Where in my post did I ever suggested that deliberately targeting civilians is good, and where did Ukraine or its allies ever somehow implied they would do it or support it ?
 
Where in my post did I ever suggested that deliberately targeting civilians is good, and where did Ukraine or its allies ever somehow implied they would do it or support it ?
I'm not. I'm saying the criticism is still relevant even if said posters refuse to see the same being carried out by Russia. It shouldn't be opposed just because of who posted it.

As for its allies, I never talked about that. I was talking about the in-thread commentary where it was floated (and Lexicus argued against it, I believe).
 
There was a comment from Cameron that somehow could imply UK had allowed Ukraine to use the provided Stormshadow to target Russian territory (and was retracted).
This is then twisted into some false outrage about an imaginary "Ukraine will target innocent civilians" by the same ghouls that either happily support, or pretend to not see, Russia having deliberately and systematically targeted civilians with terror bombing for two years. Business as usual in this thread.

ha, got it now, thanks.

Seen the news about UK allowing Ukraine to use weapons for targets in Russia, but could not link that to the unsourced and distorted comment. There are a tons of military targets in Russia for Storm Shadows, it's a non issue (or more precisely the issue is to not allow them to be used there)
 
These kinds of statements are actively counterproductive. As an American taxpayer I am told constantly that freedom is at stake in Ukraine. If Ukrainians think that "don't indiscriminately kill civilians" is a "Western peacetime moral" that "no longer works for us" then what stake do I have in the Ukrainian state's continued survival? I don't consider killing Russian soldiers a worthy end in itself, as some posters here seem to.
Now you’re getting it.
 
Now you’re getting it.

If you go back through the previous seven threads you can find me making similar posts whenever the subject of hypothetical Ukrainian reprisal attacks on Russian civilians comes up.
 
A little like how Biden heroically chastises Israel, right?
 
Moderator Action: News please. @Crezth If you want to post in this thread, please contribute actual news to your posts and not just political commentary.
 
that's quite a stark contrast with the frontline.


We quickly learned that we would have no reconnaissance, no evacuation teams - nothing. We were given only a couple of APCs. The only thing that saved me was that I was in the assault group, which was supposed to do evacuation in addition to assaults.

It was planned that each group would be sent forward in APCs or BMPs, and as they advanced, they would build up their forces. Simply put, we were to be driven to a certain point, and from there we would advance on foot. In the course of advances, some were wounded and some were killed. It was forbidden for the wounded to evacuate or crawl back: if you could hold a machine gun, it meant you were still a stormtrooper - advance. Desertion during the assault was impossible - machine-gun points were set up, and we were "met" when we returned. If anyone tried to go back, he would be shot, so the assault was only forward.

The first groups that came in were immediately demolished - they were met by artillery, a tank and infantry worked on them, and there was a pile of corpses. They were just moving out - and they were covered. Subsequent groups were able to squeeze the Ukrainians a bit, but almost the whole company was killed. On the first day we managed to capture three hundred meters. I managed to pull out three wounded. And it was a miracle - it snowed and it was possible to drag them on sledges: I put one down, dragged him to zero, came back - the next one, and so on as long as I could. It took about two kilometers to drag them.

There were no medics, they helped themselves, it was almost impossible to pick up the wounded - the artillery covered everything tightly. Nearby were flying kamikaze drones, there were about 20 of them - they were circling like birds. At the same time, our artillery was silent - they would fire once an hour, and then silence. Assault groups were advancing on APCs, BMPs, I think we even had a tank, but all this equipment was quickly hit, and the sky was black and black. When the equipment was hit, there was a short break - there was nothing to bring the attackers up on: you sit and listen to the first group shouting and shooting, the wounded asking for help, and no reinforcements arriving - there was nothing to bring them up on.

There were only a few survivors from the first groups - those who had time to burn themselves out. Or whose wounds were not so serious. Because [when seriously wounded] people there were drained in 30 seconds, that is, the first ten seconds you are on adrenaline and screaming, the next ten seconds you come to your senses, realizing what happened, and another ten seconds you try to do something. But if your strength is gone, that's it.

We didn't have any commanders with us. The only officer who was not afraid to go to the assault, went in the penultimate assault group on a par with everyone else. And the company commander didn't even show up at the positions. During the whole time I was in Ukraine, I saw him only once - at night. He went to see his deputy. But the deputy stayed in the dugout for the whole two days, during which we were thrown into the assaults, and kept his head down.

Toward morning it was our turn to go in. We were put on an APC and sent forward. As with the first groups, we were shot at with machine guns and automatic rifles, snipers and artillery - 150s and 80s (artillery and mortar shells of appropriate calibers - The Insider) were coming at us. RPGs were coming in. And this was at a time when we had not even gotten to the point we needed - we were just approaching.

We drove into a wooded area, dismounted, and the APC left. The wounded were lying there, no one was taken away. And for four hours it went on: tanks, artillery, mortars, infantry. Rockets were coming in. Explosions were everywhere - the woodland was completely strewn with corpses. They were not just corpses, but torn body parts, and we walked right over them, because it was impossible not to walk: you couldn't see the ground. Among these bodies we took shelter and hid from the explosions. You could lie on them somewhere, sit on them somewhere, walk on them somewhere.

The artillery worked for four hours, and then for another five hours we pretended to be dead, so that Ukrainian intelligence would not find out that we were alive. They stopped shelling, the "kamikazes" and "birds with drops" stopped flying in, and we continued to lie motionless until darkness fell. Out of the whole company - which was about a hundred men - there were seven survivors.
 
"Attention! Staff of US, UK, Germany, France and Poland embassies have priority access to the exhibition"


"Glory to Geranium"
Russia has effectively declared war on Europe – so it makes perfect sense to signal that decision to the Russian public with this kind of indirect messaging.

Russia has effectively by itself burned its bridges to Europe, and is now accusing it of arson.
 
Russia has effectively by itself burned its bridges to Europe, and is now accusing it of arson.
It is by design. A fascist state needs an assigned external enemy in order for the ruling elites to stay in power and to keep the populace materially and mentally mobilized. Those who aren't technically external, like liberal-minded and anti-totalitarian portion of Russian population, are intimidated into silence and branded as external too ("foreign agents").

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Russia plotting sabotage across Europe, intelligence agencies warn

European intelligence agencies have warned their governments that Russia is plotting violent acts of sabotage across the continent as it commits to a course of permanent conflict with the West.

Russia has already begun to more actively prepare covert bombings, arson attacks, and damage to infrastructure on European soil, directly and via proxies, with little apparent concern about causing civilian fatalities, intelligence officials believe. While the Kremlin’s agents have a long history of such operations — and launched attacks sporadically in Europe in recent years — evidence is mounting of a more aggressive and concerted effort, according to assessments from three different European countries shared with the Financial Times.

Intelligence officials are becoming increasingly vocal about the threat in an effort to promote vigilance. “We assess the risk of state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased,” said Thomas Haldenwang, head of German domestic intelligence. Russia now seems comfortable carrying out operations on European soil “[with] a high potential for damage,” he told a security conference last month hosted by his agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Thomas Haldenwang has warned that Russia is comfortable carrying out sabotage on European soil. Haldenwang spoke just days after two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Bayreuth, Bavaria, for allegedly plotting to attack military and logistics sites in Germany on behalf of Russia. Two men were charged in the UK in late April with having started a fire at a warehouse containing aid shipments for Ukraine. English prosecutors accuse them of working for the Russian government. In Sweden, security services are meanwhile investigating a series of recent railway derailments, which they suspect may be acts of state-backed sabotage. Russia has attempted to destroy the signaling systems on Czech railways, the country’s transport minister told the FT last month. In Estonia, an attack on the interior minister’s car in February and those of journalists were perpetrated by Russian intelligence operatives, the country’s Internal Security Service has said. France’s ministry of defense also warned this year of possible sabotage attacks by Russia on military sites.

“The obvious conclusion is that there has been a real stepping up of Russian activity,” said Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the think-tank. “One cannot tell if that’s a reflection of the fact that the Russians are throwing more resources at it; whether they are being more sloppy and getting caught; or whether western counter-intelligence has simply become better at detecting and stopping it,” he added. “Whatever it is though — there is a lot going on.” A defendant in Baden-Württemberg who is alleged to have violated EU trade restrictions in connection with deliveries of electronic components for military equipment to Russia.

One senior European government official said information was being shared through NATO security services of “clear and convincing Russian mischief”, which was coordinated and at scale. The time had come to “raise awareness and focus” about the threat of Russian violence on European soil, he added. NATO issued a statement on Thursday declaring its deep concern about growing “malign activities on allied territory” by Russia, citing what it said was an “intensifying campaign . . . across the Euro-Atlantic area”.

The growing fears over Russia’s appetite for physical damage against its adversaries follow a spate of accusations against Russia over disinformation and hacking campaigns. On Friday, Germany vowed consequences for Moscow — in a statement backed by the EU and NATO — over a 2023 hacking attack on the social democratic party of chancellor Olaf Scholz. A scandal exposing Russian attempts to co-opt far right European politicians ahead of upcoming European elections is meanwhile still unfolding. One intelligence official said Moscow’s sabotage efforts should not be seen as distinct from other operations, saying the ramp-up in activity reflected Russia’s aim to exert maximum pressure “across the piece”. Putin is currently feeling “emboldened” and will seek to push lines as hard as he can in Europe, on multiple fronts, he said, whether through disinformation, sabotage, or hacking.

Increased aggression from Russian intelligence also reflects the desire for the country’s spymasters to reassert themselves after their most serious setback since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 600 Russian intelligence officers operating in Europe with diplomatic cover were ejected, dealing serious damage to the Kremlin’s spy network across the continent. In a recent report, analysts at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute highlighted the efforts to which Russia had gone to reconstitute its presence in Europe, often using proxies. Those include members of the Russian diaspora as well as organized crime groups with which the Kremlin has long-standing ties. A key strategic shift has also occurred, with so-called “Committees of Special Influence” coordinating intelligence operations country-by-country for the Kremlin, drawing together what were previously piecemeal efforts by the country’s fractious security services and other Kremlin players.

With Russia’s stepping up operations, security services have been on high alert over threats and are looking to identify targets they may have missed. Questions have been raised, for instance, over a so-far unexplained explosion at a BAE Systems munitions factory in Wales that supplies shells used by Ukraine. In October 2014 a Czech arms depot where weapons for Kyiv were being stored was destroyed; Russian military intelligence agents were later revealed to have planted explosives at the site. A huge fire broke out on Friday at a factory in Berlin owned by the arms company Diehl, which also supplies Ukraine. More than 160 specialist firefighters were called to tackle the blaze, with residents in a huge swath of the west of the capital told to keep windows closed due to possible toxic fumes.

“As ever with Russia, it’s wise not to look for a single explanation of why they are doing anything. There’s always a combination of things going on,” said Giles. “These pinprick attacks we’ve seen so far are of course to create disruption, but they can also be used for disinformation. And then there is what Russia learns from these attacks if they want to immobilize Europe for real . . . They’re practice runs.

 
It is by design. A fascist state needs an assigned external enemy in order for the ruling elites to stay in power and to keep the populace materially and mentally mobilized. Those who aren't technically external, like liberal-minded and anti-totalitarian portion of Russian population, are intimidated into silence and branded as external too ("foreign agents").
More on that seems to be incoming:

In the kind of system that is Russia's, every day is existential-threat-to-the-government-day. In a way by starting this kind of forever-war, with no actual winning strategy for Russia, Putin has managed to remove the insecurity of whether there is some kind of existential situation for Russia, with a situation of war that makes it obvious there is a such a situation. Because this Russia needs to be threatened, or it won't work out for the Kremlin. It still might not work out, but they kind of always knew that. Like this they tend to know what needs to be done – keep fighting that forever-war, against whomever. Possibly even to the point of further attacks against more countries.

But the selection of wetsern countries to point out to the Russian public is selective. The current military aid to Ukraine was US initially (40 billion), then the Germans have in fact stepped up (10 billion). But Poland, France and even the UK are there more because they can be expected to thought of as somehow "serious adversaries" for Russia. Because when totting up the numbers, the four Nordic countries have between them provided more military aid than the Germans, Sweden alone has provided more than France, and while the UK is no slouch, the Danes alone have by now chipped in almost as much as the UK. Finally the Dutch have outspent the Poles by now.

But Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands cannot be made out as some kind of actual threat to Russia in the eyes of the Russian public. Even if they have for the moment (it will shift again) provided more military support to Ukraine than Poland, France and the UK combined, challenging the Germans.
 
It is by design. A fascist state needs an assigned external enemy in order for the ruling elites to stay in power and to keep the populace materially and mentally mobilized. Those who aren't technically external, like liberal-minded and anti-totalitarian portion of Russian population, are intimidated into silence and branded as external too ("foreign agents").

Faux victimhood is also part of the toolkit. Proven by Russian posters in this thread too.



" -... American, Polish, Swedish, Czech, Australian, South African. So what does this tell us? The whole world is at war with us, with the Russians... with our mighty, majestic people. Nobody likes us.
- And we are the best!
- Apart from our comrade in arms China, no one else is interested in us as comrades, we are no longer friends with anyone."
 
- Apart from our comrade in arms China, no one else is interested in us as comrades, we are no longer friends with anyone."

I know of at least one Chinese serving for Russia against Ukraine, but I'm sure they're not the majority of foreigners in the Russian army.

Petro Yatsenko, a spokesman for Ukraine's agency for prisoners of war, told the BBC many of them came from low-income countries such as Cuba, India and Nepal, as well as African and Central Asian states.


"Every week we capture up to five persons from foreign countries on the frontline as prisoners of war," he said.


 

‘I love my country, but I can’t kill’: Ukrainian men evading conscription​

As the war stretches on indefinitely, there are few eager recruits and Kyiv’s armed forces are short of soldiers

Anton* was on his way to work as a civilian volunteer in the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv 10 days ago. Several men stopped him. They asked: “Hi, who are you?” And: “Can you show me your documents please?” One of the officers produced a tablet and scrolled down a list. He found Anton’s name. A single word was written next to it in red capital letters: ukhyliant, or draft dodger. The men took him to the nearest conscription office.

That morning, Anton and his colleague Serhii were due to drive a truck full of humanitarian aid to a frontline zone. The two men – aged 32 and 31 – had been checked twice before, once outside a metro station, and on a second occasion while waiting for a tram. They received pieces of paper. The first was a polite request to register details. The second an official summons to report to a recruiting centre as soon as possible.

<..>

With draft officers roaming the streets of Ukrainian towns and cities, some men of conscription age are hiding. Telegram channels have sprung up where users can report sightings of state representatives in order to avoid them. Posts are written in a simple meteorological code. The officers are dubbed “clouds” or “rain”. A typical exchange goes: “What is the weather like at Defenders of Ukraine metro station?” Answer: “Three clouds have covered a young guy.”

At the Kharkiv conscription centre, meanwhile, Anton explained he was a volunteer doing useful NGO work. The military official interviewing him was unimpressed. He told Anton he had to appear within three days before a medical commission, which would assess whether he was fit to join the army. If he didn’t turn up he faced a 5,100 hryvnia (£100) fine. “There was hate in his eyes. He was a Dalek. He emphasised Ukraine has been fighting Russia since 2014,” Anton’s friend Serhii said.

The official said that if Anton didn’t want to serve, he could swim across the Tisa river to Romania, one of several routes used by draft evaders. Or he could “tunnel” to the Russian city of Belgorod.

“It was a joke but not a joke,” Serhii said. Instead, Anton vanished. He moved to a village. Now he works remotely. “I love my country. But I can’t kill anyone and I don’t want to die,” Serhii said. He added: “Everyone is tired of war. And of this government. There’s an attitude of: ‘Go fudge yourself.’”

Oleksandr – a 36-year-old IT manager – said he rarely went out. He avoided public transport, travelling only by car. He moved to a wealthy neighbourhood of Kyiv because draft officers preferred to operate in poorer districts, where it was easier to catch evaders, he said.

Some of the apartment owners in his block were members of parliament. “The military don’t visit here. Our compound is an island of survival. To be poor in Ukraine is to be dead,” said Oleksandr’s wife, Nastia.

Nastia said she worried about her husband and suffered from panic attacks. “We’ve been married for 12 years. We are one organism. If he dies I will die too. Maybe I will kill myself,” she said.

The couple paid taxes, were “100% Ukrainian” and bought a prosthesis for a soldier who lost a leg. But they believed Ukraine should negotiate with Russia, even though Putin was a “madman”, they said. “I feel a slave. You have one life. If it’s a choice between life and flag I choose life,” Oleksandr said.

In October 2023 one of their friends, Myroslav, fled Ukraine on foot. He bought a map for $500 (£400), paying on a crypto site, and trekked for 24 hours to Hungary, across fields and through a forest.

Myroslav said he only took with him a small backpack. At one point he spotted a patrol and lay down in the grass for 40 minutes. He crawled through a hole in a border fence. Then he went to a Hungarian police station. Myroslav is now in Warsaw. “I didn’t want to fight. I’m afraid to die,” he said.

Others pay local smugglers to show them the route. The going rate is $5,000 to $15,000 per person. Another option is to pay a bribe to obtain a medical exemption certificate and to exit via normal channels.

About half of those who try to escape – 40,000 people, up to summer 2023 – get caught. Some drown. On Saturday the state border service said its guards found the bodies of two men who tried to swim across the Tisa river.

 
I know of at least one Chinese serving for Russia against Ukraine, but I'm sure they're not the majority of foreigners in the Russian army.
He sure wasn't talking about the Chinese manpower.


 
I read the first link:

The sentence there:

Senior US officials said last week that China was helping Russia undertake
its most ambitious defence expansion since the Soviet era and on a faster
timeline than we believed possible” early in the Ukraine conflict.

reads like an open admission that the US officials got it very wrong.
 
I could have commented on other sentences but selected
the one I thought most enlightening, I was considering the
performance of Joe Biden's foreign policy in the POTUS thread.
 
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