming for perfect consistency, or merely greater consistency, as is suggested by the argument that legal client privilege is of the same character as confessional privilege.
Secondly, the relevance of international law (or the lack thereof). Jehoshua mentioned Tasmanian anti-sodomy laws, which were declared by the UNHRC in
Toonen v Australia to be in contravention of Australia's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Crucially however, this did not make the laws repugnant and void. It was simply an embarrassment that the federal government addressed by passing legislation that
did overrule the Tasmanian anti-sodomy laws. The state law was not void due to inconsistency with the treaty, but due to inconsistency with a federal law introduced in response to the UNHRC ruling.
Let's go through some case law again. As a starting point,
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550, 570:
Gibbs CJ said:
Treaties do not have the force of law unless they are given that effect by statute.
An international treaty that Australia has signed does not in itself place any limits on anything. The signing of a treaty is essentially a symbolic act. Any obligations under the treaty only become relevant when they are enacted as domestic law. Even if it is argued that customary international law is incorporated into the common law (see Brennan J at 42 in
Mabo (No 2) or Kirby J at 443 in
Tofilau v The Queen (2007) 231 CLR 396 for the preferable view), the common law is overridden by statute, and whilst a relevant interpretative presumption may be raised, legislative intent is supreme.
A restatement of essentially the same thing, in
Kruger v Commonwealth (Stolen Generations Case) (1997) 190 CLR 1, 70-1:
Dawson J said:
[Despite ratification, the Genocide] Convention has not at any time formed part of Australian domestic law...[71] t is well established that the provisions of an international treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of Australian law unless those provisions have been validly incorporated into our municipal law by statute. Where such provisions have not been incorporated they cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and obligations.
To swing back to the point about legislative intent, there is this from Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 286:
Mason CJ and Deane J said:
The fact that the Convention has not been incorporated into Australian law does not mean that its ratification holds no significance for Australian law. Where a statute or subordinate legislation is ambiguous, the courts should favour that construction which accords with Australia's obligations under a treaty or international convention to which Australia is a party, at least in those cases in which the legislation is enacted after, or in contemplation of, entry into, or ratification of, the relevant international instrument. That is because Parliament, prima facie, intends to give effect to Australia's obligations under international law.
So if there is some sort of treaty that Australia is party to that for some reason would prevent mandatory reporting laws applying to Catholic priests, though being a party to it would inform statutory interpretation, that obviously wouldn't be relevant if the special exemption of Catholic priests was removed, evincing a clear intention to not abide by such a treaty.
The point about international law that might be more relevant when talking about State legislation is s 51(xxix) of the Constitution; the 'external affairs' power. The basic point of this section is that the Commonwealth can legislate in areas not otherwise within their purview if they are doing so to give effect to an international obligation. See e.g. Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 (regarding the Racial Discrimination Act 1975) and Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (the famous Tasmanian Dam Case). The former would probably be particularly relevant, in that the decision was based on the idea that human rights are of international concern, and so fall within the ambit of the external affairs power (the overarching point being that the external affairs power only applies when the treaty is truly international, and not just a way to work around the Constitution). So if there were some treaty preventing mandatory reporting laws for Catholic priests, and if the Commonwealth gave effect to that treaty through legislation (not simply through ratification), then the States would most likely have to act in accordance with that legislation.
To summarise, Australia can do pretty much whatever it likes with the seal of Confession. As already discussed, s 116 of the Constitution is not helpful. The States may under certain circumstances have to act in accordance with the Commonwealth if the Commonwealth has actually incorporated international obligations into the domestic law, but given what we're talking about is a national Royal Commission, that potential difficulty is pretty irrelevant to this discussion.
So unless some relevant treaty can be pointed to, alongside legislation that the Commonwealth has implemented under its s 51(xxix) powers, the point about international law seems pretty misplaced.