William Lane Craig often uses an argument from morality to argue his case for God. For instance:
There doesn't seem to be a problem with this other than that Craig never offers an argument for why objective moral values exist. He just takes it as self-evident, and seems to concede this. Shouldn't you first have to offer a proper metaethical theory and then attempt to prove it valid before accepting (2)? The fact that his opponents don't bring this up at all seem to suggest that I'm just missing something. It seems incredibly obvious. Can you clear this up for me?
I think you're quite right that this is an assumption and it's a major flaw in the argument. I would guess that Craig (and others who use this argument, which can also be found in C.S. Lewis) think that denying the objectivity of morality is either obviously absurd or ultimately inconsistent. But you're right that this is something that has to be argued for.
However, I disagree with your claim that this is the only weak point in the argument; I think MagisterCultuum is right to reject the first premise too. In fact I would say it's a weaker premise. The claim that there are objective moral truths is at least something that's widely believed; the claim that there can't be objective moral truths without God is just an arbitrary assertion which also requires substantial work to support.
And, also, how have theologians (historically) regarded the importance or truth of the Old Testament?
Well - ever since Marcionism was rejected, Christianity has held that the Old Testament is essential, as are Christianity's Jewish roots. I'm not sure what else I can say!
I wouldn't even consider that the weakest part of his argument. Divine Command Theory does nothing to help establish Objective Moral Values. If actions are right or wrong merely because they adhere to or deviate from God's commands and/or will, then morality is a purely subjective affair where it just so happens that one (almighty) entity gets to impose his opinions over all others by force. If we take the other side of the Euthyphro Dilemma, then Objective Moral Values exist separate from God and we should follow his commands merely because they are presumably made with a fuller understanding of this morality than we have.
You are quite right, though be aware that Divine Command Theory is not the
only way of grounding moral truths in God. There are other ways too.
I'd say that the problem with Craig's premise (1) is that it assumes
two things. And
both of these things need to be demonstrated in order for the argument to work:
(a) Theism provides an adequate explanation of how there can be moral truths.
(b) Atheism cannot provide an adequate explanation of how there can be moral truths.
Even if we accept that Divine Command Theory (or a similar theory) works (which we shouldn't), that only gives us (a). But Craig needs (b) as well.
Just giving a bunch of links to someone else's argument without any commentary isn't a very effective (or polite) way of responding to a comment. And there are two problems in this particular case.
The first problem is that Flannagan's posts, to which you link, don't really rebut the Euthyphro problem. (They're only targeted at Peter Singer's formulation of the problem, for one thing.) At the heart of Singer's argument is the claim that, if Divine Command Theory were true, then it would follow that, if God were to command us to torture people, torture would be the right thing to do. (Which seems absurd.) Flannagan responds:
Matt Flannagan said:
In order for Singers objection to be sound there needs to be a logically-possible situation in which God does offer the command in question and the action he commands is wrong. Is such a scenario logically possible?
It is doubtful it is. God is perfectly and maximally good. Hence, the first premise is true only if a perfectly-good being would command an action such as the torture of children. This is unlikely. The claim that a perfectly-good being would command something morally abhorrent is on the face of it incoherent. Hence, it is unlikely that such a situation is possible.
But this response doesn't work. If you're defending DCT you can't claim that torture is "morally abhorrent" apart from God's commands. If God were to command it, it
wouldn't be morally abhorrent, because moral abhorrence depends entirely on God's commands. And if you're going to say that moral abhorrence is independent of God's commands, and that God makes his commands on the basis of what's morally abhorrent or not, then you've abandoned DCT altogether, because you're saying that what makes something wrong is really the fact that it's morally abhorrent.
So Flannagan's counter-argument fails. I think that Singer's objection to DCT - at least this part of his objection - is effective. If you believe in DCT then you must believe that there's nothing inherently bad about torture and nothing inherently good about self-giving love, and that it's just the whim of God that makes one bad and the other good, and he could have chosen otherwise.
Here is the second reason why these posts are inadequate as a defence of DCT. The Euthyphro problem is not the only problem with DCT, although it's the most famous. Here are some other problems which have nothing to do with Euthyphro:
(1) The knowledge problem. It's all very well to say that murder is wrong because God commands that we don't do it; but how can we know what God's commands are? Someone might say that they're revealed in the Bible (or similar). But people seem to be aware that murder is wrong even without that. As Christopher Hitchens put it, it's not like Moses came down from Mt Sinai and suddenly everyone realised that murder was a bad thing. So how do you explain this? Are we all somehow aware of God's commands?
(2) A more serious objection: the explanation problem. DCT says that murder is wrong because God commands us not to do it. But why do God's commands have this effect? Why does his commanding us not to murder make murder actually wrong? You can express this as the problem of deriving an
ought from an
is. It's commonly accepted that normative statements ("You should...") can't be derived from descriptive ones. This is because descriptive statements tell us how the world actually is, while normative ones tell us how it ought to be; and these two things are completely distinct. But DCT does attempt to derive an
ought from an
is. It asks to suppose that "God forbids murder" is true (a descriptive statement) and that, consequently, "You ought not to murder" is true (a normative statement). But how could this be? The only plausible answer is that there's a general normative state of affairs such as "You ought to obey God's commands" or, more generally, "You ought to obey the commands of your creator" or something like that. But what makes that true? God's commands? But that would obviously be circular. So it must be true independent of God's commands. But in that case there's at least one normative injunction - one moral rule - that doesn't depend on God. In which case DCT is inadequate as an explanation of morality. It might be able to explain why murder is wrong and charity is good, but it can't explain the ultimate principles of morality.
(3) The gratitude problem. (This is Leibniz's argument.) If what God does is by definition good, then anything God did would have been good. He could have chosen to damn us all or never create us in the first place, and not only would he have had the right to choose that, by choosing it he would have made it the morally superior thing to do. In which case there is no point thanking God for creating us or for saving us or for anything whatsoever. But religious people do in fact think it makes sense to praise God for his actions.
Yes, I've seen that before... I think it confuses Monophysitism with Eutycheanism, though!