Do we have free will? Is the world indeterministic?

[Leoreth]

The world is clearly indeterministic, at least on the micro level.

I also think that free will is at least partially an illusion.

The idea that free will does not exist is advanced by Satan. If he can convince you of that then he can convince you that you are not really responsible for your actions. Then, he has you.

If someone is dangerous to the community, he should be jailed no matter if it is biochemical processes inside his brain or his conscious decisions that make him dangerous.

 

[AlpsStranger]

The idea that free will does not exist is advanced by Satan. If he can convince you of that then he can convince you that you are not really responsible for your actions. Then, he has you.

1) It doesn't matter how bad a truth is. It's either true or it isn't.

2) Creeping exculpation is an overplayed card. Even if we were fully certain that free will was an illusion I don't think we'd legalize murder.

3) Certain Christian philosophers/theologians actually agree that free will is an illusion.

What's the main reason that people don't like the idea of determinism? They can't get a justice boner when they attend the local execution. Not a respectable motive, IMHO.

 

[Traitorfish]

The idea that free will does not exist is advanced by Satan. If he can convince you of that then he can convince you that you are not really responsible for your actions. Then, he has you.

Like when he took Christ to the mountain-top, showed him all the cities and kingdoms of the Earth, and spake: "Look, it doesn't really matter if you bow before me or not, because it's all just chemicals in your noggin. You're not making concious choices one way or the other, so who cares?"


You really need to start reading the crap that comes out of your keyboard, Cooper.

 

[Birdjaguar]

This is exactly the way I see it as well. My view was heavily influenced by a series of blog posts I came across a couple of years ago. I know I've linked to them on CFC before, but in case anyone is willing to take the 30 to 45 minutes necessary to go through them all, here they are:
http://blog.case.edu/singham/free_will/index

They are listed in reverse chronological order, so take care to read them in ascending titular order - from the bottom of the page to the top. A little clumsy, but I think the time spent on this will greatly add to the discussion here. And I especially encourage those of you who hold to a hard "Free Will is God's Gift To Man" position to read it very carefully and ask lots of questions

I read all the posts. It was pretty interesting. Thanks.

 

[lovett]

They have a way out of your argument - dunno if it's a good way. They would say that only the facts about the past have to be kept fixed. So they're not committed to the idea that every statement "X could have done Y but didn't" is contradictory.

The problem with this way out, is that it's not clear that it's well motivated. The fact that it avoids lovett's argument is not really a reason in its favor. And there is plenty of reason against it:

Chemists say that salt is soluble. That means, it could dissolve in water, even if there is no water around at the time. It doesn't matter whether the salt exists in a probabilistic environment, where there might be water at any moment, or in a deterministic environment that's just plain dry. The salt is still soluble either way.

Fair enough. Given this the incompatibilist who believes in determinism isn't forced to say that all talk of possibilities is contradictory. But he is forced to say that almost all talk of possibilities is false.

The incompatibilist who thinks free will doesn't exist must keep facts about the past are fixed and keep the laws of nature fixed and say that those laws are 'deterministic'. The conjunction of these conditions entails that all facts about the present and future are fixed. Because the incompatibilists thinks that 'X could Y' is true if and only if X does Y in a world in which the conditions which they want kept fixed are kept fixed no 'could' statement which isn't realized in the actual world is true. This is because the world in which that conjunction holds -all facts about the past are those of the actual world and all the laws are those of actual world and those laws are deterministic- is just the actual world. So if such a statement isn't true in the actual world it isn't true at all. This is just to say, no 'could' statement which refers to something that doesn't actually happen is true.

But this is only a little less absurd than the position that all talk of possibilities is incoherent. The incompatibilist, on this account, says such talk is coherent but only true when those possibilities are actually realized, otherwise false. Collapsing possibility to actuality seems to be hardly more defensible than saying no such thing as a possibility exists. Of course, your water example is one instance of the absurd results this position brings us.

 

[Souron]

Fair enough. Given this the incompatibilist who believes in determinism isn't forced to say that all talk of possibilities is contradictory. But he is forced to say that almost all talk of possibilities is false.

The incompatibilist who thinks free will doesn't exist must keep facts about the past are fixed and keep the laws of nature fixed and say that those laws are 'deterministic'. The conjunction of these conditions entails that all facts about the present and future are fixed. Because the incompatibilists thinks that 'X could Y' is true if and only if X does Y in a world in which the conditions which they want kept fixed are kept fixed no 'could' statement which isn't realized in the actual world is true. This is because the world in which that conjunction holds -all facts about the past are those of the actual world and all the laws are those of actual world and those laws are deterministic- is just the actual world. So if such a statement isn't true in the actual world it isn't true at all. This is just to say, no 'could' statement which refers to something that doesn't actually happen is true.

But this is only a little less absurd than the position that all talk of possibilities is incoherent. The incompatibilist, on this account, says such talk is coherent but only true when those possibilities are actually realized, otherwise false. Collapsing possibility to actuality seems to be hardly more defensible than saying no such thing as a possibility exists. Of course, your water example is one instance of the absurd results this position brings us.

The claim that only what actually happens is possible is in fact the tenant of determinism that leads incompatibalists to claim that free will does not exist. Anyone who understands determinism must admit that this is on some level true; any deterministic process with fixed state has only one possible future.

But I agree that in the context of free will this is not an appropriate definition of "could."

So an incompatibalists claim that any choice that is inevitable is not a free choice, and compatibalist claim that a choice can be free as long as it is not forced upon you, even if the choice is a no-brainer.

 

[uppi]

This. The basic physics may be deterministic (see: multiple worlds interpretation of QM; alternately see: David Bohm's theory) or indeterministic (see: Copenhagen QM).

The multiple worlds interpretation is also an effectively indeterministic theory and Bohmian mechanics falls short of describing quantum mechanics.

So one can be pretty confident that the world is actually indeterminisic at its core. Following that, there is no reason to assume that a complex nonlinear system like the human brain is fully deterministic

 

[AlpsStranger]

I'm not convinced that 'free will' would have any meaning even if the universe turns out to be non-deterministic. Your decisions would still stem from your environment, thoughts, and other preconditions beyond your control.

In short, I suspect that 'free will' is actually a meaningless concept in all possible universes.

So the brain/mind might be non-deterministic and still not be free.

 

[primem0ver]

I just wanted you to point you all to another thread that has steered in a direction related to this discussion. It might provide some food for thought regarding this issue.

The above mentioned thread has taken several twists and turns so I am providing an index for you to find the level of relevance that suites you.

1. The thread starts with a "discussion on "hollow earth" theory that is relevant to the original on topic Civ4 Caveman2Cosmos thread. Most of this consists of whether or not their is enough evidence to support hollow earth vs plate tectonics.
2. The thread then takes a turn toward science versus faith starting here.
3. The above turn leads to a discussion of the nature of proof (and science's use of falsification rather than positive proof).
4. Subjectivity versus objectivity enters the discussion here.
5. Here is where the (im)possibility of a thinking machine (i.e. a sentient computer) is proposed.
6. Free will becomes part of the discussion at the end of this post (last section).
7. A participant then suggests that science itself is a religion (a perspective that I agree with on a certain level).
8. An explanation of why a thinking machine is impossible can be found here.
9. And finally... the point in the discussion where the idea of freewill is argued to be an implicit feature of reality.

To sum up my two cents worth (and the points I make in the discussion indexed above): Your future is not determined. You do have free will. While the body/physical world (the objective part of reality) does present us with a deterministic side, we can, if we choose to, overcome that deterministic nature because of our sentience (intellect, capacity to think, understand etc...). Ultimately sentience is the yang to the the physical world's yin. While physical laws lead to a state of entropy (deterministic disorder), I believe that intelligence is just as fundamental to reality as matter. Intelligence gives us the ability to reverse the state of entropy, to bring order to chaos. Life is the intersection of these two realities.

In terms of quantum mechanics, intelligence and will is what collapses quantum possibilities (or realities) into the single reality called history.

 

[AlpsStranger]

<snip>

EDIT: Realized what I wrote was crap.


Link to video.

 

[uppi]

II believe that intelligence is just as fundamental to reality as matter. Intelligence gives us the ability to reverse the state of entropy, to bring order to chaos.

No, that is a misunderstanding of entropy. Within a physical system, no amount of intelligence can decrease the total amount of entropy. At best it stays the same, otherwise it will only increase. This discussion came up early during the development of thermodynamics and centers around Maxwell's demon.

 

[Mise]

My beliefs:

1) Free will and determinism are compatible
2) Determinism actually makes free will more meaningful than indeterminism (so is preferable anyway)
3) Even if there is "no true free will", whatever will I currently have feels free and meaningful enough for me to not really worry about it

 

[Ayatollah So]

The claim that only what actually happens is possible is in fact the tenant of determinism that leads incompatibalists to claim that free will does not exist. Anyone who understands determinism must admit that this is on some level true

No, that's a conclusion you can pretty much only* reach by committing the modal scope fallacy. Suppose the laws of nature are L1, L2, etc., or collectively, L, and suppose they are deterministic. Let p be a true complete description of the universe at some past time and f be a true complete description of some future time. Then by the definition of determinism, the following are true:

Necessarily { if L and p, then f }.
L.
p.

Now what follows from these three statements? Only:

f.

What does not follow is "Necessarily, f" - that inference would be the modal scope fallacy. Note that "only f is possible" is simply a restatement of "Necessarily, f".

* "Pretty much only" by committing the modal scope fallacy, I say, because one can of course commit bizarre non sequiturs and reach any conclusion whatsoever.

The multiple worlds interpretation is also an effectively indeterministic theory

No, it just has the qualitative feel of one, since only our perceptions of one universe at a time are integrated. After a quantum experiment, this-universe-me is unaware of what that-universe-me sees. But that doesn't mean the outcome was uncertain.

and Bohmian mechanics falls short of describing quantum mechanics.

Not sure that's a fatal objection. Maybe the theory awaits more development, or some supplementation.

So one can be pretty confident that the world is actually indeterminisic at its core. Following that, there is no reason to assume that a complex nonlinear system like the human brain is fully deterministic

But there is good reason to assume that the human brain is largely deterministic. Otherwise we'd be dead. Evolution is a harsh mistress.

"Oh look, some berries! Hmm, everyone in my tribe who ate these berries, died. But they look so yummy! I know, I'll flip a shell. Clam side up, I eat them, ocean side up, I pass." That guy is not likely to have many descendants.

2) Determinism actually makes free will more meaningful than indeterminism (so is preferable anyway)

+1

 

[Kozmos]

My beliefs:

1) Free will and determinism are compatible
2) Determinism actually makes free will more meaningful than indeterminism (so is preferable anyway)
3) Even if there is "no true free will", whatever will I currently have feels free and meaningful enough for me to not really worry about it

So it is basically the illusion of free will is so complete it might as well be real?

 

[uppi]

No, it just has the qualitative feel of one, since only our perceptions of one universe at a time are integrated. After a quantum experiment, this-universe-me is unaware of what that-universe-me sees. But that doesn't mean the outcome was uncertain.

It is effectively indeterministic as even with full information I cannot predict in which universe "I" will end up in. If there was a lottery powered by a quantum random number generator and I have a one in a million chance to win, the MWI says that one of the million copies of me will win, but as the measurement destroys any connections between these copies this has no impact on all the other copies that lost. The resulting ensemble of universe is deterministic, but I do not (and cannot) care for the ensemble. It is one universe I am interested in, and I do not know beforehand which one that is.

Not sure that's a fatal objection. Maybe the theory awaits more development, or some supplementation.

It is fatal for the interpretation itself as that one is certainly wrong. It is non-relativistic, has classical fields and only considers single particles. This are all very fatal flaws for any interpretation of QM. It might show the way how to construct a deterministic non-local interpretation of QM that would have to be quite different from Bohmian mechanics. But at the moment it is suspected that it is the realism instead of the locality assumption that is wrong. And determinism implies realism.

But there is good reason to assume that the human brain is largely deterministic. Otherwise we'd be dead. Evolution is a harsh mistress.

"Oh look, some berries! Hmm, everyone in my tribe who ate these berries, died. But they look so yummy! I know, I'll flip a shell. Clam side up, I eat them, ocean side up, I pass." That guy is not likely to have many descendants.

Evolution does not rule out a probabilistic brain. In your example it would suffice if the probability of the brain deciding that eating those berries is a good idea was very small. Indeterminism does not mean that it is a 50:50 decision every time. The probabilities which way the decision is made would of course depend on the structure of the brain. And I would argue that a small probability of acting "irrationally" actually helps evolution as someone has to try new ideas.

 

[Souron]

No, that's a conclusion you can pretty much only* reach by committing the modal scope fallacy. Suppose the laws of nature are L1, L2, etc., or collectively, L, and suppose they are deterministic. Let p be a true complete description of the universe at some past time and f be a true complete description of some future time. Then by the definition of determinism, the following are true:

Necessarily { if L and p, then f }.
L.
p.

Now what follows from these three statements? Only:

f.

What does not follow is "Necessarily, f" - that inference would be the modal scope fallacy. Note that "only f is possible" is simply a restatement of "Necessarily, f".

* "Pretty much only" by committing the modal scope fallacy, I say, because one can of course commit bizarre non sequiturs and reach any conclusion whatsoever.

That's not quite the conclusion here. Saying f is inevitable does not equate to saying the any condition beginning with "Necessarily, f" is met.

Instead the claim being made is as you point out "if L and p, then f", but this is contrasted with "if L and p, then maybe f", which would be the case if there is an indeterministic element in L. This is a legitimate difference between indeterministic laws and deterministic ones.

In a deterministic world, for a given set of laws and inputs, there is exactly one possible state of the world at any specific time in the future. The future, whatever it will be, is inevitable if we hold the laws and present state fixed. Only if we don't know something about the state or the laws can we say that multiple things can happen. Or if we pretend we don't know, as what effectively happens when assessing individual freedom -- the internal mechanisms are treated as a black box even though human actions motivation are often easy to predict.

 

[Souron]

To sum up my two cents worth (and the points I make in the discussion indexed above): Your future is not determined. You do have free will. While the body/physical world (the objective part of reality) does present us with a deterministic side, we can, if we choose to, overcome that deterministic nature because of our sentience (intellect, capacity to think, understand etc...).

uppi already pointed out how the science of this post is bogus. Now I'll point out the problem with the philosophy.

You're asserting that the deterministic side of our mind is undesireable, and something to be fought. I would instead posit that it should be embraced. You are the sum of our experiences and genetics. That's what defines who you are. If some part of you goes against that identity, that's not intelligence. It's not really you. It's temporary insanity. Our actions, especially the important ones, where we value our freedom the most, are the direct product of our values, which are in turn the product of both our biological urges and upbringing. That's deterministic. When we behave in any other way, it doesn't feel like freedom, in fact it feels like we are not in control. A person who stutters does not feel pride from the randomness of their stutters, but instead identify with message they manage to speak in spite of the stutter.

 

[Core Imposter]

I actually like this thread. It tells me that when me and my friends nuke all the blue states that we aren't responsible for our actions. It was just fate.

If you are a bigot, its okay, you didn't freely choose to be one. Bernie Madoff was just doing what Bernie had to do. Cool.

Just let it roll. Friends raped your mamma? Fifty million murdered innocents? Just let it roll. Its all just part of the cosmic storm. Drill baby, drill.

 

[Core Imposter]

This thread is also proof that the act of educating people does not make them any smarter.

 

[Borachio]

Look, I don't get philosophy. I just don't.

Do I have free will? If when I go out of my front door, and I can go either right or left as I see fit, then I say yes I have free will. I make the choice.

Is the world indeterministic?

What?:

1) At the macro level do random things happen? Like white tennis balls suddenly turning blue, sprouting wings and flying away? No, generally speaking. So I conclude, very simply, the world is largely deterministic.

2) At the quantum level? Ask a quantum scientist to make sure, but my best guess is yes. But what do I know?