As usual, sorry to have taken so long over these. I've had a lot of RL stuff going on.
So that David Mason fellow will be teaching a class called "Religion is Theater" next semester. I think
this page gets at the gist of his perspective.
Is this a common way of thinking about religion? What sorts of flaws or strengths do you see to this approach? What exactly is the role theory of religious experience, and what other theories are there?
This is rather outside my expertise, being really psychology of religion / religious studies. The basic idea of "role theory", as I understand it, is that readers of religious texts (or participants in religious liturgies) identify with the roles of characters in the piece, and this is what gives it psychological power. This then allows religious believers to enact these roles imaginatively in their everyday life, transforming everyday experience into a religious experience. E.g. perhaps in church I hear a Gospel reading about Jesus helping a leper, and I find myself identifying with the role of the leper in the story, and in my everyday life I find myself re-thinking this identification and feeling myself to be more reliant on Jesus' aid.
As a psychological account of how religion functions it sounds pretty plausible to me - and I think there's a clear similarity between liturgy and theatre which is worth exploring - but I don't know anything about the psychology of theatre, so I can't really judge!
You might be correct, but an atemporal being would be unnoticeable to temporal beings. However, countless records claim that God is very noticeable. If that is true, then the premiss is wrong, i.e. God is not atemporal.
Why must an atemporal being necessarily be unnoticeable to temporal beings? I don't see a good reason for assuming that.
Even if it's true, bear in mind that many theologians have thought that all perceptions of God are indirect. E.g. Justin Martyr thought that all Old Testament theophanies, such as God appearing in the burning bush, are actually appearances of the Logos, not of the Father. It could also be the case that God "appears" to people by creating temporary physical objects which mediate his presence, rather than by actually inserting himself into the timeline. E.g. think of the pillar of fire and smoke which led the Israelites out of Egypt: a miraculous object, but still a physical object, which indicates God's presence in some sense but obviously isn't identical with him. So even if God is intrinsically imperceptible in a direct way, he could certainly be perceptible in an indirect way like this.
Going back to the original statement: the universe is everything known to exist (which would necessarily include God), we see that, surprisingly, it is not a contradiction, but in effect a paradox. The apparent contradiction comes from the common concept of time. So, assuming everything we know is also true, God is a timeless being affecting the temporal universe. That is the contradiction. (Not, as you state, my definition.)
I still think your definition is wrong. "The Universe" certainly doesn't mean "everything known to exist". If there is life on Europa, we don't know it. But if there is life on Europa, that life is part of the universe. A better definition would be "everything that exists", not everything that
is known to exist.
Even so, I think that such a definition wouldn't normally be taken to include God, even assuming he exists, because God is not traditionally thought to exist in the same way as other things. God, according to classical theism, isn't another entity that exists alongside chairs, horses, and galaxies. He is, rather, existence itself, that which makes the existence of other things possible in the first place. So he's not another part of the furniture of the universe, he's what the existence of the universe itself presupposes. Whether this makes any sense or not, I'm not sure, but it's how God is traditionally conceived.
1. I got a lot of heat in my "gay-friendly churches" thread from Evangelicals here when I mentioned my church allows gay members, saying any church that doesn't recognize homosexuality as a sin is 'not real Christians. Would you consider my church, the
Disciples of Christ to be 'real' Christians (you won't offend me if you say no). Either way, what would you say is the official cutoff point for someone to be a 'real' christian, or not?
I don't think there's a correct answer to that. There isn't some cosmic definition of "Christian" which is objectively correct. It's just a human term that we apply as we find useful, and different people have different definitions of it. Your church certainly sounds Christian to me; my general approach would be to say that if someone calls themselves a Christian they should probably know. Perhaps to a conservative evangelical someone who doesn't have a problem with homosexuality isn't a "proper" Christian, but that seems to me too narrow a definition. But such narrow definitions as this are part of the evangelical tradition - or, perhaps more accurately, part of the fundamentalist tradition, which is closely connected to it.
2. Should/do Christians get offended when popular culture such as books, movies, video games etc has characters or plotlines with vague Christian influence without anything direct? Or even direct. Should we be offended by movies such as 'Bruce Almighty'?
I wouldn't want to tell other people whether they should be offended or not at something that doesn't offend me. But I can't think of any reason why they should be offended by such things.
The Chronicles of Narnia never mention Jesus by name, I think, but Christians don't get offended by that!
3. I've seen arguments back and forth that either the Bible/christians defend the institution of slavery or bash it. Could you settle this both in the biblical case, and how it's relevant to the American south?
The Bible certainly assumes the existence of slavery uncritically. It would be anachronistic to see that as an explicit endorsement of slavery, though, given that it was just an accepted part of the ancient world. Later Christians were largely against slavery, and the Christianisation of Europe was the major factor in the ending of slavery there by the end of the first millennium. Obviously in early modern times, with the Atlantic slave trade, there were Christians on both sides of the debate right from the start, all appealing to the Bible and to other authorities. I'd say that this simply illustrates the futility of trying to argue from the Bible about topics that the biblical authors weren't really addressing.
4. let's say someone who has completely lost base with reality (hallucinating/under psychosis, and this isn't drug related, just something naturally wrong with them) commits a crime such as murder or whatever. Would they have sinned or would it be excused?
I think the most reasonable answer (at least the Augustinian one, which seems reasonable to me) would be that it depends on whether the person intended to do something that they knew to be wrong. If they genuinely didn't understand that the action was wrong, and if this lack of understanding itself was not their fault (e.g. they lack the capacity to understand), then it would seem unjust to hold them morally culpable even if the act was wrong in itself.
Why do you think the Problem of Evil was never taken seriously in antiquity or the Middle Ages, if it is as challenging as you believe? You'd think that a thousand years of philosophical thought would have at least recognized the difficulty of the problem.
I don't think it's really true that it wasn't taken seriously at all. You certainly find extensive treatments of it in Augustine, for example, as well as other ancient theologians such as Gregory of Nyssa, and it's a topic addressed by Aquinas and other medieval theologians and spiritual writers such as Julian of Norwich. But most people in antiquity, and everyone in the Middle Ages, thought that God's existence could be demonstrably proved beyond any reasonable doubt. So while there might be a pastoral problem of evil (i.e. how to explain to people why God had allowed something terrible to happen, which was what Gregory of Nyssa tried to answer), there just wasn't what you might call the modern evidential problem, i.e. the notion that the existence of evil gives us good reason to think that God doesn't exist. To the ancient and medieval mind, an argument like that would be a bit like Xeno's paradoxes that purport to show that motion is impossible: a nice puzzle, but since motion clearly is possible, not really worth taking seriously.
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Also, a quick announcement of possible interest to anyone following this thread: there's a new series of "Myth Busters" on the History Channel at the moment, and I'm featured as a talking head in two episodes (on the Veil of Veronica and the Chalice of Valencia). I've only watched the chalice one so far and they seem to have included a shot of me saying that the theory
could be true and left out the long explanation I gave of why it almost certainly isn't. Such is showbusiness!