It's also the size of the Russian gains in Ukraine since January to put things into perspective.
In August it was close by land area indeed. Though in last two weeks Ukraine lost about 520 sq. km, including roughly 30% of what they initially seized in Kursk.
Ukraine occupied sparsely populated forest areas, which can be lost pretty fast.
 
Ukraine no longer controls all its internationally recognized territory.

Neither does Russia.
When you say stuff like this how is it possible for anyone to take you seriously? Like yeah technically true. But if I was king and you were sayin this stuff sitting around in my small council, I’d throw you out the window for wasting everyone’s time.
 
When you say stuff like this how is it possible for anyone to take you seriously? Like yeah technically true. But if I was king and you were sayin this stuff sitting around in my small council, I’d throw you out the window for wasting everyone’s time.
But it's a real binary situation, for once.

"Recognize the new territorial reality" is not acceptable for Russia at this moment, the difference being that they need to gain back a lot less territory than Ukraine. That they don't want to negotiate for that small territory but prefer to raze it down is also a message.

Assuming it is around 1/17000 (it likely is closer to 1/20000, but both are too small), it's not comparable to Russia controlling 2/9 of Ukraine. And it does require some well-trained units of Ukraine to be there even for this,
Those were better used there, with space to maneuver than in Donbass, and they are not going to lose Povrosk anyway, the Russian offensive as failed for this year by the look of things, they may not even capture Chasiv Yar at this speed.

when their absence from Donbass is felt despite a very slow advance there by Russia. Russia at some time had lost half a continent (to nazi Germany) and didn't negotiate peace, and at another time lost Moscow.
So why would Ukraine negotiate after losing less than that to yet another authoritarian, militaristic and expansionist regime ? (and before someone accuse me of comparing Russia to Nazi Germany, I'll point the other reference to Napoleon)

While it is certainly in Ukraine's interest if long-range missiles are used and it results in Russia using its own against more than just Ukraine, I doubt the US wants or is ready for that. Because no one needs to spell out what it would mean.
Russians are not stupid, and Putin is a criminal, not a madman.
 
Putin an Co primary directive. Loot Russia not due in nuclear war.

They can survive a lost war and continue doing that.
 
That they don't want to negotiate for that small territory but prefer to raze it down is also a message.
In 2022, Ukraine forbade negotiations with Russia by president's decree and declared goal of recapturing (razing down, as you put it) all lost territories including Crimea.
 
In 2022, Ukraine forbade negotiations with Russia by president's decree and declared goal of recapturing (razing down, as you put it) all lost territories including Crimea.
Russia shouldn't have tortured and massacred civilians, if it actually wanted negotiations.
 
While Russia does this (business as usual):

Russian bomb strikes Kharkiv apartment building, one dead, 42 injured, officials say​

YIV, Sept 15 (Reuters) - A Russian-guided bomb struck a multi-storey apartment building on Sunday in Kharkiv, Ukraine's second-largest city, triggering a fire and killing one person and injuring 42, officials said.
President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said the latest attack underscored the need for Ukraine's Western partners to provide weapons and air defence systems and permission to use weaponry on targets deep inside Russia to save lives.

Prosecutors in Kharkiv region in northeastern Ukraine said on Telegram that the body of a 94-year-old woman had been recovered from the ninth floor of the building.
Kharkiv Mayor Ihor Terekhov said the fire sparked by the bomb had been extinguished. He put the injury toll at 42, including three children. Regional Governor Oleh Syniehubov had earlier said residents could be under the rubble.
Syniehubov posted photos of heavy damage to the top four of five storeys of the building, with smoke and fire billowing out of blown-out windows.

Zelenskiy, in his nightly video address, said three other guided bombs had struck villages in Kharkiv region, where population centres have been a frequent target of Russian attacks near the Russian border.
Russia did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the apartment building incident but has denied intentionally targeting civilians despite having killed thousands of them since it invaded Ukraine in 2022.

Zelenskiy called for rapid decisions on long-range strikes "in order to destroy Russian military aviation right where it is based. These are obvious, logical decisions.
"Every Russian strike of this nature, every instance of Russian terror, like today in Kharkiv...this proves that there must be long-range capability and it must be sufficient."
He said appropriate decisions were expected in the first instance from the United States, France, Germany and Italy, "those whose decisiveness can help save lives."

Russian President Vladimir Putin said last week that the West would be directly fighting with Russia if it allowed Ukraine to strike Russian territory with Western-made long-range missiles.

Ukraine does this:

Backed By Tanks And Covered By Glide-Bombing Fighter Jets, Ukrainian Troops Have Advanced Into Russia Along A New Axis​

On Thursday, Ukrainian combat engineers breached Russian defenses along the border near the village of Novyi Put, around 20 miles west of the 400-square-mile Ukrainian salient in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.

What at first appeared to be a brief and shallow Ukrainian assault in fact developed into something far more dangerous to Russian control over Kursk. Ukrainian armored trucks swiftly advanced several miles past Novyi Put toward the nearest town, Vesoloe. Now the Ukrainian force “has reached the southern outskirts of Vesoloe and has practically taken control of it,” the Ukrainian Center for Defense Strategies reported.

No later than Saturday, Ukrainian tanks rolled into Vesoloe. And on Sunday, a Ukrainian air force fighter-bomber lobbed a satellite-guided glide bomb—reportedly a U.S.-made Joint Direct Attack Munition—at a purported Russian position in a building in central Vesoloe, flattening the building while a drone from the Ukrainian Khorne Group watched from overhead. “We are observing all of you,” the group quipped on social media.

The Russian garrison around Vesoloe reportedly includes a large number of poorly-trained young conscripts, who were drafted for just a year of military service and, according to Kremlin policy, aren’t supposed to see combat.

The Russian northern grouping of forces’ heavy reliance on conscripts for the initial defense against the main Ukrainian thrust in Kursk starting in August is one reason the Ukrainians managed to advance so quickly along that axis. It’s an ominous sign for the Russians that their defensive efforts in Vesoloe apparently also depend on unprepared young men in their teens and early 20s.

If the Russians react to the Ukrainian attack on Vesoloe last week the same way they reacted to the wider Ukrainian invasion of Kursk last month, they may eventually redeploy some better-trained airborne forces to blunt the Ukrainian advance. The Khorne Group shrugged off this possibility. “Bring us more conscripts and paratroopers,” it taunted.

Aside from the Khorne Group, it’s unclear which Ukrainian units are involved in the fight for Vesoloe. It’s worth noting, however, that the Khorne Group’s videos of the Thursday breach seem to depict Turkish-made Kirpi armored trucks, which are popular with the Ukrainian marine corps. The 36th Marine Brigade is part of the main fight farther east in Kursk, so it’s possible the brigade is also behind the Vesoloe incursion.

Whichever brigade or brigades they’re facing in Vesoloe, the Russians are worried. Their local garrison reportedly includes a lot of young conscripts. By contrast, the invading Ukrainians appear to be battle-hardened volunteers backed by tanks, drones and warplanes. “Our contacts assess the situation as serious,” one Russian blogger noted.
 
In 2022, Ukraine forbade negotiations with Russia by president's decree and declared goal of recapturing (razing down, as you put it) all lost territories including Crimea.

They're not obliged to negotiate.

If you want to force them to try winning.
 
Putin has decreed another round of expansion of the Russian armed forces – supposedly up to 2,4 million from December 1 of this year:

Considering there is only some 40 million male Russians in the ages 20-60 – adding in the police and the Rosgvardia gives numbers saying that as much as 10% of them might end up police or military here. Lovely society.
 
Nah, IIRC they ran out of men during world war 2.

By the time they conquered Berlin one quarter of their soviet army were girlies.

Point is I think that Russia can manage with more than 10% military age males as military or police.

It is in my view the business of getting them organised, supplied and trained that is more likely to be problematical.
 
Peskov says it's a provocation, I say he should send a counter invitation to the same institutions to come to Bucha to check the great treatment Russia gives to civilians under their boot!

Ukraine invites UN and ICRC to Russia's Kursk region​

KYIV, Sept 16 (Reuters) - Ukraine said on Monday it had asked the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to join humanitarian efforts in Russia's Kursk region following a cross-border incursion by Ukrainian forces.
Ukraine's army remains in the Kursk region more than a month after launching the assault, in which President Volodymyr Zelenskiy says Kyiv has taken control of about 100 settlements. Russia's Defence Ministry said on Monday its forces had regained control of two more villages.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said he had instructed his ministry to invite the UN and ICRC to work in the Kursk region on Sunday. The ministry confirmed that it had issued the requests.
"Ukraine is ready to facilitate their work and prove its adherence to international humanitarian law," Sybiha said on X after visiting the Sumy region, from where Ukrainian forces launched the cross-borer attack.

He said the Ukrainian army was ensuring humanitarian assistance and safe passage to civilians in the Kursk region.
The Foreign Ministry said the invitations had been sent to the ICRC and UN, "taking into account the humanitarian situation and the need to properly ensure basic human rights in the territory of the Kursk region."
It said it had asked the ICRC to monitor Ukraine's compliance with the principles of international humanitarian law.

It was not immediately clear how or whether the UN or ICRC had responded.
Russia's state-run TASS news agency quoted Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov as saying such statements were "provocative". He made clear Moscow, which began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, expected the UN and ICRC not to accept the invitations.
A Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the Kremlin's reaction showed a disregard for the humanitarian needs of its own people and a fear of letting international observers see the situation in Kursk.

Russia's state-run RIA news agency said ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric had arrived on a visit to Moscow and planned to meet Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Last week, Russian shelling killed three Ukrainians working for the ICRC and wounded two others in a village in the frontline Donetsk region, Ukrainian officials said. Spoljaric has condemned the attacks.
 
But it's a real binary situation, for once.

"Recognize the new territorial reality" is not acceptable for Russia at this moment, the difference being that they need to gain back a lot less territory than Ukraine. That they don't want to negotiate for that small territory but prefer to raze it down is also a message.
It’s more acceptable than it is unacceptable, the battle of the bulge in Kursk is not as important as you think it is. The most important stuff is the left arm and leg Ukraine has lost, not Russia’s nosebleed. I mean, you get that, right? If you were playing Russia in this civ game you’d think you were winning? A few enemy units taking one city isn’t much compared to the 30 cities you’ve already taken? Come on. Think like a gamer.

And frankly it’s irresponsible for you to pretend the Ukrainians are on the up and up and just need to rally. This counterattack is so far from ameliorating anything for Ukraine. Call them heroes all you want you’re still marching them to the grave.

I knew a German guy once when I lived in Germany who would get quite drunk and grab me and shake me by the shoulders and say “what we need here in Europe… is another War.” That’s what this kind of reminds me of.
 
I don't understand how someone can tell who will win at this point. Ukraine's now looking at 2026, but so many things can happen...

Budanov's opinion seems to be to survive until then.

There is also the issue of defining what's winning, so far I only see two sides losing, India is maybe getting the best out of it, North Korea surely, Iran maybe, but I'm not so sure for China and the US.



Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov announced on September 15 at the 20th Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv that the Kremlin considers 2025 to be a pivotal year because failure to secure a victory in Ukraine by early 2026 will undermine Russia’s aspirations of remaining a global superpower for the next 30 years.[1] Budanov noted that Russia anticipates a worsening economic and socio-political situation by mid-2025, alongside increasing difficulties with military recruitment.[2] Budanov stated that the Russian military is experiencing personnel shortages and a decrease in the number of new volunteers signing contracts.[3] Recent significant rises in one-time payments to contract military personnel (kontraktniki), with at least 36 Russian federal subjects (regions) reportedly having increased their one-time payments to kontraktniki in 2024 and at least 11 federal subjects paying Russian kontraktniki one million rubles ($11,000) or more, are likely evidence of mounting costs and difficulties with the Russian military's ability to continue recruiting personnel.[4] Budanov also stated that the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, coupled with constant Ukrainian strikes into Russian territories, has demoralized Russian citizens and eroded the Russian public’s perception of Russian invincibility.[5] Budanov assessed that mounting issues will force Russian President Vladimir Putin to make a critical decision: either launch another risky and controversial mobilization or reduce the intensity of combat operations in Ukraine. Budanov’s assessment implicitly assumes that Western states will maintain support for Ukraine at current levels over the next one to two years. It remains unclear what Putin may do between now and 2026 or how effective Putin’s efforts to offset the impacts of Russia’s war in Ukraine, including via foreign partners like Iran, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), will be. ISW continues to assess that Putin remains averse to announcing another partial mobilization out of fear of domestic discontent and will likely continue to instruct the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to pursue ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts until such efforts begin to fall far short of operational requirements in Ukraine.[6] Putin maintains the option to call another round of mobilization - as he did in Fall 2022 - despite his desire to avoid having to do so. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is also unwilling to accept reducing the intensity of Russian forces’ combat operations because the Kremlin sees maintaining the theater-wide initiative as a strategic imperative.[7] It remains unclear whether Putin will respond with another round of mobilization if faced with another crisis similar to or worse than the crisis the Kremlin faced in Fall 2022, as Russia’s investments to grow Russia’s force generation system, war economy, and international defense relationships have matured over the past two years, and likely will continue to do so through 2026.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) promptly responded to ultranationalists' outcry surrounding the controversial deaths of two drone operators in Ukraine, highlighting how Russian authorities continue to be highly attentive to backlash from the ultranationalist community.
The Russian MoD stated on September 14 that Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov personally ordered Head of the MoD's Main Military-Political Directorate and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Viktor Goremykin and Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, alongside the Russian Federal Security Service's (FSB) Military Counterintelligence Department, to "sort out information" related to the death of the two drone operators within the 87th Separate Rifle Regiment of the 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly the 1st Donetsk People's Republic Army Corps [DNR AC]).[20] Various Russian milbloggers reported on September 13 that two drone operators from the 87th Rifle Regiment died in combat near Pokrovsk after their field commander forced them into an assault detachment as punishment for criticizing their command.[21] The death of the drone operators generated pronounced outrage among Russian ultranationalist milbloggers about poor command discipline, and the Russian MoD appears to be trying to promptly address this outrage by issuing a statement on the matter within 24 hours.[22]

The MoD's response is the latest in a series of incidents in which ultranationalist outcries have influenced Russian officials' decision-making. The Russian federal censor Roskomnadzor published and immediately deleted a draft procedure to implement a recently adopted law designed to deanonymize Russian Telegram channels following backlash from the Russian ultranationalist Telegram community on September 5.[23] Russian ultranationalist outcries about controversies tied to migrants have also previously prompted the Russian Investigative Committee to open criminal investigations.[24] Russian officials' attentiveness to the Russian ultranationalist community underscores the importance the Kremlin has placed on leveraging the community's favor to support its war effort in Ukraine and the Kremlin's concerns about the consequences of pronounced ultranationalist discontent.[25]

Russian ultranationalist milbloggers praised the Russian MoD's response to the drone operators' deaths but expressed concern about the MoD's ability to solve the systemic issues that led to the deaths.
The Russian milbloggers broadly expressed concern about various systemic issues within the 51st CAA and the Russian military, including a culture of lying to senior military commanders to falsely portray the military situation as positive; the practice of sending soldiers with specializations to conduct attritional, infantry-led "meat" assaults, command and control (C2) issues, and commanders' abuses of power.[26] A milblogger claimed that the Russian military command only ordered the assault that led to the drone operators' deaths because of false reports that Russian forces had seized a settlement near Pokrovsk.[27] Another milblogger noted that the Russian MoD only responded to the drone operators' deaths because of the significant outcry online and claimed that Russian authorities have previously investigated the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade for sending engineers to conduct infantry assaults.[28] Some milbloggers described the persistent issues within the Russian military as "Augean Stables," comparing the work necessary to eliminate the issues to the mythological Herculean task.[29] One milblogger pointed to another unresolved problem with Russian commanders sending wounded soldiers back to the frontline without treatment - an issue about which milbloggers have widely complained recently, prompting the Russian MoD to posture itself as making an effort to focus on soldiers' medical care.[30] Another milblogger provided insight into the struggles involved in the formalization and force structure of irregular Russian forces, claiming that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA (formerly the 2nd Luhansk People's Republic Army Corps [LNR AC]) are severely understrength as the regiments have reduced tables of organization and equipment (TO/E) that do not include organic artillery; drone; air defense; or radiation, chemical, and biological defense elements that Russian regulations require of all Russian regiments.[31] The milblogger stated that regiments of the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA are inadequately provisioned, drastically reducing the units' combat capabilities. The Kremlin's efforts are unlikely to be sufficient to solve the broader issues that pervade the 51st CAA and other Russian regular and irregular formations in the near or medium term, especially as the Russian military is in the process of formalizing irregular formations into the regular Russian forces.

Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov aggravated Kremlin efforts to conduct prisoner of war (POW) exchanges for soldiers who defended against the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast while balancing his attempts to appeal to both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and hardline facets of Chechen society.
Alaudinov responded on September 15 to requests for help from the relatives of Chechen servicemembers whom Ukrainian forces have captured in Kursk Oblast, claiming that "Chechens have always considered surrender to be the greatest disgrace."[32] Alaudinov claimed that Chechen prisoners of war (POWs) "didn’t deserve to live" and that Chechen soldiers should have attacked the Ukrainian personnel who were guarding them in order to provoke Ukrainian forces to kill them. Alaudinov claimed that he is prepared to help secure the release of other Russian prisoners of war (POWs), however. Alaudinov has been posturing himself as the spokesperson for the Russian forces operating in Kursk Oblast since the start of the Ukrainian incursion, and Russian state media has widely amplified his statements.[33] His September 15 statement denouncing Chechen soldiers who choose surrender over death is likely an attempt to rebalance his posturing to facets of Chechen society that hold similar beliefs and to portray Chechen forces as elite and making extreme sacrifices in the war. Ukraine and Russia conducted two POW exchanges on September 13 and 14, and Russia reportedly returned individuals whom Ukrainian forces captured in the Kursk direction, including many conscripts.[34] Russia has increasingly conducted POW exchanges with Ukraine since the start of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast following months of reportedly rebuffing Ukrainian overtures for POW exchanges - demonstrating the importance the Kremlin is placing on the return of Russian POWs captured in Kursk Oblast, particularly conscripts.[35] Alaudinov similarly recently berated the relatives of Russian conscripts fighting in Kursk Oblast for their complaints about their relatives' participation in combat operations, which likely exacerbated Kremlin efforts to respond to this socially and politically sensitive issue.[36]
 

Ukraine May Have A New Strategy In Russia’s Kursk Oblast—Move Fast And Surround Thousands Of Russian Troops​

It shocked many observers—apparently including many Russians—when, on Thursday, Ukrainian sappers riding in an ex-Soviet IMR-2 engineering vehicle breached Russian defenses along the Russia-Ukraine border just south of the Russian village of Novyi Put.

The village is 20 miles west of the main Ukrainian salient in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. Six weeks ago, a powerful Ukrainian force—around a dozen battalions from eight or so experienced brigades—invaded Kursk and quickly gained control of 400 square miles of Russian soil.

If it was unclear last week why the Ukrainians would also invade around Novyi Put, it’s a bit clearer now. Backed by tanks and covered by Ukrainian air force warplanes lobbing building-demolishing glide bombs, a Ukrainian tactical group apparently anchored by the 95th Air Assault Brigade is slicing right as it advances past Novyi Put and through the southern blocks of the nearest Russian town, Vesoloe.

That is to say, the Ukrainian troops are turning toward the main Kursk salient. If the Ukrainians attacking northeast from Novyi Put can connect with the Ukrainians in the main salient, they’ll cut off potentially thousands of Russians between them and the border.

But it’s possible the Ukrainians don’t have enough well-equipped forces to complete the maneuver.

The Ukrainian Khorne Group, a team of drone operators supporting the Novyi Put attack, hinted at the encirclement objective at the start of the assault past Novyi Put. “We've advanced into new areas, by kilometers, into Russia,” the group stated on Friday. “A group of Russian conscripts numbering in the thousands is at risk of being encircled.”

If the Ukrainians are indeed trying to surround Russian forces, the local geography facilitates the move. The Seym River forms a natural boundary along most of the northern edge of the potential pocket bounded on the left and right flanks by advancing Ukrainian forces.

[IMG alt="Ukrainian moves in blue, Russian in red."]https://imageio.forbes.com/specials...jpg&crop=1332,749,x0,y0,safe&width=1440[/IMG]
Ukrainian moves in blue, Russian in red.

Google map by David Axe
Ukrainian bombs and rockets have destroyed all the permanent bridges over the Seym in this area, so any Russians south of the Seym—and there could be entire battalions of them—depend on temporary pontoon bridges, or a narrow land bridge through the town of Korenevo, for their resupply.

It’s for this reason that the Ukrainians are relentlessly bombarding the pontoons as soon as the Russians install them. And it’s for the same reason a Ukrainian force anchored by the 225th Assault Battalion has been marching on Korenevo, clearly intending to sever the land bridge.

A Russian counterattack in Kursk that kicked off last week hasn’t made much headway—and, if anything, has worsened the Russian disposition in the potential pocket south of Korenevo by sending additional troops into that pocket.

Geography isn’t everything. The balance of forces in Kursk could weigh on the Ukrainians’ chance of success in closing a potential encirclement. It seems Kyiv has devoted around 10,000 troops to the twin-pronged invasion of Kursk. Moscow may have sent 38,000 troops into the oblast—but many of them are poorly-trained young conscripts.

Russia is struggling to generate trained manpower. Ukraine is struggling to generate any manpower—and is also desperately short of modern armored vehicles. Just four of 14 new brigades the Ukrainian armed forces are standing up have enough modern vehicles, Ukrainian Pres. Volodymyr Zelensky told CNN.

Zelensky said a lack of equipment is constraining Ukrainian ambitions on the battlefield. “We have the desire, but the tools have not come.”
 
Seems logical that Russian soldiers are more likely to surrender, who on earth would want to to live like that, whipped into service, corrupt officers and a dictatorial regime,

anything is better no ?

]

One by one, military officials are being thrown into jail. With the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine looking more favorable for the Kremlin than for some time, Putin appears to think this an appropriate moment to punish the army for the failures of 2022.
 
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