[RD] Ask a Theologian V

[Jehoshua]

Some philosophers and theologians in the past have thought this, most notably Descartes, who got into a bit of trouble for it. Peter Damian is often cited as defending a view like this too, though I think he didn't really do so. However, the vast majority of classical theists have rejected it, and held that necessary truths are true independent of God's will. That is, God does not have the power to determine what is (logically) possible; he has only the power to actualise anything that is (logically) possible. So, for example, the fact that 2+2=4 is necessarily true quite apart from anything God wills, and God could not change that fact if he wanted to (not that he would want to). Similarly, God cannot create a square circle, because such a thing is a contradiction in terms, and the fact that it's a contradiction in terms has nothing to do with God's will.

This is the standard Catholic view. Thus, in the ST I.25.3:

I didn't argue that necessary truths are dependant on Gods Will I argued firstly that if the universe is created by God than everything in it and all its laws were instituted into creation by him, and secondly that seeing as God is the first principle upon which all secondary principles are contingent that necessary truths are necessary because they are necessary to Gods divine nature. Ergo, it is impossible for God to do things that are contrary to his nature, and thus what is necessary is necessary ipso facto as a contingent result of the nature of God rather than because they pre-existed God. God wouldn't have the power to change them (although he would have instituted them into the universe he made, which was the main point I was trying to get across) but they would still be oriented around the divinity rather than being brute facts independent of him.

Thomas Aquinas puts it as such in your quote.

"The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being".

If God possesses within himself the perfection of all being, this would I think indicate that the necessary things are that inherently as a consequence of the reality of God, with impossibilities (such as the circle-square example) being impossible because they are anathema to the very nature of God himself as a contradiction of terms.

This is why, returning to the question of morality, I think that to say a moral principle (as an objective extrinsic reality as compared to a relative thing) cannot exist independently of God, since if something in a moral capacity is in fact a necessary truth, it is necessary because it is inherent to Gods nature and thus necessary. Now of course you go down later saying that possibilities aren't things, but I could come around and say that since God is eternal what is possible itself is not independent of God at all, since God has and always will exist, and what is possible proceeds from the absolute necessity of God. An alternative defence of my point would be that if God is the creator of everything (and if possibility is independent of the necessary existence of God), and noting that God had to institute the logical laws within the universe (by virtue of creating it) than independent necessary truths are intermediated via God, and thus in moral terms (if there is a necessary morality) we cannot say that those moral truths are independent from Him, only that they are necessary TO Him.

In saying all this by the way I don't think I am violating the thomist position (the standard theological one in Catholic circles) which is why I am answering it now. I will address the rest of it excluding of course the bit below which I think is related to this (presumably along with rest of the milieu's ) somewhat later when I have both the time and the rest (I'm writing this on no sleep thanks to insomnia) to ensure a modicum of coherency.

I find it very hard to understand what this would involve. I can understand the idea that charity is good because God commands it, on the understanding that he could have commanded something different. I think it's a mistaken idea, but I understand what's being said there. But what does it mean to say that the goodness of charity just emanates from God necessarily, and not as a consequence of his will? What makes it good? The fact that it reflects (in some way) the way that God is, or the way that God behaves? Well, perhaps that can make sense. But it seems to be inadequate to explain morality. Perhaps charity is good, in the sense of admirable or beautiful or desirable, because it reflects God's nature. But I could say, without any apparent inconsistency, that I think it's good in that sense, whilst denying that I'm under any moral obligation to perform it. Just as I can say that Michelangelo's David is a good sculpture without feeling under any moral obligation to carve something similar myself. Morality is about obligation and imperative - if an act is moral, it's not just something to admire, it's something that I ought to do. And if an act is immoral, it's not just something to abhor, it's something that I ought not to do. God is a perfectly admirable being, and we may say that what comes from God is as perfectly admirable as anything can be that isn't God; but you can't get moral imperatives from that.

(You can get moral imperatives from divine commands, for the reasons I gave above; so in that sense, divine command theory is superior to this sort of divine essence theory, at least as an explanation of morality. The problem with divine command theory is that, as I've said, you can't base the whole moral system on it; you can only say that some things are right or wrong because of God's commands, not that God's commands are what determine all rightness and wrongness.)

I'll accept that if this is your view, it's not relativist. But I think it buys that non-relativism at too high a price, namely the price of not really being an explanation of morality at all. It's more like an explanation of beauty. (And that's hardly surprising, given that it basically is the Neoplatonic explanation of beauty, recast into moral language.)

You're being needless reductive in your interpretation of what I said. What I'm saying that if there is a moral good that is necessary (which is what you asserted could exist and I was responding to that) that it would be so along the lines I explicated to some degree in the above section, rather than something that is not at all dependant on deity.

This being so, and a certain good being essential to God as a consequence of his nature, this moral good and imperative would then be instituted (commanded) by God by virtue of his creation (If a moral truth is necessary, than God being perfect obviously would command it). Summed up, It would be essential because Gods perfection and necessary nature demands it to be so, and be a moral obligation because he commanded men to do that moral good. The imperative would be of course along the teleological lines of sanctification and union with God, seeing as God made man in his image. Rightness and wrongness then are defined in terms of both divine perfection, the human persons progression towards perfection, which is what God intends, bringing us to the totality of "morality."

Rightness and Wrongness as a totality would presumably be determined in this conception as a product of God. God being the first, necessary and perfect principle would constitute that objective criterion by which rightness and wrongness are defined. With rightness being that which leads man closer to God and perfection, and wrongness that which leads man further away from God and perfection.

As I noted above, I will get to the rest and everyone elses later once I'm less sleep-deprived. Might as well not make this a total wall-post as well I suppose

 

[Takhisis]

timtofly, you seem to be implying that three-way relationships are to be allowed… what law, project, purpose, etc. are you basing this off?

 

[timtofly]

I was trying to imply that they are not practical. If one could make them equal, then I am sure God would have stated it ok to do in the Bible. It seems hard enough to get two humans to come together in perfect harmony and agreement.

@ God's Will:

If one is using the Bible to "create" God as the first mover and principle, and overlook the simple fact that the only rule he gave Adam was a free choice to not eat. It was not until Moses that God gave any moral or governmental rules whatsoever. There was a covenant with Noah, but no hard and fast moral code. Which it seems Noah would have violated straight away.

The marriage clause at the end of the second chapter was edited in by Moses. I see no reason that any human until Moses even saw marriage as a moral perogative. It was just something one did without any second thoughts. You can see how this was starting to erode with Abraham and Hagar. As humans communalized even the rite of producing a firstborn heir was becoming quite common, and extra-marriage "contracts" were being observed. But there was no reason that God was involved as an actual moral judgment on the issue. God's Will seems pretty simple. He wants people to be his representative on earth. He even gives one the power to do so. Humans though, are the master and sole responsible party on how they implement such measures.

 

[El_Machinae]

Plotinus, has anything interesting happened with the Problem with Evil recently? Like even in the last few decades? Some new interpretation that people seem to enjoy and propagate?

 

[Cutlass]

There are two distinct claims here, which you're running together.

First, there is the claim that (1) obeying God is good.

Second, there is the claim that (2) only obeying God is good, or, if you prefer, that obedience to God is the sole good-making characteristic of any act.

What you've said in the above quotation supports (1). And indeed (1) seems perfectly reasonable. If God exists and is the perfectly good creator, then yes, obeying him would be right. Not only that, but it would be right to obey him in matters that would otherwise be morally indifferent; e.g. if God commands everyone to drive on the left instead of the right, it would be right to do so simply because he has commanded it, even though there's no intrinsic moral rightness or wrongness about driving on one side of the road rather than the other.

But just because (1) is true (and, if God exists, it is true), that doesn't get you to (2). The reason for this is that (1) is plausible because it rests on a general moral principle, which is that the wishes of someone to whom you owe a great deal are to be respected. E.g. children should, other thing being equal, obey their parents; I should, other things being equal, obey the law. You said this yourself when you said that the universe is God's game and he gets to lay down the rules; if he is our creator then we owe him our obedience.

But if you're trying to defend not claim (1) but claim (2), you can't do this, because claim (2) states that all moral principles derive from God. But this would include the principle that it is right to obey the commands of someone to whom you owe a great deal (or in this case, your existence); and it's wrong to disobey them. Where does that principle come from? It can't be laid down by God, because then the argument would be circular: you'd be saying that all moral principles derive from God because of this other moral principle that derives from God. But if it's not laid down by God, then there is at least one moral principle that doesn't derive from God. And indeed some defenders of divine command theory have tried to argue this, but to my mind at least it doesn't make sense; if you're going to accept that there are any moral principles that are independent of God then I don't see why the rest of them can't be too.

As I see it, he's making 2 further claims, both of which are questionable as well. 3) That the Bible accurately represents God's will in the matter. and 4) that men correctly interpret the Bible.

 

[Jehoshua]

Not precisely Cutlass, my argument thus far is predicated only on the absolute principle of nature and natures God which needn't be God as he is perceived in Christianity. That said of course, the christian part is obviously implied very heavily by the fact I am christian. However seeing as I don't hold protestant notions of Sola Scriptura the implied assertion (although it isn't essential to my argument) would more accurately be summed up in a single point, namely, 3)That Catholicism is true.

 

[Agent327]

Not precisely Cutlass, my argument thus far is predicated only on the absolute principle of nature and natures God which needn't be God as he is perceived in Christianity. That said of course, the christian part is obviously implied very heavily by the fact I am christian. However seeing as I don't hold protestant notions of Sola Scriptura the implied assertion (although it isn't essential to my argument) would more accurately be summed up in a single point, namely, 3)That Catholicism is true.

Which would seem contradictory. Catholicism, whether one adheres to it or not, is a worldview, a mental position, an ideology, a religion, or all of those in one; within that context anything can be true. But ofcourse Catholicism itself is within a context - meaning it is as true as any other ism.

You aren't, strictly speaking, presenting a Catholic position with the exception of the statement that Catholicism is true. Which would always be the case for anyone adhering to a position: that it is true. It is not implied that that is truth in any absolute sense - and certainly not from the Catholic point of view, given that first sentence. (Some interpunction would be helpful with that first sentence.)

Personally I don't think "truth" is of much relevance to any ideology: it is disproved by any person not adhering to that truth - or to a different "truth". All "believers" will hold that their religion is true, but that is tautology: why would anyone adhere to a false truth? The only position possible can be that their "truth" is the only one. Unfortunately, that is the position of any believer of any "truth". If that points to anything, it is actually more likely that none of them are true, rather than that one is true, while all the others are false. Objectively, one can't take a position here - which is where faith comes in: it is true, because one believes it.

 

[Cutlass]

Not precisely Cutlass, my argument thus far is predicated only on the absolute principle of nature and natures God which needn't be God as he is perceived in Christianity. That said of course, the christian part is obviously implied very heavily by the fact I am christian. However seeing as I don't hold protestant notions of Sola Scriptura the implied assertion (although it isn't essential to my argument) would more accurately be summed up in a single point, namely, 3)That Catholicism is true.

If you are going by nature's god, then nature's god made sex something that people want to do other than with the intent of procreation. So nature's god certainly does not have any intent that sex be only about procreation.

 

[Midnight-Blue766]

All right, you seem to be mainly an expert on Christianity, but I would like feedback on this anyway.

I'm currently making a Civilization IV mod where Great Prophets found religions, so I want to have the founders of religions be included in the Great Prophet list, too (Jesus, Buddha, etc). The problem is, since Islam is a religion in Civilization IV, this would logically include Muhammad as well, but Islam seems to have a ban on depictions of Muhammad. Would the inclusion of Muhammad in the game be offensive to Muslims?

 

[timtofly]

If you are going by nature's god, then nature's god made sex something that people want to do other than with the intent of procreation. So nature's god certainly does not have any intent that sex be only about procreation.

How do we know what natures god intended? Is it pleasurable because nature intended it to be only pleasurable or that the process of procreation be pleasurable? If someone had issues with even touching or getting close to another human, how would they ever overcome that to reproduce. I don't see it's pleasure solely designed just to please oneself, and even more so, if it causes the brain to create a bond between the two people experiencing the act.

Even viewing marriage from an evolutionary standpoint, it was not done to bind two people together. It was a document that allowed fairness and equality in the relationship, so one partner did not take advantage over the other one. Even that has eroded over time, and we have evolved to pre-nuptial agreements.

 

[Agent327]

All right, you seem to be mainly an expert on Christianity, but I would like feedback on this anyway.

I'm currently making a Civilization IV mod where Great Prophets found religions, so I want to have the founders of religions be included in the Great Prophet list, too (Jesus, Buddha, etc). The problem is, since Islam is a religion in Civilization IV, this would logically include Muhammad as well, but Islam seems to have a ban on depictions of Muhammad. Would the inclusion of Muhammad in the game be offensive to Muslims?

Muhammad appears on Muslim art, usually with a veil or cloth hiding his face. The 'ban' you are referring applies to all animate life, not just Muhammad in particular - hence the many decorations in Muslim art including Qu'ran verses and other decorative patterns. (It is quite comparable to the 'ban' on carven images in Judaic and early Christian cultural tradition.)

For instance, the outrage among Muslims over Muhammad cartoons wasn't so much about the depiction of the Prophet itself, but the irreverence shown in them (Muhammad with bomb on head).

Perhaps this is helpful:

In line with the hadith prohibition against creating images of sentient living beings, which is particularly strictly observed with respect to God and Muhammad, Islamic religious art is focused on the word.[255][256] Muslims generally avoid depictions of Muhammad, and mosques are decorated with calligraphy and Quranic inscriptions or geometrical designs, not images or sculptures.[255][257] Today, the interdiction against images of Muhammad – designed to prevent worship of Muhammad, rather than God – is much more strictly observed in Sunni Islam (85%–90% of Muslims) than among Shias (10%–15%).[258] While both Sunnis and Shiites have created images of Muhammad in the past,[259] Islamic depictions of Muhammad are rare.[255] They have, until recently[when?], mostly been limited to the private and elite medium of the miniature, and since about 1500 most depictions show Muhammad with his face veiled, or symbolically represent him as a flame.[257][260]

 

[Takhisis]

If representations of human beings were totally banned, photography and films might be banned as well.

 

[Ajidica]

This is more of a historical question, but when did Christmas become a 'holiday' in the current sense? What encouraged people to turn it into a 'holiday'?

 

[Mouthwash]

1. Do you think that the anthropomorphism of religion, and the monotheistic religions in general, are a good criticism of them? I mean, yeah, obviously religious people would be more intelligent if they actively tried to avoid anthropomorphizing. But could it be argued that religion, theologically, is founded on it to some degree or the other?

2. What do you think of Daniel Dennett or his book Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon?

3. Which belief systems (paganism, Abrahamism, etc.) generate the most animosity towards each other?

4. Were there any pre-modern attempts to make the monotheistic religions compatible? You know, like pluralism?

5. Do you think that a God would actively provide evidence (not necessarily solid proof) to people on Earth of his existence? One of the strongest arguments against theism, in my opinion, is that everything is as it would be if God didn't exist.

6. Do you think that attitudes towards religion in philosophical circles is overly influenced by tradition? Analytics have a history of atheism, for instance.

Sorry for swamping you.

 

[_random_]

Are you familiar with Peter Rollins at all? I read his Reddit AMA and I really have no idea what to make of him.

 

[Kyriakos]

I have a question about a tiny chapter of the first book of the old testament. The story of the Tower of Babel...

In the text (hellenistic era translation; i cannot read the original of the old testament) the story seems to have a few key parts:

1) The people are all in one place, and speak one language (the language may be either literally a language, or a metaphor for other crucial cohesions).

2) The people there are aware that they may be dispersed around the world. They say "Let us build a tower so that we will make a name for ourselves before being dispersed/lest we be dispersed".

3) A god, speaking to itself in plural, sees the people, fears they may now achieve all they can imagine, and so urges its own self to confuse them by giving them many languages, and ultimately dispersing them.

4) The tower is left as it was. The people are dispersed as they feared.

Ok, now the question:

How can this story be seen as something positive? What kind of god would be happy to destroy the work the humans were up to, moreso when they are said to have known that they will be split and so they (maybe) only wanted to have a common monument so as to sometime lead them back to unity?

Thanks

 

[MagisterCultuum]

Well, God had explicitly ordered humanity to be fruitful and multiply and to spread out so they would fill the whole Earth.

(There is a Jewish tradition that God left the universe incomplete on purpose, so that humanity can have the honor of completing His work. The Garden of Eden was supposed to serve not as a permanent home for humanity, but as an example of good the whole world can be made through our actions. Even once humanity was ejected from the garden the species still had a duty to improve the rest of the world, which could never happen if we all stayed together in one spot.)

The tower and the city of Babel were meant to help keep all the people concentrated in one area, in one state, probably under one human despot. Even if the mortal rulers were all perfectly righteous (which seems less likely than most of them being corrupt brutal sociopaths) concentrating the whole species into one locality is very risky. A single earthquake, flood, or famine could have meant the extinction of the species. Such population density would also make it easy for deadly plagues to quickly spread. By dispersing the people rather than 'putting all your eggs in one basket' it is much more likely that the species can survive and thrive.

 

[Kyriakos]

Well, i think the above is painting a far too positive image of what happened, though. The humans in the story start frightened of being split, and the multi-person god does exactly that: splits them all.
They are not allowed to complete the sole work they deem would make them see their old unity through the ages when they are dispersed, and the god obviously is happy with this, cause it is it's own making :/

Furthermore how can you claim that god wanted to protect them from plagues etc, when supposedly those would be cancelled if that god wanted them to not exist? It has a lot of holes and is white-washing, in my view. I think the tale of Babel is a very distressing one, although i can accept (of course) that it does not have to primarily allude to a destroyed sense of prehistoric unity of humans.

 

[Mouthwash]

I actually saw the stories of Genesis as being prophecies, not a metaphor for any historical event, back when I was religious. Is that a plausible interpretation?

 

[Berzerker]

the purpose of the Tower was to reach the heavens, thats why God was mad - we weren't invited