Alternate History Thread IV: The Sequel

Otherwise, every state that has ever existed would have been feudal

Every state worth of the name had some kind of central authority rule through some kind of intermediaries on whom it ultimately was forced to rely.

One hundred and fifty years is not long enough to count?

Not nearly.

But you have not given any convincing arguments as to why an unconquered England should be much more feudal, and much less centralized and stable, and possess much less national loyalty than OTL England.

I never said it should be much more feudal, I said that it will have to develop a native feudalism in the absence of an exported one.

It will be much less centralised in the long-term because the aforementioned proto-feudal noble houses will naturally become more decentralised over time for biological (people breed, families branch off) as well as geographical (disparate lands invite decentralisation) reasons.

It will be less stable because it will not initially have the petty feudal power base the Normans possessed.

It will have a weaker national unity because it will not have foreign (i.e. not initially tied to any of the local English regions in particular) rule.

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ANYHOW, yes, initially the Anglo-Saxon state will probably be a strong and central monarchy, and possibly it will even meddle in French affairs. Still, gradually its ruling monarchy will degenerate, while local feudal institutions will receive further development. At the same time, there will be gradual urban development and stronger trade ties. Various social developments will eventually (read: over the course of two-three centuries or so) allow a revitalisation of the monarchy, possibly under a new dynasty. Weaker (in the long-term, yes, weaker) feudal elements plus literate city-dwellers form primary powerbase for revitalised monarchy; growth of state control over trade (proto-mercantilism), trade is generally a more important factor in policy than in OTL, while dynastic affairs are less important due to less entanglements. End result - Anglo-Saxons go east, either in alliance with the Hanseatic League or against it. Involvement in various Scandinavian and Baltic wars as opposed to French dynastic struggles.

Note, ofcourse, that all that is very hypothetical (I just wanted to make sure that you understand just what exactly am I suggesting here, because I fear I have not explained it clearly enough initially; plus I did revise and upgrade my position after some research). It is distantly possible that the state will break up for real, and much less distantly possible that there still will be major foreign dynastic entanglements and influences. That would be a different matter altogether, ofcourse. What I do doubt is the possibility of a wildly divergent course of social development.
 
Every state worth of the name had some kind of central authority rule through some kind of intermediaries on whom it ultimately was forced to rely.
But every state has not had to relinquinsh sovereignty over land in order to compensate the intermediaries. Hence my earlier statement that a money economy or lack thereof is a more important factor in the development of feudalism than other social or technological considerations. Incidentally, England, both before and after the Conquest, had much more money in circulation than the continental kingdoms.

I never said it should be much more feudal, I said that it will have to develop a native feudalism in the absence of an exported one.
And I still maintain that it will not have to do so. There is an argument that English feudalism was in decline as soon as it was introduced, and it certainly didn't last long. To me, it looks less like the only natural system and more like an unnecessary imposition that was discarded as soon as possible.
It will be much less centralised in the long-term because the aforementioned proto-feudal noble houses will naturally become more decentralised over time for biological (people breed, families branch off) as well as geographical (disparate lands invite decentralisation) reasons.
All of which is perfectly applicable to Norman England.
It will be less stable because it will not initially have the petty feudal power base the Normans possessed.
Which, within a generation after the conquest, had become a liability, as revolts by said feudals gripped large sections of the country, leading, of course, to the near total breakdown in Stephen's reign. If the chief purpose of the establishment of a feudal order in England was to maintain internal order, its consequence tended to be the opposite.

The revised scenario seems more plausible to me. I take it you don't put much stock in the argument that the Normans dramatically increased English ties with the continent, vitalizing English trade and allowing the twelfth century renaissance to spread to England.

Anyway, an odd thought that occurred to me: Napoleon initially wanted a naval career. He was so attached to the idea that, when he couldn't join the French navy, he contemplated going to Portsmouth to join the Royal Navy. Suppose he had actually done it. If nothing else, it raises the amusing prospect of Napoleon and Nelson serving together.
 
I take it you don't put much stock in the argument that the Normans dramatically increased English ties with the continent, vitalizing English trade and allowing the twelfth century renaissance to spread to England.

Well, they certainly did strenghthen dynastic ties and introduce/strenghthen continental cultural elements; on the other hand, the economic ties were not increased dramatically.

Napoleon's alternate careers are a wonderful topic. I myself have often pondered those. There are many potential divergences that could make him serve a whole different cause, though I am not sure if he could be quite as effective in most other occupations. Still, there is always the chance...

The first series of Napeleonic PoDs would deal with the purchase of Corsica. First of all, it is possible that it is never sold in the first place; then he might end up leading a Corsican Republic, or even leading a French-inspired Italian revolution. Alternatively, he might simply try and join any European military; all he would really need is a war, and come French Revolution there will be a lot of that. Perhaps Genoese forces, supported by French allies, stomp out the young Corsican republic, and the revolutionaries, including one Buonoparte, do like the Polish revolutionaries did - and flee to America.

I seem to recall that the British too had wanted to acquire Corsica; it certainly could be used to check/irritate the French, and generally project power. Not sure, but he might make it in the army or the navy. Or maybe he could try his luck in the East Indies...

Sardinians could also buy Corsica, for the sake of aesthetics. Their army wasn't all that bad, and, well, come the French Revolution Napoleon might advance in ranks.

Technically, the Holy Roman Emperor - who reigned in Tuscany - might also buy Corsica; it is a nice ground for his little social experiments. But I rather doubt Napoleon's ability to advance in the Austrian military.

That said, even in OTL, with a French Corsica, Napoleon had indeed wanted to join a lot of foreign armies (and, as you now said, navies). Russian althistorians have long ago noted that he had, for instance, applied to join the Russian army; had that worked out, and it well might have, he could've done very well indeed seeing as the late 18th/early 19th century Russian army was much more meritocratic (at least for foreigners with military education) than one might expect. Russia always had a lot of warfare going on - if its not the Turks, then its a Polish rebellion or at the very least Caucasian tribes. And a lot of that involves sieging places, which would be ideal for Napoleon's career. Come to think of it, Russia might be the best choice for Napoleon (after France, ofcourse), considering its political muddy water in the early 19th century; as Pavel I might as well survive, there would be excellent opportunities to first conquer Europe in the Emperor's name, and then lead your fellow officers in a republican coup d'etat against the clearly insane and tyrannical sovereign. And there you have it - Napoleon Carlovich Bonapart, First Consul of the Russian Republic. ;) Sure, it is extremelly unlikely, but so was his OTL ascent, and this is as good a (non-French) opportunity as he could probably get.

Elsewhere, there is Britain and a naval career; problem is, he will be very overshadowed and politically impotent, unless he were to somehow engineer "the Floating Republic" spilling over into a real British Revolution, and then, as one of the mutiny's heroes, claim power in the resulting mess (I'll bet the Irish at least will support a fellow Catholic stalwartly). But the problem is, Napoleon was simply awful at actual intrigue, so that probably won't work unless he takes some French revolutionary mastermind like Fouche along (and even then, 'tis a stretch).

Searching the SHWI would reveal some more possibilities. For instance, the Directory intended to assist Selim III's military reforms with advisors and suchlike; and indeed, Napoleon Bonaparte was supposed to go to Constantinople before he got distracted by the 13 Vendémiaire. Now, I doubt that he could gain power in the Ottoman Empire (although, he might double-cross it, ally with the Greek nationalists in Greece and the Danubean Provinces, and then rebuild the Byzantine Empire in its full glory ;) ), but such a PoD seriously appeals to me because of its numerous immediate effects. Consider:
- Though the 13 Vendémiaire coup attempt will probably still be defeated, the Directory's power will be further shaken; but on the other hand, the precedent for military intervention will not be set, as Barras will probably be able to deal with the rebellion himself, though not as quickly or thoroughly (perhaps the Directory will even grant amnesty to Chouans again);
- This and the likely failure of the Italian Campaign without Napoleon Bonaparte will result in the Republic - still rather moderate and oligarchic - being put firmly on the defensive. That might work out just fine, though, as far as internal stability is concerned; the Directory might just manage to use this emergency to rally the population around itself, at the same time making sure that the generals are busy fighting off the reactionary counter-offensive;
- Meanwhile, Napoleon Bonaparte will strenghthen both the Franco-Turkish relations and the Ottoman military considerably. And so the Directory might just manage to play the Ottoman card against the rampaging Austria and Russia; certainly the Ottomans could make some progress against the Austrians at least, before an eventual Austro-Russian offensive threatens the empire's survival;
- At which point the moderate French Directory - certainly regarded as more reasonable by the British, who were exhausted by fighting France and at the same time alarmed by the Eastern Question - might easily reach a compromise with Britain;
- And so we might get something as bizzare as an Anglo-Franco-Turkish alliance against Russia and Austria, and possibly Prussia as well. Moderate French republic or parliamentary monarchy, reinvigorated and possibly somewhat egalitarian Ottoman Empire, reactionary crackdowns in Italy, etc.

Ofcourse, I am rambling here, but still.

Not sure where else we could fit Napoleon in. Maybe we could have Bernadotte become the Emperor of France instead, so that Napoleon, as a famed marshall, could become King of Sweden=>Emperor of Scandinavia.
 
(although, he might double-cross it, ally with the Greek nationalists in Greece and the Danubean Provinces, and then rebuild the Byzantine Empire in its full glory ;) )
I enjoy that, but unfortunately it seems to be rather cliché for me to support anything Eastern Roman. It's certainly cooler than the Catherine the Great option. :lol: All of this Napoleon stuff looks cool; unfortunately, don't we already have a very good early 1800s althistorical NES out? Seems like it'd be a good idea to pass on most of these ideas for awhile.

I can't seem to really get up the energy to write anything substantial for that silly 1860s PoD I had going there, so I suppose I can sum up my thoughts on it here. There are a lot of tense changes in there that I'm too lazy to change, so please ignore the horrid grammar.

The basic idea was that this Franco-Austro-Spanish alliance system would end up in a very massive clash with the Brits, North Germans, and Russians over the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans. The Russians naturally want to go after the Straits, and we have already seen an vague sketch of British support, which is likely to increase after the French continue to build up their alliance's military. The French, for their part, will be wanting to use the Ottomans as a bastion against the Russians seriously breaking into the Austrians' rear, aiding the British in the Med (a rather minor concern, but still slightly significant, especially now that the Brits are assisting a minor Russian Black Sea Fleet revival in spite of the terms of the Treaty of Paris). They'll also want to use the Ottomans as a springboard to Egypt (which the British will surely go after de jure in addition to their de facto control) and India. On the other side of the coin, the "Northern Alliance" would be supporting both separatist movements like Bulgaria, the Danubian Principalities, and the Serbs, and also lending significant help to Greece. All of this is likely to explode a little sooner than the actual Serbian and Montenegrin war in 1876, mainly due to added pressure and increased interest; 1874 seems like a good date.

This will probably not be a rapid war. The French will be mainly concentrating on eliminating the Italians from the picture and preserving the lifeline to Austria through southern Germany. A limited offensive into Belgium is possible, mainly to distract German and British attention away from launching what very may well be a killing blow in Bavaria and Baden. Spain's main goal will be preventing war with Portugal long enough to eliminate Gibraltar. Maximilian and the British will be vying for the support of Portugal, and this is much more of a realistic contest than at any other time in Portuguese history, since the British are mildly opposing them colonially, and the King is generally split between Liberals and Conservatives, preferring to dabble with his fish instead. There will probably be a Portuguese Civil War, and this time it is unlikely that the British will beat a Franco-Spanish combination. In Italy, the French and Austrians will be able to exploit their rear position in control of the Patrimony of St. Peter, which will probably lead to a rapid fall of the north of the country. The south is likely to desire Austrian control rather than continue under the Liberal mantle from Turin, but the British will be able to, with naval superiority, seize Sicily and Sardinia at the very least and a landing on the heel or the toe of the boot is not out of the question, although they may very well get chased out of that arena as well as Iberia.

In Germany, things are a good deal more complex. Von Moltke is unlikely to take the bait the French will offer in Belgium, leaving that to the Belgians and a token Anglo-German force; instead, he will concentrate all on splitting France and Austria, to leave Austria to wither on the vine or, worse yet, fall to concentrated pummels across the Carpathians from the Russians. The French and Austrians will need to meet this force on force, as a blow through Silesia is unlikely to succeed and it will be nearly impossible to cut through Poland. Austria's only hope is to preserve the land connection to France long enough to smash Italy - which will probably take until 1875-6 - and that requires a standoff at minimum in southern Germany. The Austrians and French will have the benefit of having the South German army on their side; unlike the OTL Franco-Prussian War, the French will have had more time to integrate their army with the mitrailleuse. However, there is no real alternative to excellent artillery at this point, and now that the Austrians have had the benefit of French influence, training, and weaponry, they have a good mix of mitrailleuse and regular artillery, whereas the Prussians simply have the good artillery. On the other hand, North Germany (I know I'm using this interchangeably with Prussia, but I don't care) has the invaluable staff and reserve systems. Those will have a major effect on the outcome, such that the North Germans should be able to penetrate very quickly very rapidly, and in the first month or so we should see a battle near Ulm. I don't think that the North Germans can win that early battle though, even though they can concentrate superior numbers, mainly due to the closeness of the Austrian army and their lack of need to mobilize reserves due to their large professional army - and especially their excellent cavalry, which could help play a good reconnaissance role. After about a month or six weeks, we should see a very major battle - on the scale of Leipzig - between the North Germans and the allies in the vicinity of Augsburg, in which the North Germans are hampered by damage to their supply lines (caused by those darned jägers, which replace the francs-tireurs in this world) as well as the technical advantages of the chassepot and the mitrailleuse/Austrian arty combo. The inherent defensive advantages of fighting on home ground will help the allies win the battle. This is the battle that saves France, but it is too late for Austria, which basically lost the war when it started.

In the Balkans, 1874 is a rough year for France's allies, mainly because of the Russo-British command of the waves. The Russians and Brits have helped reorganize the Greeks, Montenegrins, and Danubians (soon to be renamed) and their militaries into new model armies capable of beating up on the Turks, who simply didn't have the kind of time to overhaul their military. There will be no Plevna to save the Ottoman Empire, because the Greeks will strike north for Salonica, the Montenegrins will seize Scutari and north Albania, and the Serbs will run rampant, though a small Austrian force will keep them in check in Bosnia, which the Habsburgs will occupy so as to prevent the allies from having it. Russian troops will flood over the Danube and swarm through Rumelia, and the Brits will land a small expeditionary force in conjunction with the Greeks at Gallipoli, and the Ottoman Empire will basically collapse on the fall of its capital after a Russo-British combined naval and land storming operation and the capture of most of the European portion of the Turkish military in Rumelia by the combined advance of the Greeks, Serbs, and Russians. Most of the rest of the war on this front after the fall of Constantinople in 1875 will be aimed at occupation of the remaining Ottoman territories and cleaning out pockets of resistance. The British will seize the Levant in its entirety, the Russians will grab Armenia and large chunks of eastern Anatolia, and the Greeks will be denied Constantinople but compensated with basically all of the Aegean coastline and a good deal of inland Anatolia, perhaps to Ancyra. However, most of Anatolia will remain unoccupied due to fierce Turkish resistance, and there will be Arab uprisings in the Hejaz and Libya, although those will probably be pro-British. Mesopotamia is a bit of an unknown - I think that even this huge amount of imperialism is going a bit far already, but I really don't see much of an alternative for Britain. It's really a bad idea for them to let Russia have it all, and they know that, but it's also extremely difficult to absorb this kind of territory. Ottoman survival is very unlikely at this point in time, especially since they are so much more outnumbered than in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8, and they only barely survived that. I just don't see much of an alternative for Britain to try here, but I also know that Disraeli (who is in charge as opposed to that vexing Gladstone, but who is still (grudgingly) getting involved in the war, of course) is far too smart to try to swallow the Empire whole. Any suggestions as to the later state of the Ottoman Empire would be great.

Meanwhile, we see the Russians slowly encircling Austria. In the first year, Galicia has already fallen and Alexander II's men are already scrambling through the Transylvanian Alps; by the second, despite increasing direct French support, the combination of a Hungarian uprising and pressure on all sides slowly causes the Habsburgs to break down in the middle of their great political reorganization. By 1876, Hungary is lost, and the Russians, Germans, and Magyars will be attacking Vienna's great fortress complex early the next year. This is combined with a renewed advance by the North Germans in Bavaria, where with the withdrawal of the Austrians to defend their homeland, they finally manage to beat the French in a sanguinary contest in the Black Forest, mainly decided through French strategic encirclement and the relative lack of French troops available due to overstretch, and begin to press on towards the French borders. The French have the Italian ulcer to deal with, they have comprehensively lost the naval war in both Mediterranean and Atlantic, and save in Iberia and Belgium their allies are on the retreat. Reluctantly, Napoleon III opens peace negotiations two weeks after Algiers finally falls to the British, in early 1877. The war has been one of the bloodiest in European history, primarily because of the North German failure at Augsburg (which prolonged the war) and the continued resistance of the Turks and Austrians, who are holding out in the Tyrol and Dalmatia at war's end.

The treaty is critical. Signed in Frankfurt, it opens the door to entirely new avenues of European relations. Naturally, it is the death of two Empires, that of the Habsburgs and Ottomans, that is the primary function of the peace talks, but colonial considerations also are high on the list. Russia annexes about as much as the British would let them, including Moldavia, Galicia, and chunks of Armenia. A new Hungarian republic is set up, roughly with the borders of the OTL Ausgleich Kingdom of Hungary, with about the same political structure. Austria and Bohemia, along with the South German Confederation, are awarded to Otto von Bismarck's North Germany, which re-forms into a true national German Empire. While this is contrary to von Bismarck's initial vision of Germany, he knows that a counterbalance to Russia is necessary, and a focus on the land - i.e. against Russia - is necessary to guarantee British support, and besides, the German military and political leadership is already clamoring for a renewal of the great Drang nach Osten. While Disraeli himself is very leery of the new German Empire, he is also very aware that Russia is growing altogether too rapidly, and reestablishing the dead Habsburg Empire is out of the question at this point. France herself loses no continental possessions, and is indeed rewarded in Italy, which is divided into a French puppet Kingdom of Italy in the north - including the Patrimony of St. Peter - and in the south, the British protectorate Kingdom of the Two Sicilies is revived under Habsburg leadership to give them something to do, although a personal union with Spain was utterly forbidden, and Maximilian and his heirs were prevented from taking the throne in Naples. Spain is forced to relinquish Gibraltar, but is allowed to annex small slices of Portuguese territory on the border - a significant fortress here, a critical town there - as well as Andorra (at this point, Napoleon III really didn't care much) and - surprise surprise - Sardinia, for which the Spanish had traded Portugal in the negotiations. The Balkans were a good deal more confusing, but they were eventually sorted out - the Serbs grew enormously, annexing Bosnia and Dalmatia, as well as a chunk of northern Macedonia, mainly as a result of Anglo-German patronage and an unwillingness to create any more small, weak states for the Germans and Russians respectively to steamroll. The Russians initially wanted to create a Bulgarian state as well as their puppet Wallachia (or the southern chunk of the Danubian Principalities), but the British didn't want them to expand any more than absolutely necessary and therefore lumped the Bulgarians in with the Greeks, about which the Bulgarians were most unhappy. Constantinople itself was a very big sticking point, the British not entirely having reconciled themselves to Russian control and the Russians wanting something for fighting in the bloody war, and of course neither would consent to Greek rule, since those silly provincials were already getting way more than they had fought for. The idea of an international "free city" was brought up, with a council of clerics - Sunni and Greek Orthodox - controlling the city, but nobody really liked that either, so the Russians and British decided to let the Russians have the city, as well as the entire European coast of the Bosphorus, but to not allow the Russians any fortifications there whatsoever. The Greeks were allowed much of their "occupation zone" (in reality, they didn't do much occupying and instead a good deal of pillaging, and even then in only a small area of the territory) in Anatolia to annex, extending as far east as Attaleia, Ipsos, Dorylaion, and Herakleia Pontika, as well as most of the Aegean Islands and Crete, but Rhodes was given to the British on a 99-year lease, and Cyprus was directly made a colony of the Crown. A Turkish Republic was establish in central Anatolia, between the British-allied Greeks and the Russians, which controlled the Pontic coast (rapidly exacting justice on the Greeks who lived there just as the Greeks, Serbs, and Rumanians were slaughtering the Turks who lived in their designated zones), Ankara, and Antioch, and which was allowed nominal control of Mesopotamia, with a similar arrangement there as had existed with Egypt previously. Egypt and the Levant were of course annexed directly to Britain. Colonially, the French were allowed to retain conquered Algeria, and the British took over Libya and established a Hejaz protectorate, but really not much had happened. The French had been entirely content to concentrate on Europe, to the detriment of their endeavours elsewhere, such as in Siam, China, West Africa, and Abyssinia, which had been more or less ignored by the British.

The end result of the war, of course, is the reversion to the condition some call "international anarchy" and what I call good diplomacy. There were no overriding alliances at the end of the Great European War (they rejected the name "War of the Eighth Coalition" because France had had her own coalition too, and besides it was too long and sanguine for one of those wars); France and Spain had very good relations, of course, but there was some trans-Pyrenean rivalry between the two, especially as Spain rejoined the search for colonies in Africa. Germany and France, while not particularly liking each other, didn't really have absurd hatred between them, since the Germans were definitely oriented east and the French were just trying to recover from the immense expense of the war in blood and treasure, and didn't want to needlessly make enemies. Russia was fairly isolated, although the Tsar had a good rapport with France, mainly due to the lack of conflicting interests. The Germans and the British got along well enough, especially since the British had no real German navy about which to worry, but the industrial colossus headquartered at Berlin was still putting shivers down various MPs' spines. The main rivalry, of course, was that of Britain and Russia. These two worked together very infrequently, and the contest between the two, later called the "Great Game", was renewed in Central Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and even (to a lesser extent) Scandinavia.

British internal politics underwent a shift of their own. Disraeli's Conservatives had been the ones to lead Britain into an unquestionably victorious war, albeit against their collective will - and besides, they'd managed to pick up a few good new colonies here and there too, hadn't they? It cannot be said that Britain withdrew from Europe after the Great European War, but they focused much more on colonial adventures from here on out with the new power the Conservatives brought to the helm. Even Gladstone, in his eternal seesaw of power with Disraeli, concentrated more on the colonies, although his tenures were more of a look at internal British politics than anything across the waves, and when he did dabble in foreign adventures, more often than not he chose to align with Liberal-leaning powers like Habsburg Spain and - later, as we shall see - the German Empire. All in all, the next few decades were a period of consolidation and expansion in the colonial field.

In France, the Emperor held on to power, despite several coup attempts in 1877 and 1878, and oversaw a revitalization of the French economy in the 1880s following the usual postwar slump. This was quickly reinvested into colonial expansion in West Africa, where the Emperor made sure to stay out of the way of the British. Upon his death in 1881, his son Napoleon IV began to reorganize the army on German lines, especially with the general staff school, and under his reign more than any other's in Europe France advanced by leaps and bounds in the sphere of military technology and theory.

Spain, under Maximilian I, entered a little golden age. The remaining colonial possessions Spain had were quickly reorganized and the few pangs of native unrest in Cuba and the Philippines were quickly overridden by Madrid's program to Liberalize the empire. More than previously, Spain found its interests repeatedly against those of France...and the United States of America, which was doing its own little thing. Greater involvement in the Mediterranean and limited inroads into the Two Sicilies also aided the recovery of Spanish commerce.

Otto von Bismarck's Germany enjoyed its flowering as a true Great Power in these years. Germany's great industrial potential was exploited more and more each year, and in this country compared with many other workers' rights were recognized early on. Indeed, von Bismarck decided to go along with the Liberals and later the Socialists in their attempts to secure first universal male suffrage and then greater workers' rights. Von Bismarck himself didn't really care about the workers, but he wanted to have complete control over the Reichstag in order to remain unquestionably in power and to continue with his diplomatic program of keeping everyone but himself relatively isolated. The German military was reintegrated, incorporating elements of the Austrian and South German armies and concentrating more on mobility. Von Moltke's successors were, along with the French, the first to realize the effect that railroads and the increase in firepower had on the balance between defense and offense, and they made every effort to increase troop mobility to offset this.

Russia under Alexander II struggled a bit. Success in the War was wonderful, but there were still growing undercurrents of dissatisfaction in the intelligentsia. The movements of nihilism and of Marxism found the greatest purchase in the Russian intellectual elite, despite government movements to not only free the serfs but to decentralize a little (it was mostly nominal, but it was a step) by creating the regional zemstvo councils. Threats against the Tsar's life grew and several assassination attempts were foiled, until finally Alexander combined not only harsh repressive actions (including the near destruction of the People's Will organization) but also decided to give a carrot as well, creating a relatively powerless state duma, which technically only had the power to recommend courses of action but whose "recommendations" Alexander generally followed anyway, because they were mostly extremely limited in scope.

Of the Balkan countries, Greece faced a great deal of nationalistic trouble in finally uniting the realm, but the Bulgarians and the few remaining Turks were gradually brought into line following a carrot and stick combination of harsh repression and increasing Liberalization. Serbia on the other hand simply grew more repressive. Under the leadership of King Milan Obrenovic, the Bosnian Muslims were nearly wiped out, and the Croats in the realm were forced into hiding. Three Karageorgevic-led uprisings were crushed, although the last one managed to take and hold Sarajevo, second city of the Kingdom, for a month, and also showed signs of technical support from Germany. Wallachia was a nice, quiet Russian puppet, and did as it was told; Hungary, under a fairly stable Liberal government, managed to reverse most of the Austrian Reichsföderalreform ethnic projects and reestablish a semblance of Magyar population in most of the areas controlled from Budapest. Internationally, the Hungarians generally aligned with the Russians against the Germans.

America was an interesting sideshow to the great events taking place in Europe. The Confederate States, despite the fall of Richmond in 1864, were certainly not dead, and the wraith that passed for the rebels was reformed under the leadership of John S. Mosby, Nathan B. Forrest, and J.E.B. Stuart into a council of regional jäger groups, such as Forrest's Ku Klux Klan in the Deep South, Mosby's Virginian organization Gray Riders, and Stuart off in the Great Plains with the native-allied Freedom's Sons. Indeed, it was Stuart who wreaked the greatest havoc on the Federal effort to reestablish a semblance of order in the United States, as he helped to rally the natives in the series of Plains Wars that the federal army was forced to fight all over the western two-thirds of the United States. Lincoln ended his presidency due to exhaustion and repeated assassination attempts in 1868 - even his conciliatory attempts had been rebuffed by the Radical Republican-controlled Congress, which refused to readmit most of the former Confederacy while they were still engaging in jäger warfare - after having come so close to victory in reestablishing national unity. His Republican Party retained power, though, electing first Lincoln's faithful Vice President, Hannibal Hamlin, in 1868, and then replacing him with war hero, prominent Plains commander - victor of the Battle of Bozeman, where a large-scale Southern/Lakota attack under Stuart's personal command was repulsed - and compromise candidate William Sherman in 1872. Sherman's Presidency saw extremely harsh repressive actions against the white Southerners (including radical measures such as allowing their former slaves to redistribute much land amongst themselves and instituting some labor laws - this of course didn't really help the agricultural output of the region, but the new inventions of the time, such as the McCormick reaper, did, and so production increased anyway) but relatively conciliatory ones towards many natives, who were still forced onto reservations - but those reservations had significantly better land and were much larger than Hannibal Hamlin's original plan. As a result, the Republican coalition of the northern businessmen and the workers began to split apart. Sherman ended his Presidency in 1876 after narrowly avoiding a scandal over treatment of the defeated South and the white citizens there. The Democrats, having a bit of a revival in the North, managed to defeat James G. Blaine and take the White House with their own war hero, George Armstrong Custer, and his Vice President, Samuel Tilden. Under Custer, the Southern states were gradually readmitted to the Union and the Democratic power bloc was strengthened. The Republicans, the party now of the newly-freed blacks and of the white working class, was forced to relinquish control of many seats.

That's it. What do you think?
 
Well, I don't really have any criticisms considering my own inadequate knowledge of the time period but...

I despise the Spanish annexation of Andorra at least :p
 
I enjoy that

Thought you might. ;) Seriously though, Ypsilanti strikes me as a Napoleon wanna-be (enlightened legal reform? civil code? imperial glory?); now, if we were to replace him with Corporal Corsica, his plans just might have worked.

All of this Napoleon stuff looks cool; unfortunately, don't we already have a very good early 1800s althistorical NES out?

Yours is middle 19th century (I do hate it when people call 19th century 1800s; 1800s is the Cthulhu-damned first decade of that century, to use that for anything else is confusing), while mine is sadly stagnating (and likely to become a bit too similar to yours in some places). Still, Republican Russian hegemony over Europe looks rather appealing to me, especially as it is bound to come crushing, but not before Napoleon and his lieutenants (such as Pestel and Yermolov) make a big mess of things. Lots of possibilities there, and I'm pretty sure it hasn't been done before. Plus I think I owe Tsar Paul one after the British Revolution althist.

Anyhow, interesting developments.

Any suggestions as to the later state of the Ottoman Empire would be great.

Well, it might survive, though much diminished and largely dependant on Britain both economically and politically. The British may well take over Libya and Hejaz, and I don't see why not Iraq as well - it is close enough to India and British commercial interests are stronger there, though they will be using some puppet Arab king. Presumably Russia will annex Greater Armenia, and possibly Trebzond as well; that leaves the Turks with Thrace, non-Armenian Anatolia, Kurdistan and the Levant. Control over the latter two is likely to degenerate over time as well, as regional authorities will be capable of securing de facto independence with British support. The Levant might do very well in this althist, actually, as an economically-prosperous cosmopolitan informal British protectorate, though at a later time it might succumb to sectarian strife. Kurdistan will see Russo-British jockeying. As for Turkey itself, it might be just small enough to succesfully reform and modernise (under pro-British liberals with nationalist elements, most probably), and maybe even try to reestablish some of its influence.

Anyhow, the Great Game will probably expand into the former Ottoman Empire. Hard to predict the outcome, though for the 19th century the British will probably do fine.

French puppet Kingdom of Italy in the north - including the Patrimony of St. Peter

Would they want to retain a kingdom? I think a loose confederacy - possibly headed by the Pope, and locally governed by traditional local dynasties - is generally better.

lumped the Bulgarians in with the Greeks, about which the Bulgarians were most unhappy.

Very unhappy. Are the Greeks capable of holding on to a Bulgaria in the midst of a nationalist revival? I suspect Bulgarians will rebel all the same.

Russians and British decided to let the Russians have the city

Nah. Well, I already posted my thoughts on the Ottoman Empire. I don't think the British are going to let it be dismantled, its too damn convenient, and the Russians won't really be able (or willing; Alexander II certainly doesn't seem to have been particularily enthusiastic about actually taking Constantinople) to insist.

Spain rejoined the search for colonies in Africa.

That's promising; with both France and Britain less interested in the region, the Spanish might snatch something good for themselves.

Greece faced a great deal of nationalistic trouble in finally uniting the realm, but the Bulgarians and the few remaining Turks were gradually brought into line following a carrot and stick combination of harsh repression and increasing Liberalization.

See, I really doubt they would have the time they need to reintegrate Bulgaria. Too much nationalism, and Russians are even more likely to support an anti-Greek rebellion as an anti-Turkish one, because the former has better chances of succeeding.

What do you think?

Time for imperialism. I think Mexico might well be even more messy than in OTL, and the reinvigorated Spaniards are likely to meddle. Maybe they could get a militaristic France along for the ride and have a little war with the Americans near the century's end, while the British sit on the sidelines and gloat as their enemies beat each other up. Meanwhile, the Great Game is ofcourse ongoing, as is the colonial race. Not so much French involvement as in OTL, but more of the Spanish one, and, though you'd dislike it, the German one as well (the position in Europe is secure, the industry is prospering, so one might as well begin establishing a colonial empire). I think there might be a stronger Far Eastern focus, though; the Germans might even try and replace the French in Vietnam, so as to establish a strong base for further interference in China. Russia - likely to focus on Asian expansion as well - might sign a secret agreement with Germany to break the British monopoly on trade and influence in China. The Qing will probably remain with the British, so we could look forward to Sino-Russian and Sino-German border wars late in the 19th/early in 20th centuries. As for France, the survival of the Second Empire will allow it to retain its not-inconsiderable influence in Japan, which will be less of a British ally and more of a French one. France will have less influence in the Far East, but a good alliance with Japan migth be enough to replace it. The Franco-Japanese alliance will probably support the Qing and the British in the Far Eastern Great Game, in exchange for... concessions. Qing China might yet reform succesfully with this assistance, or it might fall after military defeats.

Still, not nearly as much imperialism in Africa as in OTL until the next geopolitical revolution, I suspect. I don't think a world war situation will develop out of the Mexican and Chinese conflicts, or the lesser proxy wars, though they might work as a build-up; possibly after these subside, greater attention will turn to Africa, and after that is partitioned a world war will come. Russia, Germany and USA versus Britain, France, Spain, Japan and China in, say, the 1920s might be the culminative conflict of this age.
 
Russia, Germany, AND America on one side? Game over :p

Dachs, we can never have too many Industrial NES' especially if one is yours. I have a feeling your modding skill would be incredible :D
 
Russia, Germany, AND America on one side? Game over :p

'Tis not quite so simple. They are facing the sheer naval and economic might of Britain, the very modern and reformed Imperial French army, the reinvigorated Spain that might even be in control of Mexico (sure, why not? If we do have France and Spain against USA, chances are that the European militaries might win in Mexico and the sea, intimidating Americans into surrender, though after that there will be revanchism and major military reforms...), a modernised and militarily-competent but probably underestimated Japan and last but not least China (which the British, the French and the Japanese might just manage to succesfully prop up, reform and modernise, in which case it would be a pretty serious enemy).

So it really might go either way.

Btw, the unholy Anglo-French Entente is likely to seriously prop up any residual Confederate movements; I am increasingly convinced that this hypothetical world war will have an American front, as Spanish, French and British forces invade the South with assistance from separatists (to whose reprisals against blacks the blind eye is turned). At any rate, that should be quite brutal.
 
'Tis not quite so simple. They are facing the sheer naval and economic might of Britain, the very modern and reformed Imperial French army,

Does france have belgium? No? Then don't hold your breath ;).

the reinvigorated Spain that might even be in control of Mexico (sure, why not? If we do have France and Spain against USA, chances are that the European militaries might win in Mexico and the sea, intimidating Americans into surrender, though after that there will be revanchism and major military reforms...),

Even a 'reinvigorated' Spain will be a overstreched pissant till the second industrial revolution at least ;), with little industry and poor demographics.

Btw, the unholy Anglo-French Entente is likely to seriously prop up any residual Confederate movements; I am increasingly convinced that this hypothetical world war will have an American front, as Spanish, French and British forces invade the South with assistance from separatists (to whose reprisals against blacks the blind eye is turned). At any rate, that should be quite brutal.

I pretty sure even a 'blind eye' would still bring about great dissent at home, though not nearly as much as Financers screams over their american investments ;).
 
If we do have France and Spain against USA, chances are that the European militaries might win in Mexico and the sea, intimidating Americans into surrender, though after that there will be revanchism and major military reforms...)
What sort of morons in France would ship their advanced Imperial Army to Mexico when they have Germany right next door to deal with and would have to trust the British Fleet to get them there? :p They have to win the sea first, then somehow hold off Germany and Russia while propping up a minor victory in a different hemisphere against someone who is not their main opponent. That just makes no sense at all, and would greatly irritate that US to boot instead of likely doing anything to make it surrender, as they'd likely have to push it back into its native territory for that (which would generally be bad for them, Mexican and American history [and American and British history] being what it is at that stage--Mexico likely wanting its territory back, which I have hard time believing even hardcore Southerners would tolerate the loss of as many of them [or their commanders] fought to take it, and having been screwed by both France and Britain previously, not to mention crippled and then being in the process of reconciliation with the Northern government; see also South Africa post Boer War).

So they'd have to fight a two-front land war against America in the Western hemisphere which they would have a hard time resupplying and would be outnumbered and outgunned in, a sea war against all three powers (limited though their Navies might be even the British Navy cannot be everywhere at once), and a land war in Europe, and possibly the Far East. Forgive me for believing their resources--France's and Britain's in particular--would be a little bit too divided to just ship over forces to knock out America ASAP. In which case it would mostly fall on the Spanish alone.

Nevermind that even if they won, they would be greatly depleted, and Monsieur de Tocqueville was quite correct in his statements--the Anglo-French-Spanish alliance would be facing the three most rapidly industrializing nations in the world very shortly into the future, and all three would be very, very angry. Pyrrhic victory, even on the off-chance it happens; they'd be hobbled in the war and the next one would be like the three laws of thermodynamics: can't win, can't break even, can't quit the game.
 
I have to agree with the two previous statements.

Britian needs serious industrial reform (this is the WWI analogue correct? well the 1920 one anyway, it'll have lagged behind again. Although I would like more discussion on this point, not 100% on it. IF its the american Civil war, well Britin gets it restructuring a bit earlier, frankly right on time really). Although at this point its still likly to outproduce Germany and Russia.

France, lacks the potential areas of growth, and is if anything just as vunrable as OTL wars have shown to its major industries being taken out. (well the few examples of that *cough*).

Spain, demographs... simply put. they start off in a worse situation than USA, German, Russia, as mentioned by sympth the most rapidly industrilising nations in the world. And they'd have to grow quicker to actually get to a point where they'd be more than a minor power.

The only comparative advantange they have is in starting military resources, meaning: They require a quick blitzkreig type victory to kill pressure off from the european nations; Germany/Russia. USA, well a bit of a different approach, but if you can get the USA paralysing itself with witch hunts [seccesionists], that might go a long way to help the situation.
 
Britian needs serious industrial reform (this is the WWI analogue correct? well the 1920 one anyway, it'll have lagged behind again. Although I would like more discussion on this point, not 100% on it. IF its the american Civil war, well Britin gets it restructuring a bit earlier, frankly right on time really). Although at this point its still likly to outproduce Germany and Russia.
Last date for the American section is 1876 and there's no war immediately on the horizon, which pushes it off to probably around 1890 at the earliest for a kick-off date if there is one at all, meaning...

USA, well a bit of a different approach, but if you can get the USA paralysing itself with witch hunts [seccesionists], that might go a long way to help the situation.
... the witch hunts as they were, will long since be over (and have mostly already occurred) and will likely consist mostly of old-timers or diehard groups like the KKK, not that they can really do all that much. I again point to the example of South Africa wherein much brutality was inflicted in the Boer War and yet less than 20 years later they stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the British in a European war which didn't affect them.

If the Europeans were to invade the South in the hopes of propping up extremists, and the South were to have come around to anything like at all near the same opinion (which it did, and retains to this day despite all the continued talk of "the war of Northern aggression"--you can't drive 25 miles in the South on a Highway without seeing some gigantic American flag somewhere, in my experience), then it's going to be bloody, and not for the Americans. It's also important to keep in mind the bulk of the Confederate Army was composed of poor whites, who didn't enjoy the benefits of the Southern aristocracy any more than did the slaves, and with that aristocracy discredited, dead, or in hiding, and the states reintegrated and slaves freed, well, there's rather not much left to fight for, particularly as they'll be "the previous generation" by the time any war rolls around.

Add on top of this that it will mostly be Spanish troops fighting them in such a case (for reasons previously discussed) with maybe token British and French units (the British mostly conducting sea affairs in the Western Hemisphere probably, as they will have to help France on the Continent, and probably more concerned about the fate of Canada, and the French being rather distracted by Germany), and as previously mentioned, a reinvigorated Spain is still nothing spectacular, and I do not think that situation looks terribly good for the Western Europeans if it should even come to war--which I don't see to begin with, particularly from Britain on one side or the United States on the other.
 
Last date for the American section is 1876 and there's no war immediately on the horizon, which pushes it off to probably around 1890 at the earliest for a kick-off date if there is one at all, meaning....

I do doubt there being another round so soon. and the reaction to the civil war and its aftermath will if anything allow for a greater militirisation of the USA. Which is just bad from the Brits+French PoV.


... the witch hunts as they were, will long since be over (and have mostly already occurred) and will likely consist mostly of old-timers or diehard groups like the KKK, not that they can really do all that much. I again point to the example of South Africa wherein much brutality was inflicted in the Boer War and yet less than 20 years later they stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the British in a European war which didn't affect them.

If the Europeans were to invade the South in the hopes of propping up extremists, and the South were to have come around to anything like at all near the same opinion (which it did, and retains to this day despite all the continued talk of "the war of Northern aggression"--you can't drive 25 miles in the South on a Highway without seeing some gigantic American flag somewhere, in my experience), then it's going to be bloody, and not for the Americans. It's also important to keep in mind the bulk of the Confederate Army was composed of poor whites, who didn't enjoy the benefits of the Southern aristocracy any more than did the slaves, and with that aristocracy discredited, dead, or in hiding, and the states reintegrated and slaves freed, well, there's rather not much left to fight for, particularly as they'll be "the previous generation" by the time any war rolls around.

Add on top of this that it will mostly be Spanish troops fighting them in such a case (for reasons previously discussed) with maybe token British and French units (the British mostly conducting sea affairs in the Western Hemisphere probably, as they will have to help France on the Continent, and probably more concerned about the fate of Canada, and the French being rather distracted by Germany), and as previously mentioned, a reinvigorated Spain is still nothing spectacular, and I do not think that situation looks terribly good for the Western Europeans if it should even come to war--which I don't see to begin with, particularly from Britain on one side or the United States on the other.

Of course. I begin to take issue with my statement when I say that Germany+Russia need to be swept aside.

Frankly I can only see The British/French and Spain winning if they seek to isolate their opponants and take them out one at a time, using their overwhelming military force to take them out. This reaches a problem with the USA as its hard to put this military force on the ground, and by that point, the USA is probably equal if not better. [assuming(!) that the initial isolation works]


Although I'm sure getting the British+French+Spain to win is not impossible, das just has to be smart about it, if thats what he wants. And hey whats a war without upstarts and suprises.
 
Frankly I can only see The British/French and Spain winning if they seek to isolate their opponants and take them out one at a time, using their overwhelming military force to take them out. This reaches a problem with the USA as its hard to put this military force on the ground, and by that point, the USA is probably equal if not better. [assuming(!) that the initial isolation works]
Except you can't really isolate one by one. If you try and take the USA out, Germany and Russia get free time to maul the power bases in Europe, and they are by far the greater imminent threat. Meanwhile, both of them are basically back-to-back territory wise and can assist one another in Europe rather easily. So no matter what's done, none of them can be easily isolated sufficiently to justify the risk of doing so (or it's not possible at all).

Although I'm sure getting the British+French+Spain to win is not impossible, das just has to be smart about it, if thats what he wants. And hey whats a war without upstarts and suprises.
But das isn't the one writing it. ;)
 
Except you can't really isolate one by one. If you try and take the USA out, Germany and Russia get free time to maul the power bases in Europe, and they are by far the greater imminent threat. Meanwhile, both of them are basically back-to-back territory wise and can assist one another in Europe rather easily. So no matter what's done, none of them can be easily isolated sufficiently to justify the risk of doing so (or it's not possible at all).


But das isn't the one writing it. ;)

Yes, that was the (!). Any defeat of russia, germany and the USA is going to come from internal issues, almost inspite of the West European powers.

And apologies dachs. :blush:
 
I agree that the Americans are a bit too powerful. I still think that a more militaristic and aggressive USA is likely to clash with an assertive, somewhat paranoid Britain. So it is not exactly impossible.

Spain will probably have some time to develop itself into something more manageable, so yes, unless they fully succeed in reconquering Mexico Spain will still not be much of a great power. I still would argue that France would be much better off here, under Bonapartist management and without wasting as much resources at the colonial race.

Germany could perhaps be knocked out, though that might be hard to achieve. I agree that USA and Russia will then have to be destroyed with a mix of attrition and domestic sabotage. Still, it is obviously more likely that the Triple Alliance will come out victorious.
 
A Triple Alliance victory would seem kinda boring though...if the other side wins, you have a USA-Russia-Germany all likely to diverge into seperate extremist (although kinda cliche'd) paths. If you have the Triple Alliance win, you get a world divided into three spheres of influence.

If I recall, that only das NES to fail was based on the world being divided into three spheres of influence :p
 
I am truly overjoyed at the response this has gotten. As for the comments, a quotefest:

alex994 said:
I despise the Spanish annexation of Andorra at least
The polar bears like Maximilian, man! He's certainly better to have around than, say, Napoleon III!

I know that the whole Ottoman Empire thing was pretty far out, and there are definitely biases coming in there, but it must be noted that Greece is basically in a state of anarchy right now, with Athens only exercising effective control over the original Kingdom plus a little bit of Thessaly, with only nominal authority over the remainder of its territory. I might just change that, though, since the philhellenism is getting a bit rampant around here.

das said:
Would they want to retain a kingdom? I think a loose confederacy - possibly headed by the Pope, and locally governed by traditional local dynasties - is generally better.
Yeah, I'd forgotten that Napoleon III proposed that at Villafranca (IIRC)...and that was a rather popular idea. Whoops.

das said:
Time for imperialism. I think Mexico might well be even more messy than in OTL, and the reinvigorated Spaniards are likely to meddle. Maybe they could get a militaristic France along for the ride and have a little war with the Americans near the century's end, while the British sit on the sidelines and gloat as their enemies beat each other up.
That's entirely probable - I hadn't considered bringing along the French, but the Spanish-American War will indeed happen, and with a somewhat different outcome and location. If France does get involved in a war with America, only token land support would be granted - perhaps an "American Expeditionary Force" or something similarly named. 'Twould be a good test for the New Model Army, in any event. Such a war would probably take place in the late 1880s, after the Americans get fed up with Spanish dabbling in the new Mexican civil wars. The other Great Powers probably won't get involved early on at least, mainly because of apathy...and I still have to figure out the actual course of the war itself.

das said:
Meanwhile, the Great Game is of course ongoing, as is the colonial race. Not so much French involvement as in OTL, but more of the Spanish one, and, though you'd dislike it, the German one as well (the position in Europe is secure, the industry is prospering, so one might as well begin establishing a colonial empire).
Yes, if I were playing Germany at this juncture, I would definitely still not establish any colonies, but unfortunately - or fortunately - Panda or someone like him is. Besides, von Bismarck's reasons for staying out of colonialism were always flimsy at best, and even he didn't follow them all the time.

das said:
I think there might be a stronger Far Eastern focus, though; the Germans might even try and replace the French in Vietnam, so as to establish a strong base for further interference in China. Russia - likely to focus on Asian expansion as well - might sign a secret agreement with Germany to break the British monopoly on trade and influence in China. The Qing will probably remain with the British, so we could look forward to Sino-Russian and Sino-German border wars late in the 19th/early in 20th centuries. As for France, the survival of the Second Empire will allow it to retain its not-inconsiderable influence in Japan, which will be less of a British ally and more of a French one. France will have less influence in the Far East, but a good alliance with Japan might be enough to replace it. The Franco-Japanese alliance will probably support the Qing and the British in the Far Eastern Great Game, in exchange for...concessions. Qing China might yet reform successfully with this assistance, or it might fall after military defeats.
I hadn't yet given much thought to East Asia yet, but all of that does sound reasonable, and if/when I develop this more, those proposals will certainly figure highly.

Azale said:
Dachs, we can never have too many Industrial NES' especially if one is yours. I have a feeling your modding skill would be incredible
I have doubts about my ability to keep it up for long enough to satisfy those involved, although I can run a mean pencil and paper game, especially on high adventure trips. This will definitely be at the top of my list should I ever choose to mod, though.

das said:
Btw, the unholy Anglo-French Entente is likely to seriously prop up any residual Confederate movements; I am increasingly convinced that this hypothetical world war will have an American front, as Spanish, French and British forces invade the South with assistance from separatists (to whose reprisals against blacks the blind eye is turned). At any rate, that should be quite brutal.
While not all of this is spot on, I would like to caution against serious spoilers via good guessing. It's like you're all Harry Potter fans or something. :lol:

Symphony D. said:
Nevermind that even if they won, they would be greatly depleted, and Monsieur de Tocqueville was quite correct in his statements--the Anglo-French-Spanish alliance would be facing the three most rapidly industrializing nations in the world very shortly into the future, and all three would be very, very angry. Pyrrhic victory, even on the off-chance it happens; they'd be hobbled in the war and the next one would be like the three laws of thermodynamics: can't win, can't break even, can't quit the game.
This quote, especially the last sentence, is just so fantastic that I had to cite it. :lol:

All of the speculation on the outcome of the next global war is great, and the fundamental challenges of the now-obvious Franco-Anglo-Spanish alliance in surmounting the power of Germany, Russia, and the United States are obvious. However, nothing is ever particularly clear-cut in any event, and this war will most likely be much like the OTL First World War, in that it is politically (and superficially, I might add) indecisive. Though again, there is much room to play...

Kal'thzar said:
And apologies dachs.
Eh. It's happened before.
 
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